記取歷史教訓,開創現代中華──讀《中國可以說不》有感

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1996 / 10月

文‧朱高正



「民族情感」一直是大陸與台灣之間的敏感話題,今年初中華民國總統選戰期間更成為中共一再提出、企圖使人民認同其對台武力恫嚇政策的藉口;現在,這本書的出版和所造成洛陽紙貴的現象,是否正是狹隘民族沙文主義發酵之故?我們當然並不認同該書的種種論點,但與其抨擊它、指責它,而使得它的感情支持者益發偏執危險,不如自其立論的根據和邏輯去瞭解它,較有助於所有關心該議題的人士理性對待、解構此一情緒。因此,我們在這期用了極大的篇幅,請精研東西交流史多年、能對大中國歷史情結之成因和變化深入剖析的新黨立委朱高正,以及去年以談中國民族意識一文獲學術論文首獎的英國東亞關係學者休斯博士,自不同的角度來探討該書。但在這兒特別提醒讀者,這二篇專文皆不代表本刊立場,而我們在為朱文撰寫圖說時,也以與主文完全不同的思考邏輯來呈現,讓讀者對民族主義這個脆弱而複雜的情緒能有更多層面的檢討。(編輯部)

《中國可以說不》一書自從今年五月出版以來,隨即在華人世界躍登為非文學類暢銷書的榜首,並在海內外引起廣泛的評論。一般多認為該書充斥情緒性的宣洩,說理不足,並有鼓吹民族沙文主義之嫌。其實,《中國可以說不》本來就不是一本學術論著,其成為暢銷書毋寧是一個值得注視的「社會文化現象」。該書作者毫不保留地陳述當代中國青年對「鴉片戰爭」以來帝國主義的憤慨與厭惡。因此,唯有從歷史和現實國際關係的角度切入,才能探視到這一「社會文化現象」的本質。

二次世界大戰結束後,東、西陣營即進入以意識形態為名,以恐怖軍備競賽為實的災難性對抗。美、蘇兩大超強主導的「冷戰」格局從此規範了整個國際政治的運作。當時,由於中國的共產黨革命多少帶有布爾什維克的戳記,解放後的中國大陸普遍被西方世界視為是蘇聯在亞洲的一個附庸國。一九五○年韓戰爆發,中共和蘇聯站在同一戰線與美國對抗,美國派出第七艦隊協防台灣,「中」美關係嚴重交惡。美國積極介入亞太地區的經貿活動和戰略部署,一九五四年由美國一手促成的「東南亞國家公約組織」(SEATO),其實已有從經濟、軍事和外交上圍堵中共的企圖。

意識型態的戰爭

進入六○年代,冷戰愈加嚴酷,軍備上的恐怖平衡危如懸絲,有一觸即發之勢。從一九六一年的「豬玀灣事件」、翌年的古巴「飛彈危機」,到一九六五年美軍全面介入越戰,在腥風血雨中,意識形態戰爭的荒謬和愚昧逐漸被凸顯出來。美國內部面臨前所未有的道德危機,反戰、反政府的風潮四起,到一九六八年達到顛峰。反觀中共自一九五八年與蘇聯爆發意識形態的嚴重分歧,因此開始有意擺脫蘇聯附庸國的地位,積極與亞、非新興國家結盟,並逐漸確立其為第三世界國家盟主的地位。一九六九年,中、蘇邊界爆發「珍寶島事件」的流血衝突,更使中、蘇關係降到冰點。做為中國「頭號敵人」的美國,從此被蘇聯所取代。而在美國內部也開始醞釀「聯中制俄」的構想。

自七○年代開始,美國內部主張打「中國牌」的,政界以季辛吉為代表,學界則以費正清最有份量。一九七一年,季辛吉秘訪北京,安排尼克森總統的訪華行程。費正清則在「紐約時報」上發表文章,指出「自一九五○年以來,華盛頓官方送到月球上去的人,比送到中國去的人還多。」嗣後又與六十位知識分子在「紐約時報」發表一篇公開信,呼籲支持中共進入國際組織,尤其是聯合國。同年,中共成為聯合國安理會常任理事國,「中」美之間也以「乒乓外交」開始正式往來。

從敵人到盟友?

但是,「中」美之間真正建立互信,是在一九七九年的「懲越戰爭」。中華人民共和國和美國於一九七九年元旦正式建交,一月底,甫於七八年十一屆三中全會,以改革開放路線取得政治主導地位的鄧小平訪問美國。二月十七日,中共隨即向越南出兵。顯而易見,中共對越南發動的這一場以懲罰為名的有限戰爭,事先曾徵得美國同意。相對地,美國在聯合國內部運作對越南實施嚴格禁運的決議,則是在中共支持下通過的。波布政權得以在聯合國繼續代表高棉,也是中美通力合作的結果。七九年四月,中共更進一步通知蘇聯廢止「中蘇友好同盟互助條約」。從此以後,在國際爭端上,中共和以美國為首的西方國家,形成全球性箝制蘇聯的態勢。

中共主動實施對內改革,對外開放,並與蘇聯漸行漸遠,事實上已預告以意識形態做為集團界限的冷戰格局將面臨瓦解。果然,在全球性箝制的戰略佈局下,蘇聯的軍費負擔愈益沈重,長達十年的阿富汗戰爭更使得莫斯科如同踩在蜂窩裡難以脫身,老化的官僚結構積重難返,國內經濟則急遽惡化。戈巴契夫雖於一九八六年拋出重建(perestroika)和自由開放(glasnost)的藥石,卻已緩不濟急。先是柏林圍牆垮下,東歐國家紛紛脫離蘇聯老大哥的陣營,華沙公約組織形同解體;一九九○年,兩德統一;九一年,蘇聯分崩離析。美國眼中的「邪惡帝國」自此從地球上消失得無影無蹤。

西起波羅的海,東至白令海峽,所有社會主義政權在骨牌效應下,幾乎紛紛應聲倒地。唯獨越南、中國和朝鮮不為所動。尤其是中國,早於一九七八年即開始實施經濟改革,實質上擋住了骨牌效應,成為冷戰結束後世界上最大的社會主義國家。

收回「中國牌」

蘇聯瓦解後,美國去除主要敵人,成為世界獨強。這時,「中國牌」成為多餘,「中」美關係隨而發生本質上的變化。事實上,二次大戰結束之後,中國始終奉行「反霸」的立場,刻意與亞、非、拉丁等曾受歐、美霸權蹂躪或殖民過的第三世界國家結盟。美國則因其本土在戰爭中從未受到戰火波及,戰後憑其雄厚的軍事力量和經濟資源,馴然成為非共國家的盟主。

若說美國在非共國家中曾遭遇挑戰,那麼其一是來自法國的戴高樂,其二則是來自中東的阿拉伯國家。戴高樂堅持「民族獨立」政策,退出北大西洋公約組織,不接受美國的軍事指揮,率先打破冷戰的僵局,主張與東歐國家和蘇聯「和解與合作」,並第一個承認中共,與中共建立外交關係……。至於中東的阿拉伯國家,石油一直是最重要的戰略物資,油田卻長期控制在英、美、法等西方強權的手裡。一九七三年,阿拉伯國家覺醒,運用「石油輸出國家組織」,掙脫以美國為首的西方國家對中東油田的操控,並以石油做為「武器」,用禁運、減產、調高油價等方式向西方國家施壓,終於爆發全球性的石油危機,美國百分之九十九的加油站大受影響,幾致歇業;英國為節約能源,也不得不一度將每星期工作天數減為三天。

但是,美國和法國之間畢竟有其歷史文化淵源,矛盾不致太過尖銳。尤其戰後歐洲殘破不堪,百業蕭條,美國以「馬歇爾計劃」協助歐洲重建經濟,直到一九五八年在比利時首府布魯塞爾盛大舉行國際博覽會,歐洲才呈現了復甦的跡象。一九六○年,「經濟合作發展組織」(OECD)成立;到後來的「七大工業國會議」(G-7),基本上都是以北美、歐洲、日本為主的「富國俱樂部」。因此,美國即使與其他先進工業國家有矛盾,其溝通管道仍是相當暢通的。

難以捉摸的中國

至於美國與中東阿拉伯國家之間的矛盾,由於回教文明和基督教文明在歷史上有其共同的淵源,在天文學、數學、曆法,回教國家對歐美曾有重大的影響,在小亞細亞出土的查士丁尼法典與希臘文版聖經對歐洲的法律與宗教生活影響至鉅。尤其經濟上歐美對中東產油國有能源上的依賴,中東則是歐美軍火業的最大市場。波斯灣戰爭甫結束,西方國家即向中東出售了五百億美元的軍火,其中美國佔了泰半。美國與中東阿拉伯國家即使有矛盾,但是其血緣較近的文化背景和經濟上的利害關係卻是永遠牽纏不清。

唯獨中國,有悠久的歷史傳統,獨特的文字,卻又與西方十分陌生。歐美國家始終覺得中國難以理解。即使中共實施改革開放後,與西方逐漸接軌,但是中共經濟的迅速發展,卻又很快脫離了西方的想像和掌握。加上中共現行的一套與美國資本主義截然不同的意識形態在主導國家和人民的生活。中共的壯大,使美國產生恐慌,雖然還不致威脅到她做為世界霸權的地位,但中共的發展模式卻是美國所難以掌控的。因此,在美國產生了「遏制中國」的聲音,在冷戰之後重新規劃的全球戰略中,也將中國設定為主要的假想敵。

幼稚的反遏制論

相對於美國的「遏制中國」論,《中國可以說不》的作者馬上提出「反遏制」的主張:「在美國所採取的每一個遏制中國的步驟中,我們都必須針鋒相對,絕不能有一點點姑息與寬容。」這是典型的機械式反射動作,缺乏泱泱大國應有的主體意識,充其量仍是受到美國一舉一動的制約。全書充滿著太多類似的反射式情緒,缺乏縝密的分析和有效的對策性思考,也缺乏作者所說的,做為一個大國應有的「優容」。因此,五位年輕作者對後冷戰時代的「情感及政治選擇」常常是「以戰止戰」、「以遏制反遏制」、「以貿易制裁反貿易制裁」……。如果國際政治的遊戲規則可以簡化為「以牙還牙」,那麼也不需要政治家的運籌帷幄,不需要外交家的折衝樽俎了。

做為一個文化大國,中國首先要確認自己在世界史上的地位。中國地處東亞,根據已出土的、散布在黃河中游的數以千計的部落遺跡,中華文化的歷史發皇已逾八千年。在長遠的歷史中蘊育出人文主義傳統和興亡繼絕的王道思想。中國最古老的經典《周易》,正是總結了上古社會實踐的智慧結晶,經過文王、周公、孔子的彙整和詮釋,形成往後樸實、敦厚、講人道的文化傳統,並不斷吸引周圍的族群融入華夏這個大家庭之中,如此的凝聚力可謂絕無僅有。

中國和西方的接觸除了東漢時甘英前往大秦(羅馬),中途折返之外,始於蒙古西征和傳奇人物馬可波羅的記述。成書於十四世紀初的《馬可波羅遊記》打開了歐洲人的視野,並使得中國傑出思想家的作品成為歐陸啟蒙運動的原動力。啟蒙運動初期的健將,如伏爾泰(Voltaire,1694-1778),萊布尼茨(Leibniz,1646-1716)和吳爾夫(Christian Wolff,1679-1754)都極力推崇中國文化,而啟蒙運動正是推動歐洲邁向近現代社會的知識分子自覺運動,這一運動扭轉了人類歷史發展的軌跡。

即使在經濟層面,一般人都以為「市場經濟」的概念最早是來自亞當.史密斯(Adam Smith,1723-1790)出版於一七七六年的《國富論》。事實上,早在一七五八年,法國「自然管理學派」的經濟學家魁奈(Francois Quesnay,1694-1774)即在《經濟表》一書中提出自由市場的觀念,他認為私有財產是絕對的,經濟個人主義和市場都是構成經濟生活的基礎;而市場法則是和自然法則一樣專斷的。魁奈更明確指出,他心目中理想的模式正是中國的政治經濟型態。魁奈和其弟子都承認其思想來自孔夫子的啟發。

啟蒙運動與孔子思想

歐洲啟蒙運動健將對中國的認識多來自耶穌會傳教士。耶穌會教士最早是十六世紀隨著葡萄牙、西班牙的商船東來;到十七世紀,荷蘭和英國商船也接踵而至。當時,中國與西方是對等、互惠的交流,傳教士帶來天文學和數學,也將中國的典籍、制度介紹到西方。可惜在一七二三年,由於耶穌會傳教士介入清室奪嫡之爭,雍正皇帝頒布了禁教諭,從此東西方的往來阻絕了一百年之久。

中國原本是自給自足,雄據東亞的文化古國,但是自從一八四○年,東西方再度接觸,卻伴隨著鴉片戰爭的慘酷烙印。西方首度以猙獰的掠奪者面目出現在中國人面前,赤裸裸、大辣辣地對中國傾銷毒品。自一八四二年簽下「南京條約」之後,中國被不平等條約捆縛得幾近窒息。在這個時候,整個西方只有馬克思為中國說話。他在「紐約論壇報」一再為中國仗義執言,譴責英、法等西方國家在中國的傲慢行徑和不當掠奪。馬克思對資本主義的批判會那麼快的在中國被接受,是有跡可循的。

一部中國現代史即西方列強蠶食鯨吞中國的歷史。中國在長期的內亂、外患中,艱苦地在帝國主義的陰影下摸索著現代化的途徑。在鴉片戰爭以前,中國對西方帝國主義的巧取豪奪尚無警覺,一六八九年康熙在位期間,居然在三度勝戰的情況下與俄國簽訂「尼布楚條約」,糊裡糊塗地讓俄國拿走貝加爾湖到外興安嶺的大片土地。鴉片戰爭才使中國看到帝國主義的真面目,而喪權、辱國、割地、賠款的條約卻已紛至沓來。清廷的積弱、顢頇,令人憤慨。逮民國肇建,英、俄、日三國居然還提出要脅,分別以西藏自治、外蒙自治和滿蒙五鐵路的路權做為承認中華民國政府的條件。

《中國可以說不》一再提及的西藏問題其實可做為清末民初帝國主義侵華的一個樣本。一八七七年,英國併吞印度,而西藏地處印度至中國的通商要道,英國乃處心積慮要控制西藏。以英國當時號稱「日不落帝國」的政經力量,印度都可以輕易吞下,染指西藏更是輕而易舉。一九○四年,英印政府進兵西藏,入拉薩城,屠殺藏胞一千五百餘人,達賴喇嘛出亡青海,藏人被迫簽下「英藏條約」十款。英國一方面在印度大力鎮壓印人的獨立運動;一方面則在西藏鼓動藏人脫離中國而獨立。英國勢力早已進入西藏,一旦西藏成為「中立國」,英國即可隨心所欲予以駕御。

西藏的悲歌

今日的西藏問題是帝國主義侵華所留下來的歷史餘緒。前不久台灣的國民大會開議期間所爭執的外蒙古問題,其實與西藏問題如出一轍。俄國利用清廷崩亡之際,於一九一一年鼓動外蒙獨立,並隨即於翌年壓迫「庫倫政府」簽下俄蒙協約,俄國藉此全面控制外蒙,排除中國勢力。後來由於國民政府抗議,幾經折衝,才於民國二年換約,聲明「俄國承認中國在外蒙之宗主權,中國承認外蒙古之自治權。」

英俄的侵華策略,都是「捨名取實」,名義上是爭取藏、蒙自治,實質是慫恿其獨立,而後使其成為自己的「保護國」。所不同的是,外蒙於一九二一年終被蘇聯軍隊佔領,而後於一九二四年正式宣告獨立;西藏則由於英國國力日衰而未覆蹈外蒙的途徑。

至於五位作者不斷以激情口吻論述的台灣問題,事實上也在日、美帝國主義支配下達一百年。台灣在甲午戰後於一八九五年的馬關條約中割讓給日本,一九四五年雖歸還中國,又由於國共內戰、韓戰爆發而成為美國霸權所「保護」。戰時,日本以台灣做為南進基地,向東南亞進行攻擊。戰後,台灣又成為麥克阿瑟所說的「不沈的航空母艦」,是西太平洋上防堵共黨勢力向外擴散的戰略前線。

其實,早在一九四二年,美國「戰後和平方案問題研究委員會」即主張戰後於太平洋上建立一條起自夏威夷,經中途島、關島、琉球以迄台灣的防禦線,因此,台灣應由國際共管。這裡所謂「國際共管」,其實即交由美國管理。一九五○年韓戰爆發,台灣地位更形重要,美國乃拋出「台灣地位未定論」的主張,以增加其在太平洋防務的游刃空間。杜魯門總統於一九五○年六月說:「台灣未來地位的決定,必須等到太平洋安全的恢復,與日本和平解決,或由聯合國考慮。」這裡,似乎又給予日本對台灣問題的發言權,使得日本對台灣仍存有不當幻想,因而不斷暗中支助親日的台灣獨立運動,以從中圖謀政經利益。一九五七年,日本外務省官員即明白表示:「我們可以等到下一代,台灣將成為另外一個國家,那時候,日本將自兩個中國獲得最大經濟利益和最小政治冒險。」

台灣的命運

美國亦暗中運作「一中一台」或「兩個中國」的政策,以確保台灣做為美國太平洋防線上的一顆棋子。曾任美國副國務卿和駐印大使的甘迺迪總統密友鮑爾斯(Chester Bowles)即在一九六○年四月的《外交季刊》上撰文道:「一個獨立的中台國(Independent Sino-Formosan Nation)可以顯出一個非共的近代化中國社會之特異……我們最好不惜費時使台灣在聯合國內獨立的地位得到承認……台灣成為獨立國家的前途,關係到自由亞洲的前途,尤其是與兩個地理上的政治安定力──印度與日本為然。」

中國分裂的狀態的確提供給美、日許多背後操縱和私相授受的機會。琉球群島原是日本利用清廷窮於應付內憂外患之際於一八七九年強行占領。二次大戰期間美軍占領琉球做為軍事基地,而後竟在一九七二年未照會中國的情況之下,逕自將琉球交給日本,日本並隨即將其劃為沖繩縣,併入日本領土。如今,有關釣魚台的爭執正是肇因於此。釣魚台距台灣東北角一百八十公里,位於東海大陸棚前緣,為台灣附屬島嶼。只因美國私自將琉球群島交予日本,又加上釣魚台海域被發現有豐富石油礦藏,日本乃提出對釣魚台的主權主張。帝國主義的乘虛而入、得寸進尺,於此又是明證。

美國在中國近鄰挑起的爭端不僅於此。為了遏制中共,使其疲於應付,美國先是默許中共的懲越戰爭,之後又積極改善與越南的關係,並挑起南沙群島的主權之爭,以擴大中、越之間的矛盾,拉攏東協(ASEAN),意圖在亞洲孤立中國。

「中國威脅論」

美國九十年代的亞太戰略是針對中國而設計的:在國際上散布「中國威脅論」,製造「遏制中國」的正當性;對中國則推動「和平演變」,意圖將社會主義國家轉化為資本主義國家。一九九一年七月,美國副國務卿鄒立克(R.B. Zoellick)在東協擴大外長會議中,具體說明美國未來在亞太地區的戰略部署:以北、中、南三線撐起防衛架構。其中,「北線」指美國與南韓既有的聯盟;「中線」指美、日雙邊關係和「美日安保條約」;「南線」是美國與東協的良好關係和美國對菲律賓、泰國與澳洲的安全承諾。明眼人都看得出來,此三線所形成的「新月形戰略線」所要圍堵的正是中國。同年年底,國務卿貝克(James Baker)在《外交事務》發表〈美國在亞洲──浮現中的太平洋區域架構〉專文,更指出美國的亞太戰略是:以美國為中心所輻射出去,從日本──南韓──菲律賓──泰國──澳洲構成一弧形「扇狀圖」。這一「扇形戰略」也明顯指向中國。貝克稱其扇沿為「新圍堵線」。

至於美國的「和平演變」論,可以其前總統布希的談話為代表。一九九一年底,布希訪問亞洲,行前在紐約發表演講,指出「包括北韓、實施社會主義專制的緬甸,以及中國,這些政權頑抗政治多元化的世界潮流,而且恣意散播危險的武器」。關於中國部分,布希特別強調美國的政策就是:保持接觸以使之發生良性的變化,即「和平演變」。柯林頓總統比布希更強調「經濟安全」的重大意義,他將催化中共政權「和平演變」的戰略分為三個層面:一、防止核武擴散,管制傳統武器,限制中共軍力擴張;二、藉由經濟組織如GATT-WTO(關稅貿易總協定──世界貿易組織)的條約和規章,以及雙邊最惠國待遇以及「三○一條款」等,迫使中共進行經貿體制的改革;三、在政治民主化與人權外交的前提下,刻意凸顯台灣地位以及西藏問題的殊異性,讓中共因內部政治壓力及地方特質發展的差異而「分權化」,弱化其做為單一國家的整體力量。

顛覆北京政權

美國所提出的「和平演變」,說白一點,即是要顛覆中共政權,並按照美國所想望的方向來重構其政府形式。其實,中共自一九七八年改革開放以來,即無時無刻不在調整其對內、對外政策,一方面彌補過去封閉的極左路線所造成的損害;一方面適應國際上新的政經局勢,努力與國際社會全面接軌,並希望透過有計劃的政策推行,提升人民的生活品質,解放國民的生產力和創造力。中國並不反對「變」,但是以中國那麼遼闊的國土和那麼龐大的人口壓力,最怕的是「變」得亂了套,「變」得失去章法。美國以自己設定的標準,要求中國遵循特定的「演變」方向,而完全無視於中共政權的主觀意願,這若不是霸權心態作祟,就是忽略了文明國家在國際外交上對他國應有的尊重和禮儀。

前面提到的「和平演變」的三個層面其實是相當可疑的。首先,美國始終拒絕簽署絕不首先使用核武的承諾,擁有的核子彈頭又遠遠超過所有核武國家,又有何資格要求限制中共的核子試爆?美國要求中國接受國際組織的規章和條約的約束,可是又百般阻撓中共爭取西元兩千年的奧運主辦權,始終不允許給予中共GATT以迄WTO的會員資格,動不動拋出停止最惠國待遇、祭出三○一條款的威脅,這又如何讓中共在國際社會上與其他國家平等往來呢?

人權工具化

美國時常提出人權問題做為談判的交換條件,其實是將人權工具化、形式化。《中國可以說不》所提到的吳弘達事件、孤兒院事件,都顯然有CIA 或主流媒體操作的影子。美國的人權主張,有太多的時候是「選擇性執法」。俄國總統葉爾辛炮轟國會、鎮壓車臣,死傷人數千百倍於──已成為美國人權圖騰的──天安門事件。可是美國毫不保留地支持強人葉爾辛,認為那是「不得已的選擇」,因為以俄國當前的狀態,一旦實施民主,就會變成無政府狀態。美國對昔日勁敵俄國的寬容,常令飽受指摘的中國感到驚訝。

一九九五年,五角大廈做過兩次中、美軍事交鋒的模擬演習。結論是:按照中國目前軍隊現代化和經濟成長的速度,到二○一○年,若是美國的海、空軍在太平洋西岸與中國遭遇,則美軍敗北。中國解放軍也做過同樣的模擬,獲得一樣的結論。

關於這樣的結果,美國內部有兩種看法。一種是認為:中國成為下一世紀的世界強權,已是無可避免的趨勢。因此,美國應及早理性地承認並接受這一事實,在重大的國際問題上,應主動與中國諮商,兩國的合作將可以有效維持世界的和平。另一種看法卻是:美國既然在十五年後即無法在軍事上屈服中國,那麼就應該把握時間,在十五年內儘量找些冠冕堂皇的理由來箝制中國,遏阻中國對外擴張,甚至找機會對中國開戰,以防患中國成為另一強權。

偏執的帝國主義 VS. 狂熱的民族主義

後者是典型的、妄圖以主觀意志改變客觀現實的帝國主義者的想法。前者代表的是美國內部理性的力量。我們應該透過有效的溝通,明確告知美國人民,中國有愛好和平以及與人為善的文化傳統,俾壯大這股理性的親華力量。反之,若任令《中國可以說不》的憤怒情緒和報復心理蔓延,則狂妄的美國帝國主義者將更有理由搧風點火,製造事端。

狂熱的民族主義常是歷史悲劇的來源。我們相信,一個有悠久歷史文化的中國,必有其理性的力量,可避免從一個極端走向另一個極端,不會徒然地在媚外和仇外的情結之間搖擺不定。

日本右翼政客石原慎太郎於一九九○年與新力公司老板盛田昭夫合著《日本可以說不》。但是石原慎太郎始終認為日本當年對亞洲鄰國的侵略戰爭是為了使亞洲擺脫白種人的統治,受日本侵略的鄰國應對自己歷史上的失敗負責,日本沒有任何道義上的責任。對於日本的侵華戰爭,他稱之為「對支那進行大規模的進出」。《日本可以說不》暴露了日本帝國主義的本質和缺乏反思能力的悲哀。最近,日本首相橋本龍太郎又到擺置二次大戰戰犯的靖國神社憑弔,正可以看出,日本這股狂熱民族沙文主義的逆流仍然蠢蠢欲動。

中國人的集體憤怒

《中國可以說不》所表現出來的對美、日帝國主義的憤慨,我們可以理解。中國自鴉片戰爭以來,飽受強權的欺壓和凌辱。長期的壓抑需要宣洩的管道,《中國可以說不》正是某種形式的宣洩,這也是它得以暢銷的原因。中國人的集體憤怒,美、日要負擔大部分的責任。但是,憤怒是一時的,和平與希望才是長遠的;在憤怒之後,我們對於中國的未來前途仍要冷靜面對。

從發展心理學的角度來看,幼兒約在二歲半至三歲半之間開始會不自覺地說「不」。這個階段,自我意識甫形成,常會很情緒化地說「不」,故意唱反調,以證明自己的存在。父母親若是只知權威地加以壓制,而不知適時地疏導,子女的自我意識無以發展,會轉為下意識或潛意識的反抗。同樣地,中國過去飽受列強巧取豪奪,經濟上任人擺佈。如今,在積極實施改革開放之後,經濟上總算獲得初步成就,於是自我意識形成,也不知不覺進入說「不」的階段了。此時若是不妥為處理,善加疏導,對於往後整個國家社會的心理發展恐將留下不良的影響。

從「不」到「要」

其實,不知道說「不」,就不曉得說「要」,說「不」正是說「要」的前提。而一旦說「要」,也就牽涉到「自由意志」的問題。英文的Will,在動詞是「要」,在名詞則為「意志」。意志之所以是自由的,乃是因為它能依循普遍的律則來「要」,而非如同禽獸一般,做漫無限制的「要」。正因為人的意志會「要」得合於思維的律則,會「要」得不自相矛盾,所以各個人的意志也才能「要」得彼此不相矛盾、「要」得彼此和諧並存。也就是從個人的私欲(I will)擴展到整個社會的普遍意志(general will)。合理的國家秩序也就是這樣建立起來的。同樣地,合理的國際社會秩序又何嘗不然?每一個國家就像個人一樣,也都可以「要」得與國際社會的普遍意志並存不悖,中國可以說「不」,正是中國可以說「要」的前提。

從一八四○年鴉片戰爭以來,中國出現過洋務運動、師夷長技以制夷、中體西用、全盤西化等等各種主張。推翻帝制後,國內又出現了幾股各行其是的力量:共產黨以蘇聯為師,蔣介石身邊有人效法納粹,胡適、蔣廷黻等人則唯英美是尚。在紛歧的、以自我經驗為中心的現代化提法中,始終未出現足以凝聚國人共識的現代化道路。所幸,自從一九七八年確定改革開放政策,一九九二年又以建立「社會主義市場經濟體制」為改革焦點,中國人終於摸索出一條現代化的道路。

「鴉片戰爭」是中國現代史的原點。一百五十年來,外有帝國主義的侵凌,內有太平天國、捻亂、回變、義和團、國民革命、軍閥割據、國共內戰、十年文革等鉅變。其間稱得上是太平時期的只有二○年代的「黃金十年」,一九四九到五七年的解放初期,以及一九七八年以來的改革開放。尤其一九七八年到現在,是歷來持續最久的和平發展期,百姓生活明顯改善,綜合國力大幅提升。這十八年來未曾間斷的改革開放,在中國歷史上,可以說是自商鞅變法以來最成功的和平改革範例。

重建文化的主體意識

改革開放的成就,燃起了中國人對未來的希望,也重建了中國因長期內憂外患而幾乎喪失殆盡的民族自信心。於是,傳統文化的價值終於有機會重新受到重視。綜觀人類歷史,全世界沒有一個國家可以徹底否定自己的文化傳統,而能完成現代化的。筆者認為,在此民族自信心甦醒之際,也正是我們重建「文化主體意識」的時候。文化主體意識的重建,不僅決定了中國大陸經濟改革的成敗,更決定了中國全方位現代化的目標能否達成。要重建文化主體意識,首先要喚醒全民族有意識地接受並承認八千年的傳統文化為我們所固有、所獨有,並進而認識傳統、批判傳統、超越傳統,從而創新傳統。面對現代化的課題,許多前所未有的問題,都將逐一浮現。唯其為一個具有文化主體意識的民族,才能在面臨問題時,知道如何衡量客觀條件和主觀能力,審時度勢,靈活應變,而後將問題加以解決。

《中國可以說不》坦誠地說出中國當代年輕人的想法,也具體地表達了中國追求民族尊嚴的決心。部分評論對其外露的民族主義情緒加以撻伐,這是反應過度。放眼當今世局,日本有「再亞洲化」的呼聲,阿拉伯世界有「再回教化」的浪潮,印度則有「印度教復興運動」,即使在歐洲,當區域聯盟不斷擴張之際,「民族認同」(法文稱為identite nationale)的問題也成為輿論爭執的焦點,可見「文化主體意識」的再興是世界性潮流,《中國可以說不》只是符合這股潮流而己。

鉅變不如微調

但是,內省式的重建文化主體意識,總比宣洩式的狂熱來得久遠,而且深刻。中國歷史的悲劇之一,就是有太多的「鉅變」,常常由一個極端走向另一個極端。如今,中國確定以「社會主義巿場經濟」做為改革開放的張本,這是好不容易才找到的一條──能有效調和資本主義與社會主義的──現代化道路。與其週期性的「鉅變」,不如與時推移的「微調」。「微調」是穩紮穩打,隨時適變、應變,不是固守成規,也不是急功冒進。如同鄧小平所說的,「摸著石頭過河」,「以實踐做為檢驗真理的唯一標準」。《孟子.盡心篇》有謂:「子莫執中,執中為近之;執中無權,猶執一也。所惡執一者,為其賊道也,舉一而廢百也。」這也是告訴我們權衡時勢,隨機應變的重要。畢竟,為政之道,最怕的就是「執中無權」、「舉一而廢百」了!

《中國可以說不》激亢的反美情緒是對美國的一個警訊。美國可能是一個需要敵人的國家,但是它刻意設定中國為首要假想敵,對中、美雙方可能都將造成無可彌補的傷害。 《中國可以說不》也可以視為是對台灣的一個警訊。作者在書中將台灣問題形容為「中國的私處」,可謂敏感至極。在中共內部高昂的民族主義抬頭之際,台獨訴求更將刺激其情緒的暴漲。台灣與大陸之間,合則兩利,執意對抗則將釀成兩岸間的歷史悲劇。大陸方面應體認到,台獨問題的產生有著複雜的經濟、政治、社會、歷史、文化背景,與其一味地予以恐嚇、打壓,不如寄予同情的理解,並以最大的耐心和智慧來化解。同時,大陸也不應迴避政治改革的問題;若大陸能推行政改成功,不僅可確保經改的成果,對化解台獨問題也將會有莫大的助益。

 至於台灣方面,對於美、日在亞太地區的擴張,應有高度的警覺,切莫援引外力來介入台海問題。身為中華民族的後代,台灣要極力避免成為帝國主義者侵凌中華的馬前卒。

和平的「政改」與「經變」

 其實,大陸自一九七八年開始的經濟改革與台灣自一九八六年以來的政治改革,都是中國現代史上最具革命性的現代化成果。台灣的政改打破了中國人不適合實行民主的迷思,而大陸的改革開放,尤其是一九九二年以來所建立的「社會主義市場經濟體制」更是兼顧到有效解放國民生產力和社會財富公平分配的問題,也是變法成功的一個典範。這些輝煌的成就,足令全體中國人同感驕傲,這也是中國走出苦難與屈辱的契機。在後冷戰時期的國際政治經濟環境中,我們肩負著跨世紀的使命,要讓中國擺脫一百五十年來的苦難與屈辱,要開創現代中華的國家目標。而兩岸的彼此尊重、培養良性互動、擴大互信基礎,則是完成此跨世紀使命的前提。

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Thoughts on Reading --The China That Can Say No

Ju Gau-jeng /tr. by John Murphy


"Nationalism" has long been a sensitive subject between the mainland and Taiwan. Early this year during the ROC presidential elections, the mainland again and again used national identity as justification for its military intimidation of Taiwan. Now, might the publication and best-seller status of The China That Can Say No push Chinese down the slippery slope of nationalism? We of course do not agree with many of this book's arguments. But rather than simply lambaste it, and thus push those who sympathize with its views to even more dangerous positions, wouldn't it be better to try to come to a logical, theoretical understanding of it and thus help the people who care about this issue to deal with and quell emotional responses to it? Therefore, in this issue we have alotted much space to publishing two reviews of this book: one by Ju Gaujeng, a New Party legislator and long-time observer of East-West relations, who lays bare the causes and history of Chinese nationalism, and one by Chris Hughes, a British Far Eastern affairs scholar who wrote an award-winning dissertation last year on Chinese nationalism. Note that the captions were written by Sinorama's editors. May these different perspectives provide some food for thought on this emotional issue. (Editorial Dept.)

Since its publication in May of this year, The China That Can Say No has become a non-fiction bestseller in the Chinese language market, and has generated controversy at home and abroad. Many feel that the book is an emotional outburst, with inadequate reasoning, and suspect the book of inflaming nationalist chauvinism.

In fact, The China That Can Say No was never meant to be an academic work, and it is better that we examine its popularity as a noteworthy "socio-cultural phenomenon." The authors unreservedly express the anger and frustration of Chinese youth at the imperialism suffered by China since the Opium War in the mid-19th century. Thus, we can only understand the nature of this "socio-cultural phenomenon" by looking at history and international relations.

After WWII, East and West divided into a disastrous confrontation that was nominally based on ideology but in fact was enforced by a balance of terror. The "Cold War" between the USA and USSR set the norms for the playing out of international politics. At that time, the Chinese Revolution had Bolshevik overtones, and the West mainly saw China as a Soviet dependency in Asia. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, pitting the USSR and PRC on one side and the US on the other, the US dispatched the Seventh Fleet to assist in the defense of Taiwan, and US-PRC relations severely deteriorated. The US actively inserted itself in Asian political and economic affairs, and began a strategic buildup. The US virtually single-handedly created SEATO (the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization) in 1954, and was clearly aiming to "contain" Communist China militarily, economically, and diplomatically.

Ideological war

In the 1960s, the Cold War grew frostier, and it seemed that a single spark could upset the balance of terror and start a war. With the Bay of Pigs in 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis a year later, and the US intervention in Vietnam in 1965, the danger and blind foolishness of the ideological war became increasingly obvious. The US faced an internal crisis, marked by anti-war and anti-government movements, which peaked in 1968.

Looking at the PRC meanwhile, after its ideological split with the USSR in 1958, it deliberately rejected the status of Soviet dependency and allied itself with newly independent nations of Asia and Africa, trying to establish itself as a leader of the Third World. After the Zhenbao Island incident of 1969, when Soviet and PRC forces had a bloody clash, relations between the two reached a low point. At this time the USSR supplanted the USA as the PRC's "leading enemy." At the same time, in the US, the idea spread to "ally with the PRC to contain the USSR."

In the 1970s, the leading advocate in government of "playing the China card" was Henry Kissinger; in academia the most prestigious figure was John King Fairbank. In 1971, Kissinger secretly visited Beijing, arranging for Nixon's later visit. In an editorial in the New York Times, Fairbank noted that since 1950 the American government had sent more people to the moon than to mainland China. Later he and 60 other intellectuals, in an open letter in the New York Times, called for supporting PRC entry into multinational bodies, especially the UN. The PRC became a member of the UN Security Council, and the US and PRC began "ping-pong diplomacy."

From enemy to ally

However, the relationship between the US and PRC did not really firm up until 1979, in a series of events culminating in the "punitive war" against Vietnam. The two countries exchanged formal diplomatic recognition on January 1, and later that month Deng Xiaoping (who had just recently won leadership on a reform program at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in 1978) visited the States. On February 17, the PRC sent troops into Vietnam. It seems clear that China received the endorsement of the US before launching their limited punitive war on Vietnam. Meanwhile, a US-led boycott of Vietnam undertaken through the UN was approved with strong Chinese support. Another product of US-PRC cooperation was that the Pol Pot regime continued to hold Kampuchea's seat in the UN. In April of 1979, the PRC notified the USSR that it was terminating the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Support." The PRC and the US-led West were engaged in global containment of the USSR.

The PRC's internal reforms, opening to the outside world, and estrangement from the USSR foretold the gradual dissolution of the Cold War division of the world along ideological fault lines. Completely strategically contained, facing mounting defense costs, and embroiled in a ten-year long war in Afghanistan, Moscow was caught in a hornet's nest. The bureaucratic system had become stagnant, and the domestic economy was in decline. Though Gorbachev launched perestroika and glasnost in 1986, it was too little, too late. First the Berlin Wall came down, then Eastern European countries one by one left the shadow of "big brother" Russia, and the Warsaw Pact collapsed. In 1990 Germany was reunified, and in 1991 the USSR itself dissolved. The state Americans had seen as the "Evil Empire" had disappeared from the world map.

From the Baltic to the Bering Strait, socialist regimes fell one after another in a domino effect. Only Vietnam, North Korea, and the PRC held out. It was the PRC in particular, which had begun economic reform as early as 1978, that blocked the domino effect, thus becoming the world's most important socialist state in the post-Cold War era.

Folding the China card

With the demise of the USSR, the US had seen its main enemy disappear, leaving the US as the world's only superpower. At this point the "China card" became superfluous, and US-PRC relations underwent a qualitative change. In fact, ever since WWII, the PRC's foreign policy has always been to "resist hegemonism." Thus the PRC tried to ally itself with Asian, African, and Latin American nations that had been victims of US or European power politics or colonialism. The US, having gone untouched by war and relying on powerful military and economic resources, naturally became the leader of the non-communist nations.

As for challenges to US dominance within the non-communist nations, there were two. One was from DeGaulle's France, the other from the Arab world. In the former case, DeGaulle asserted "national independence," and France left NATO, refusing to accept US military command. France led the way in breaking the Cold War deadlock. It promoted "harmony and cooperation" with the Eastern Bloc, and was in the forefront in establishing formal diplomatic relations with the PRC.

In the case of the Arab world, its strategically vital oil resources had long been controlled by the US, UK, and France. In 1973 oil producers employed OPEC (the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries) to seize back control over their resources from the US-led West. Using oil as a weapon, they employed boycotts, reduced production, and higher prices to pressure the West. Ultimately they set off a global oil crisis, affecting operations at 99% of the gas stations in the US, while in the UK, in order to save energy, the government reduced the work week to three days.

However, after all the US and France share historical and cultural links, and their conflicts did not become overly acute. In particular, after WWII, Europe lay in ruins, and the US provided aid under the Marshall Plan; it was not until the 1958 World's Fair in Brussels that it was clear that Europe had finally recovered. In 1960, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was founded, and the G-7 (group of seven leading industrial nations) was formed as a "club for the rich"-North America, Europe, and Japan. Thus, though the US has had differences with other developed nations, they have maintained smoothly operating channels of communication.

Inscrutable China?

As for the conflict between the US and Arab states, there were also mitigating factors. Islamic and Christian civilizations share common historical and cultural roots; Islamic sciences (astronomy, math, the calendar) had a profound impact in Europe; and the Justinian Code and Greek Bible, from Asia Minor, had far-reaching influence on law and religion in the West. More immediately, the US and Europe have remained energy dependent on the oil-producing states of the Middle East, while these states are the largest purchasers of US and European weapons. Since the end of the Gulf War, Western countries have sold US$50 billion in weaponry to the Middle East, most of which has come from the US. Thus, though there are differences between the US and Arab states in the Middle East, they have remained tied by cultural background and economic interdependence.

Thus there has remained only China, with its ancient history and traditions, which has remained very different to the West. Westerners have always found China difficult to understand. Even after reform and opening to the outside world, as relations between the PRC and the West have gotten on track, the PRC's rapid economic growth has outrun Western expectation and Western control. Add to this the fact that the PRC has an ideology for governing the country and the people's lives markedly different from American capitalism.

The PRC's strength creates fear in the US. Even though it still poses no threat to the US' hegemonic position, the PRC's development model is difficult for the US to control. Thus, voices in the US are calling for "containing China" and making the PRC the major hypothetical enemy in post-Cold War strategic planning.

An eye for an eye

Faced with the idea among some in America of "containing China," the authors of The China That Can Say No have advocated "counter-containment": "For every step that the US takes to contain China, we must meet them head-to-head, and cannot allow the least appeasement or relaxation." This is the classic mechanistic model of action and reaction. It lacks the autonomous consciousness that a great nation should have, and at worst forces the PRC to be knee-jerk reactive to American initiatives. The entire book is overburdened with such "backlash" sentiments, and lacks any detailed analysis or effective counter-strategic thinking.

The book also lacks what the authors call the "tolerance" that a great nation should have. Thus, the "feelings and political choices" of the five young authors toward the post Cold-War world are often to "use war against war," "use containment against containment," "use trade sanctions against trade sanctions." If the rules of the game of international politics could be simplified to "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth," there would be no need for statesmen or diplomats.

As a great cultural nation, China must first consolidate its position in world history. Based on artifacts of settlements unearthed along the middle portion of the Yellow River, Chinese culture has been developing for 8,000 years. In the course of this long history, there have taken shape traditions of humanism and benevolent kingly government. China's oldest classic, the Yi Jing, is a crystallization of the wisdom practiced in ancient society. With additions and interpretations by King Wen of the Zhou dynasty, his son the Duke of Zhou, and Confucius, the later cultural tradition-sober, benevolent, and humanitarian-evolved. Moreover, China continually absorbed surrounding peoples into the great Chinese family, and in this way could be said to have had unmatched coherence.

Leaving aside Gan Ying's abortive trip to Rome in the Eastern Han dynasty, contact between China and the West began with the westward expeditions of the Mongols and the record of the legendary Marco Polo. The Travels of Marco Polo, completed in the 14th century, opened up the eyes of the West and caused the works of outstanding thinkers of China to become a stimulus to the Enlightenment in continental Europe. Leading figures of the early Enlightenment era, like Voltaire (1694-1778), Leibniz (1646-1716), and Christian Wolff (1679-1754) all deeply admired Chinese culture. The Enlightenment was a movement of awakening among intellectuals pushing Europe into early modern society, and it changed the course of human history.

Even in economics-where most people ascribe the earliest conception of the market economy to the 1776 work The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (1723-1790)-there was earlier Chinese influence. As early as 1758, the economist Fran蔞is Quesnay (1694-1774) of the French "physiocrat" school outlined the free market concept in his book Tableau Economique. He argued that private property is absolute, that the foundations of economic life are formed from economic individualism and the market, and that the law of the market is as inviolable as the laws of nature; and he clearly indicated that his ideal model was China's political economy. He and his followers acknowledged that their thinking was inspired by Confucius.

Enlightened by China

Leading figures of the Enlightenment got most of their understanding of China from Jesuit missionaries. Jesuits came to China as early as in the 16th century, following in the wake of Spanish and Portuguese merchants. By the 17th century, Dutch and English trading ships had followed. At that time China and the West engaged in equal, mutually beneficial relations. Missionaries brought astronomy and mathematics, and introduced China's classics and system to the West. Unfortunately, because Jesuits got involved in court intrigues, the Yong Zheng Emperor banned missionary work, and East-West contacts were interrupted for a century.

China was originally self-contained, relying on its status as an ancient cultural power to play the leading role in East Asia. But in 1840, after the resumption of contacts between East and West, came the horrors of the Opium War. For the first time foreigners appeared before Chinese as vicious bandits. They nakedly and brazenly sold narcotics into China. And after the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, China was restricted nearly to suffocation by unequal treaties. At this time, in all the West only Karl Marx spoke up for China. He wrote several articles for the New York Tribune defending China and criticizing the arrogant methods and wrongful plunder in China by nations like England and France. Thus there are reasons why Marx's critique of capitalism was so quickly accepted in China.

The modern history of China is a history of how the great Western powers have encroached upon and swallowed up China. Amidst a long period of internal chaos and external aggression, China-always under the shadow of imperialism-has groped to find a path to modernization.

Prior to the Opium War, China had no inkling about Western imperialism. In 1689, during the reign of the Kang Xi emperor, after three wars China signed the "Treaty of Nerchinsk" with Russia. They blindly allowed Russia to take a huge chunk of land from Lake Baikal all the way to Manchuria. It was only in the Opium War that Chinese finally saw the true face of imperialism, and there followed a series of treaties which ceded rights, humiliated the nation, cut away territory, and required reparations. The weakness and stupidity of the Qing court was infuriating. When the Republic of China was first established, as usual England, Russia, and Japan all made demands. As conditions for recognizing the ROC, they demanded, respectively, self-rule for Tibet, self-rule for Outer Mongolia, and railroad rights in Manchuria and Mongolia.

The Tibetan problem, repeatedly raised in The China That Can Say No, can be taken as a sample of the encroachment on China by imperialism in the late-Qing/early- Republican era. In 1877, England swallowed up India. As Tibet was a principal trade route between India and China, Britain also was very anxious to control Tibet. Given the enormous political and economic power of Britain's empire (on which, it was boasted, "the sun never set"), India was easily swallowed up, and Tibet promised to be an even easier target.

In 1904, the British regime in India sent troops into Tibet; they entered Lhasa and killed more than 1500 Tibetan compatriots. The Dalai Lama fled to Qinghai, and the Tibetans were forced to sign the ten-article "Anglo-Tibetan Treaty." Britain, even while forcefully repressing the independence movement in India, encouraged Tibetans to leave China and become independent. The British established their influence in Tibet, so that once Tibet became a "neutral" nation, the British could do with it as they pleased.

The tragedy of Tibet

The current Tibet problem is a product of the imperialist invasion of China. Recently the National Assembly in Taiwan was debating the issue of Outer Mongolia, which in fact is just like the Tibetan problem. Russia, taking advantage of China's weakness at the time of the collapse of the Qing court, encouraged Outer Mongolia to declare independence in 1911, and the next year coerced the "Kulun authority" into signing the Russo-Mongolian Treaty. Russia used this to completely control Outer Mongolia, completely excluding Chinese influence. Later, owing to protests from the Republic of China, after repeated mediation, the treaty was altered in 1913 to declare that "Russia recognizes the suzerainty of China in Outer Mongolia, while China recognizes Outer Mongolia's autonomy."

Both Britain and Russia tried to disguise their motives even as they in fact encroached on China. Nominally they sought self-rule for Tibet and Outer Mongolia. But in fact they wanted to urge those places to declare independence only so that they could later make them into "protectorates" of their own. The difference is that Outer Mongolia was occupied by Soviet troops in 1921, and formally declared independence in 1924, while Tibet did not follow Mongolia's path due to the decline of British power.

As for the Taiwan problem, repeatedly raised in the most emotional terms by the five young authors, this is in fact something that has been drawn out for a century through manipulation by Japanese and American imperialism. Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.

Though Taiwan was returned to China in 1945, due to the civil war between the Kuomintang and Communists and the outbreak of the Korean War, it became a place "protected" by American hegemonism. During WWII, Japan used Taiwan as a base for moving into Southeast Asia. After the war, Taiwan became (in MacArthur's words) "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" on the strategic frontline to block the expansion of communist power in the Western Pacific.

In fact, as early as 1942 a non-govern-mental group in the US, the Committee for Peace After War (organized by editors of several prestigious magazines), advocated setting up a Pacific defense line including Hawaii, Midway, Guam, Okinawa, and Taiwan; thus they thought Taiwan should come under "international condominium." This so-called "international condominium" in fact meant putting Taiwan under American control. After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Taiwan's position became even more important. The US put forth the position that "Taiwan's status is still undetermined," in order to expand its room for maneuver in Pacific defense.

In June of 1950, President Truman declared that determination of Taiwan's future status would have to await the return of stability to the Pacific and the signing of a formal peace treaty with Japan, perhaps through deliberation by the UN. This seems to have again given Japan the right to speak on the Taiwan issue, causing Japan to still have inappropriate fantasies about Taiwan's future. Moreover, Japan provided behind-the-scenes support to pro-Japanese Taiwan independence movements in a plot to gain political and economic benefits. In 1957, an official of the Japanese Foreign Ministry clearly stated: "We can wait until the next generation, when Taiwan will have become another country. At that time, Japan can gain the maximum economic benefits from both Chinas at minimal political risk."

Taiwan's future past

The US also was secretly pursuing a "one China, one Taiwan" or "two Chinas" policy, to insure that Taiwan would remain a flag in the map of the American Pacific defense line. Chester Bowles, a former deputy US Secretary of State, ambassador to India, and close confidant of President Kennedy, advocated helping "Formosa" gain independent status in the April 1960 Foreign Affairs: "An independent Sino-Formosan nation can offer the contrast of a modernized non-Commu-nist Chinese society," he argued. He acknowledged that "It might well take some time for Formosa's position in the UN as an independent nation to become accepted," but urged that this goal be pursued. And he tied Taiwan into US regional strategy: "Formosa's future as an independent nation is tied to the future of free Asia and especially those two great geographic and political anchors, India and Japan."

The fact of the division of China definitely presented the US and Japan with many opportunities to manipulate and trade behind the scenes for their own gain. In 1879, taking advantage of the inability of the Qing court to deal with internal and external problems, Japan occupied the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa). In WWII the US occupied the islands as a military base. Ultimately, in 1972 the US-without reference to the situation of China-took it upon themselves to turn the islands over to Japan. Japan then established Okinawa Prefecture, absorbing the islands into Japanese territory.

The controversy over the Diaoyutai Islands now taking place can be traced back to this. Diaoyutai is only 180 kilometers from Taiwan's northeast coast, and lies on the edge of the East China Sea continental shelf, and is an island belonging to Taiwan. But because the US unilaterally gave the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, and because rich petroleum resources have been discovered in the seas around Diaoyutai, Japan has claimed sovereignty over Diaoyutai. Here is the proof that imperialism will take advantage of a vacuum, and if given an inch will take a mile.

This is not the only dispute that the United States has instigated near China. In order to contain and exhaust China, the US tacitly permitted China to launch a punitive war on Vietnam. Then the US moved actively to repair relations with Vietnam and instigated the argument over sovereignty in the Nansha (Spratley) Islands in order to widen the differences between China and Vietnam, and also pull ASEAN closer to the US, as part of a scheme to isolate China in Asia.

The theory of the China threat

The US Pacific strategy of the 1990s has been aimed at China. The US has spread the "China threat theory" internationally in order to manufacture justification for "containing China." Meanwhile, it has promoted "peaceful evolution," scheming to turn socialist countries into capitalist countries.

In 1991, US Deputy Secretary of Defense R.B. Zoelick, speaking to an expanded conference of ASEAN foreign ministers, clearly explained future US strategic deployments in the Asian region. Deployments would be based on a division into northern, central, and southern lines. Of these, the "northern line" indicated the US-Republic of Korea alliance; the "central line" indicated US-Japan bilateral relations and the "US-Japan Security Treaty"; and the "southern line" referred to good relations between the US and ASEAN and American security guarantees to Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia. As anyone can clearly see, this "crescent- shaped strategic line" is aimed at surrounding China.

At the end of the same year, Secretary of State James Baker, in a Foreign Affairs article entitled "The US in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community," described US Asia-Pacific strategy. He advised readers to "imagine a fan spread wide" with the US at the center. The spokes of the fan, extending from the US to Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia (especially the Philippines and Thailand) and Australia, represented bilateral ties, with the body of the fan representing the developing relationships within Asia itself. This "fan-shaped" strategy was clearly aimed at China. Baker elsewhere alluded to "a new containment line."

As for the American "peaceful evolution" theory, one can take a speech by former President Bush as representative. In November of 1991, in a speech before the Asia Society in New York, Bush cited North Korea, Burma, and China as three countries resisting the "global trend" of political pluralism, and also made accusations of proliferating dangerous weaponry. In his remarks on China, Bush especially emphasized that American policy was to sustain contacts in order to encourage positive change, which is to say "peaceful evolution."

Clinton has, even more than Bush, emphasized the significance of "economic security," and his strategy for stimulating "peaceful evolution" of the Chinese Communist regime has been divided into three levels: (1) Blocking the spread of nuclear weapons and controlling conventional weapons, limiting the expansion of Chinese Communist military power. (2) Utilizing the treaties and regulations of multi-national bodies like GATT and the WTO, as well as bilateral policies like most favored nation status and the "301 provisions," to force China to undertake reform of its economic structure. (3) By making a top consideration out of political democratization and human rights diplomacy, deliberately publicizing Taiwan's status and the special nature of the Tibet problem, causing China to "fragment" under internal political pressure and differences in the characteristics of regional development, weakening its overall strength as a unified nation.

Overthrowing the Chinese regime

Stated somewhat baldly, what Americans call "peaceful evolution" is in fact aimed at overthrowing the Chinese Communist regime and restructuring political forms in a direction desired by the US. In fact, since beginning reforms and opening to the outside world in 1978, the Chinese Communists have at all times and in all ways been adjusting internal and external policies. On the one hand they have been making up for some of the damage caused by the closed, ultra-left policies of the past; on the other they have been adapting to the new global politico- economic situation and striving to get fully on track with international society.

The PRC's leaders hope that through planned policy implementation they can raise the quality of life of citizens and liberate the people's productivity and creativity. China is not opposed to "change," but given China's huge territory and the pressures of an enormous population, they deeply fear that "change" will become "chaos," and that amidst "change" order will be lost.

Despite this, the US, using standards it has set itself, demands that China follow a specific direction of "evolution," without any regard for China's own wishes. This attitude is perhaps a result of America's hegemonic habits, but in any case it certainly is neglectful of the respect and courtesy for others any civilized country should have in its foreign relations.

In fact, moreover, one may be highly skeptical of the US' own behavior with regards to the three levels of "peaceful evolution" noted above. First, in terms of weapons, the US has refused to sign any agreement forswearing first use of nuclear weapons, and the number of warheads it possesses far exceeds that of all other nuclear countries. So what right does the US have to demand that China restrict nuclear testing?

Second, with regard to international organizations, the US demands that China accept the regulations and treaty obligations of international organizations. Yet the US has made every effort to block China from winning the right to host the Olympic Games in 2000, has always refused to give China GATT or WTO membership, and periodically pulls out MFN (most-favored nation status) and Section 301 provisions as threats. Under these terms, how can China interact with other nations in international society on an equal basis?

Human rights as a tool

As for the third element, the US frequently raises the human rights issue, but in fact is only using it as a bargaining chip in negotiations. This distorts human rights into a tool and a mere formality. As examples, The China That Can Say No points to the Harry Wu issue and the orphanage problem, both clearly under the shadow of manipulation by the CIA or the mainstream media. Further, US advocacy of human rights is too often "selective enforcement." Russian President Boris Yeltsin bombed the Russian Parliament and has suppressed Chechnya, causing tens or hundreds of times as many deaths as the "Tiananmen Incident," which has become the totem of US human rights. Yet the US unreservedly supports the strongman Yeltsin, and considers his actions "unavoidable choices." This is because, given Russia's current situation, if democracy were truly implemented, anarchy would result. America's tolerance toward its former arch-enemy Russia frequently amazes China, which has had its fill of criticism.

In 1995, the Pentagon staged two model exercises of a Sino-US military confrontation. The conclusions were: Based on the current pace of Chinese military modernization and economic growth, by the year 2010, if the US Navy and Air Force take on China in the Western Pacific, the US will lose. The People's Liberation Army of the PRC has done similar models, reaching the same conclusions.

There are two main views in the US regarding these conclusions. The first says that it is inevitable that China will be a global power in the next century. Thus the US should as early as possible rationally recognize and accept this fact. The US should take the initiative to talk with China on major international problems, and the two countries can cooperate to maintain world peace. The other view says: Within 15 years the US will be unable to militarily defeat China. Therefore, within the next 15 years the US should find every high-sounding pretext to contain China, block China's outward expansion, and even find an opportunity to start a war against China, in order to prevent China from becoming another superpower.

Imperialism vs. fanatic nationalism

The latter is a classic example of the imperialist way of thinking of blindly trying to change objective reality through subjective will. The former represents rational forces within the US. We should, through effective communication, clearly inform the American people that China has a cultural tradition that is peace-loving and benevolent, in order to strengthen this rational pro-China force. Otherwise, if we just allow the angry emotions and vengeful thinking of The China That Can Say No to run rampant, then arrogant American imperialism will have even more excuses to fan the flames and create incidents.

Unrestrained nationalism has often been the source of tragedy in history. I believe that China, with its ancient history and culture, has the strength of reason, and can avoid going from one extreme to the other, and will not waver unstably between moods of looking favorably at the outside world and looking angrily at that same world.

In 1990, the right-wing Japanese politician Ishihara Shintaro and Sony Corporation head Morita Akio cooperated to write the book The Japan That Can Say No. The book argues throughout that Japan's aggressive war against neighboring countries was to enable those countries to escape from the control of Caucasians. It argues that the neighboring countries that Japan invaded should take responsibility for their own historical failures, and that Japan has no moral responsibility at all. As for Japan's invasion of China, it uses the term "a large scale advance into China."

The Japan That Can Say No reveals the nature of Japanese imperialism and tragedy of the lack of an ability to reflect on the past. Recently Japanese prime minister Hashimoto Ryutaro went to pay his respects at Yasukuni Shrine where Japanese war criminals are buried. From this we can see that in Japan the retrogressive current of arrogant and inflammatory nationalist chauvinism is still busily preparing for future action.

Collective anger

We can understand the anger expressed in The China That Can Say No toward American and Japanese imperialism. Ever since the Opium War, China has suffered repression and insults from stronger nations. Anything suppressed for a long time must find an outlet of expression, and The China That Can Say No is one form of outlet. This is one reason why it has sold so well. The United States and Japan must accept most of the responsibility for the collective anger of the Chinese people.

However, anger is fleeting; only peace and hope are long-lasting. After anger, we must rationally look at China's future.

From the point of view of developmental psychology, children learn to say "no" at roughly two-and-a-half to three years of age. In this stage, self-consciousness has just begun to take shape, and children will often say "no" just because of their mood. They will deliberately be contradictory in order to demonstrate their own existence. If the only thing the parents know is to assert authority and strengthen controls, if they don't understand how to provide guidance at appropriate times, the children's sense of self will not develop, but will be transformed into sub conscious rebellion.

Similarly, in the past China had its fill of being victimized by the powers, and economically could not stop foreigners from doing whatever they wanted. Today, after the determined implementation of reform and opening to the outside world, initial results have already been achieved in the economic realm. As a result, a sense of self has taken shape, and China has--without anyone being fully aware of it--entered the phase of saying "no." If this phase is not handled appropriately, and well-meaning guidance provided, this will unfortunately have a negative impact on the psychological development of the whole nation and society.

From "no" to "I will"

In fact, not knowing how to say "no" means not knowing how to say "I will." Saying "no" is the prerequisite to saying "I will." This touches on the problem of "free will." The English word "will," as a verb, expresses a willingness or plan to do something. As a noun it suggests self-assertion or desire. The will is free insofar as people can order their desires according to general principles. People thus differ from animals, which want without limit. Precisely because people's desires can be ordered according to reasoned principles, and can be structured so that they do not clash, each individual's will is not internally contradictory, and desires can be harmonized and co-exist. And it is out of individual desires (I will) that the general will of a complete society develops. That is how a rational national order is constructed.

And why should a rational international order be any different? Every country is like an individual, and their wills can co-exist without conflicting with the general will of international society. The China that can say "no" is the prerequisite for the China that can say "I will."

Beginning after the Opium War in 1840, a variety of ideas have been advocated in China, including Western learning, learning the strong points of the barbarians to check the barbarians (powerful countries), adopting Western knowledge for its practical uses while keeping Chinese values as the core, complete Westernization, and so on. After the overthrow of the imperial system, a number of forces appeared in China, each with its own agenda. The Communist Party learned from the USSR, some around Chiang Kai-shek learned from Nazi Germany, and people like Hu Shih and Chiang Ting-fu adulated only the US and UK.

In the proposed strategies for modernization, which were divergent and based on individual experience, there was yet to appear any path to modernization that could win a consensus among Chinese. Fortunately, in l978 the policy of reform and opening to the outside world was set, and in 1992 the "socialist market economy" was set as the focal point of reform. The Chinese people have finally groped their way to a path to modernization.

The Opium War was the starting point of the history of Chinese modernization. Over the past 150 years, externally China has suffered from foreign imperialism, while internally there have been a series of dramatic cataclysms--the Taiping rebellion, the Nian rebellion, the Muslim insurrection, the Boxers, the Republican revolution, the warlord period, the Civil War, and the ten years of the Cultural Revolution.

In this time the only periods that can be called tranquil are the "golden decade" of the late 1920s and early 1930s, the early period after liberation from 1949- 1957, and the era of reform and opening to the outside world that began in 1978. In particular, the period from 1978 to the present has been the longest continuous period of stability in the past 150 years--there has been a clear improvement in the living standards of the people, and a major increase in the nation's overall power. This uninterrupted 18-year-period of reform and opening could be said to be the most successful model of peaceful reform in Chinese history since the changing of the laws by Shang Yang in ancient times.

Building cultural consciousness

The success of the reforms has inspired hope toward the future among Chinese. It has also rebuilt the national self-confidence of the Chinese, which had been eradicated by the long period of internal and external disasters. Consequently, there is finally an opportunity for traditional cultural values to once again be emphasized. Looking over the course of human history, in the entire world not a single nation has been able to thoroughly repudiate its own cultural tradition and still complete modernization.

I feel that, in this period of the recovery of national self-confidence, this is the time when we should rebuild a "consciousness of cultural subjectivity." The rebuilding of such a consciousness will not only be decisive in the success or failure of mainland China's economic reforms, it will be even more decisive in whether or not the goal of comprehensive modernization can be achieved.

But what does this "consciousness of cultural subjectivity" entail? The first step is to call on the whole Chinese people to consciously accept and acknowledge the 8000 years of traditional culture as properly ours, originally ours and uniquely ours. Then we must understand tradition, critique tradition, transcend tradition, and reinvent tradition. Facing modernization, many unprecedented problems will surface. Only a people with such a "consciousness of cultural subjectivity" can, when facing such problems, know how to balance objective conditions with subjective strengths, seize opportunities, react dexterously, and finally resolve these problems.

The China That Can Say No sincerely expresses the thinking of contemporary young Chinese, and concretely expresses China's determination to pursue national dignity. Some reviewers have been critical of the emotional way in which it lays out its nationalism, but this is an over-reaction. After all, look at the current situation around the world: There are calls for "re-Asianization" in Japan; there is a tide of "re-Islamization" in the Arab world; and in India there is a "Hindi renaissance movement." Even in Europe, as the European community has expanded, the problem of national identity has become a focus of debate and controversy. Clearly the revival of "consciousness of cultural subjectivity" is the global trend. The China That Can Say No merely is part of this trend.

However, introspective rebuilding of a cultural consciousness is much more long-lasting, and more profound, than simply passionately venting feelings. One of the tragedies of Chinese history is that there have been too many cataclysms, with the country jumping from one extreme to the other.

Feeling for stones in a river

Today, China has confirmed that the "socialist market economy" will be the framework for economic reform. This is a path to modernization "that can effectively harmonize capitalism and socialism" that was worked out only with great difficulty. Periodic grand shifts are not as good as constant "adjustments." "Adjusting" means standing on firm ground to stably take the next step, with readiness to adapt and react at any moment; it is different from either holding on to established rules or advancing rashly with hopes of immense short-term gain. It is, as Deng Xiaoping says, like "crossing a river by feeling for stones," a passage in which "the only criterion of truth is practice."

In Mencius there is a passage which reads: "Tzu-mo was a middle-roader [between egoism and universal love]; and that approximates the ideal. But the middle-roader [who takes no decisive action] is unadaptable just like the panaceist [who sticks to thing only as a cure for all ills]. What I dislike about the panaceist is the way he seems to be doing some thing, but while he exalts one thing, he lets a hundred lie useless." This instructs us as to the importance of timing, balance, and adaptability. In the final analysis, in governing the greatest fear is to lack adaptability, or to "exalt one thing while letting a hundred lie useless."

The intense anti-Americanism of The China That Can Say No should be a warning signal to the US. The US may very well be a country that needs an enemy, but its setting up of China as the primary hypothetical enemy will create irreparable damage to Sino-American relations.

The China That Can Say No can also be seen as a warning signal to Taiwan. In the book the authors describe Taiwan as "China's private parts," a metaphor which indicates how sensitive it is. As powerful nationalism raises its head in Communist China, advocacy of Taiwan independence will just provoke an explosion of emotionalism. Between Taiwan and mainland China, both stand to benefit from cooperation, but deliberately creating confrontation can only result in a historic tragedy in the Taiwan Strait. The mainland side should comprehend that the Taiwan independence problem is the result of a complex economic, political, social, historical, and cultural background. To use nothing but threats and crushing force will not be as effective as offering sympathetic understanding, and using the greatest possible patience and wisdom.

At the same time, the mainland should not avoid addressing the issue of political reform. If the mainland can successfully implement political reform, not only would this solidify the successes in economic reform, it would be of the greatest benefit in resolving the Taiwan independence problem. On the Taiwan side, Taiwan should maintain the highest wariness of US and Japanese expansion in the Asia-Pacific region; Taiwan must not seek outside help to intervene in the Taiwan Strait issue. As descendants of the Chinese people, Taiwanese must make every effort to avoid becoming the pawns for imperialism to encroach on China.

Political and economic change

In fact, the mainland's economic reforms, begun in 1978, and Taiwan's political reforms, begun in 1986, are the most revolutionary results of modernization in Chinese history. Taiwan's political reform has shattered the myth that Chinese are not suited for democracy. And the mainland's reform and opening up--and especially the elucidation of the goal of the "socialist market economy" in 1992--is a way to effectively handle problems of emancipating citizens' productivity forces while balancing the distribution of income, a model of successful reform.

These glittering achievements are enough to make all Chinese people feel proud. This is the opportunity for China to emerge from pain and humiliation. Amidst the international political and economic environment of the post-Cold War era, we are charged with the transmillenial mission to bring China out from 150 years of suffering and humiliation, to achieve the national goal of creating a modern Chinese nation. And the prerequisite for this transmillenial mission is that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have mutual respect, develop positive interactions, and expand the foundations of trust.

[Picture Caption]

The China That Can Say No Authors: Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, Qiao Bian, et. al. Publisher: Jen-chien Price: NT$360 404 pages

The tearing down of the Berlin Wall symbolized the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, leaving mainland China as the sole remaining socialist great power. Is this why it has replaced the USSR as the "Evil Empire" in the eyes of many in the West? (photo by Luo Hsu-kuang)

China wants to say "no" to the West. But can Tibet say "no" to China? The photo shows a protest demonstration held by Tibetans in exile in India on March 10 this year, the day marking the fall of Tibet. (photo by Jenny Hu)

Wasn't Mao's 30-year policy of autarky saying "no" to the West? What cam e of it? (photo courtesy of Agence France Presse)

In Spring of 1989, when the mainland student movement was just starting, the mood was hopeful. After the Tiananmen massacre, many Chinese intellectuals became dispirited. Does The China That Can Say No represent a shift to the left among post-Tiananmen intellectuals? (photo courtesy of Agence France Presse)

The "Protect Diaoyutai" demon strations in Taipei are concrete actions by which Chinese have said "no" to Japan. (photo by Hsueh Chi-kuang)

The China That Can Say No is a product of history, yet ignores the historically based feelings of Taiwan's people; it blames the US for the Taiwan problem. Given that mainland readers have no access to outside information, this misrepresentation is very dangerous. When will substantive talks resume between the two sides? (photo by Vincent Chang)

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