Koo Chen-fu's recent visit to Commu-nist China clearly demonstrates the actual state of affairs in cross-strait relations. Mr. Koo controlled the course of the dialogue from start to finish on what was clearly a victorious visit. I give it a perfect score, 100 out of 100. Some people have only rated it a 59 because Mr. Koo's trip destroyed their illusions about the mainland. These people should reflect on why their own political judgment cannot achieve a passing grade.

Examining the whole of Mr. Koo's talks with Wang Daohan, Qian Qichen and Jiang Zemin, we see that Mr. Koo's soft appearance hides a core of steel. Smiling all the while, he played three trump cards from a seemingly weak position, maintaining the essential differences in the ROC and PRC positions.

Koo's three trumps

The first of these was the "Republic of China" card. This trumped Beijing's "one China" principle, which denies the existence of the ROC. Mr. Koo clearly pointed out that the most fundamental obstacle to cross-strait relations is the "one China" principle which denies the objective fact of the ROC's existence. There will only be a basis for mutual trust and the possibility of progress in talks once the PRC accepts the existence of the ROC. After all, how is it possible to hold talks with an entity which does not exist?

On this visit, Mr. Koo demonstrated a fact to the people of the mainland and to the entire world-the Republic of China's representative has returned! Didn't you say that the ROC had ceased to exist in 1949? She not only still exists, but has returned to Communist China to hold talks with its highest officials, forcing them to accept this fact as well.

The second of these cards was the democracy card, which trumped the Communists' hegemonic "one country, two systems" reunification principle. In the talks, Mr. Koo made it clear that the ROC is a free and democratic nation. The mainland must first take the path to democracy itself before the ROC will be willing to discuss the question of reunification. Further, it is only after democratization that the mainland will not be viewed as a threat by neighboring Asia-Pacific nations. Mr. Koo was making this point not only to Communist China, but also to the nations of the Asia-Pacific region and the rest of the world, the US administration in particular. The Clinton administration cannot be so blind that it does not see the seriousness of the threat that the annexation of democratic Taiwan by Communist China under the so-called "one country, two systems" principle would extend mainland China's hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.

This card of Koo's was not only a wake-up call to Jiang Zemin and Qian Qichen, but also to the nations of the Asia-Pacific region and the Clinton administration. Jiang is naturally unable to grasp the democracy card; the fear of it is so strong in Communist China that they did not even dare to meet with Kang Ning-hsiang, a well-known figure in Taiwan's democracy movement. Nonetheless, Mr. Koo talked to Mr. Jiang at length about Taiwan's democracy, sharing with the mainland the island's experience. This forced Mr. Jiang to get past the moment by awkwardly falling back on the same canard that Taiwan's experience is not necessarily applicable to the mainland's style of "democracy."

The third card was the priority of the rights of the people, which Mr. Koo used to trump the Communists' political dominance card. The Communist Chinese originally wanted to limit this round of the Koo-Wang Talks to political issues, with the intent of avoiding all non-political issues. Their objective was to lure Mr. Koo into the political trap of discussing the "one country, two systems for peaceful reunification" item from Mr. Jiang's "Eight Points." But Mr. Koo would not dance to their tune, expressing instead the primacy of ROC President Lee Teng-hui's "Six Conditions" and the rights of the people. Mr. Koo did not avoid politically sensitive issues, clearly and unambiguously giving voice to the Republic of China's political principles. And by avoiding the mainland's trap, Mr. Koo expanded the scope of the dialogue to include the rights of the people and lured the mainland into agreeing to four points of consensus set by Taiwan. While working within the major differences outlined above, the two sides together sought out minor points to agree upon.

Tang and Qian's methods

If we look at the Koo-Wang talks as a competition between two teams, both the Shanghai and Beijing matches consisted of an inning of "stick" followed by an inning of "carrot." On the first day of talks in Shanghai, Tang Shubei wielded the stick. On the second, Wang Daohan offered the carrot. In Beijing on October 18, Qian Qichen used the stick in the morning, while Jiang Zemin held out the carrot in the afternoon. This does not indicate the existence of dove and hawk factions, as some in the media have speculated. It was instead the Communists' typical alternation of civil and military tactics, of carrot and stick, applied here to counter Mr. Koo's attacks. It seems that the three trumps that Mr. Koo played were anticipated by neither Mr. Wang nor Mr. Jiang, leading to responses by Mr. Tang and Mr. Qian that were both too strong and not terribly reasonable. The content was largely bellowing of the hegemonic reunification tune. Moreover, Mr. Koo is utterly familiar with the rhetoric of Mr. Tang and Mr. Qian. He thus attacked and retreated at will, controlling the initiative throughout the talks.

In sum, Mr. Koo has harvested three positive results from these talks:

The first is that both sides spoke frankly about their positions. Mr. Koo states that this is the basis for mutual trust. It also prevents misunderstanding. Some say that Mr. Tang and Mr. Qian's hard-line policy statements were forced out of them by Mr. Koo. Truth that has been compelled is better than ambiguous deceitfulness. At least this revelation has shattered the illusion of some in Taiwan that the Chinese Communists would back off by, for example, hanging up their gloves in the foreign-relations arena.

Second, the talks preserved democratic Taiwan's sovereignty and respect for the island. Koo Chen-fu made the fact of Taiwan's existence apparent to the world. He also made apparent Taiwan's democratic achievements and the differences between the political systems of Taiwan and the mainland. Fully protecting the rights of the Republic of China, as Mr. Koo did by absolutely rejecting the Communist Chinese's hegemonic reunification principles of "one China" and "one country, two systems," is fully protecting the sovereignty of the Taiwanese nation.

Third, the talks reestablished the primacy of the rights of the people. The reaching of a consensus on four concrete points has begun the process of thawing communications channels which have been frozen for three years. They have advanced the process of making dialogue an exchange between equals. And the resolution of problems related to the issue of people's rights has created a new situation across the straits.

Bringing home victory

Before Mr. Koo embarked on his journey, I held out little hope for the talks. I imagined that the Communist Chinese would stubbornly stick to "one China," "one country, two systems" and exclusively political talks. In my mind, these stood like three icebergs blocking the shipping lanes across the straits. Could Mr. Koo's "ice-breaking visit" really break through? Wouldn't it be extremely fortunate just to avoid a Titanic-like tragedy? Instead, Mr. Koo employed an inspired "thawing" strategy, refusing to follow the misguided lead of the Communists' baton. In the talks, each side said its piece, maintaining the essential differences and looking for agreement on minor issues. And as a result, a small path for communications across the strait was melted through the heart of these three icebergs, restarting dialogue between the SEF and ARATS. I think it is not too much to call this visit a success.

Mr. Koo, welcome back from your successful journey. It has been a long, hard road.

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Despite the talks, mistrust and enmity persist. In order to show Taiwan's sincerity in preparing for the Koo-Wang meeting, the ROC military canceled routine exercises scheduled for October 2.

(Sinorama file photo)