Both sides of the Taiwan Strait are up-grading their military power, yet globally there is a trend toward resolving international disputes through negotiation. From a national defense point of view, weapons are only the front line of defense. Diplomatic support and the international situation also play a vital role in security. Foreign relations can be more important than military force. "The Taiwan Strait problem should be considered at levels beyond merely the military," says Rear Admiral Chang Chang-yung.

After looking at the military balance, what are the key political factors affecting security in the Taiwan Strait today? Besides armed preparedness, what other supports can Taiwan rely on for its security?

In September of this year, the revisions to the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines were made public in New York. They declared that "regional" concerns of Japan would be covered under the US-Japan Security Treaty. But, the US and Japan have never specifically included either the Korean Peninsula peninsula nor the Taiwan Strait in this definition. So is the Taiwan Strait excluded from the Western Pacific security system? Is it only a matter for Taiwan and the PRC?

Taiwan Strait: International waters

Lin Cheng-yi, a researcher in the Institute of European and American Studies at the Academia Sinica, points out that the new Guidelines do not specify any particular geographic areas. But the two areas closest to Japan are Korea and Taiwan. Given that Japanese ships frequently use the Bahsi Channel and the sea lanes off the east coast of Taiwan, the Guidelines (and by extension the US-Japan Securty Treaty) definitely have implications for Taiwan.

In fact, "since the 1980s, Japan has begun taking increased responsibility for the security of the sea lanes up to 1000 nautical miles from Tokyo Bay," says Parris Chang, a scholar of international security issues and currently a legislator for the Democratic Progressive Party. When the PRC mounted threatening maneuvers around Taiwan last year, and the US sent two aircraft carriers to keep an eye on the situation, Japan lent support to the US mission.

Lin Cheng-yi notes that the seas around Taiwan are not anyone's "internal" waters, but are international navigation lanes. If any country undertakes military action in these waters, thus obstructing these sea lanes, this would involve not only Taiwan and mainland China, but other countries as well.

The US plays the leading role under the newly issued Guidelines, while Japan will support the US in any military conflict around Japan. When there is a crisis involving a "regional" issue, the US is required to take responsibility for restoring peace and security in the "region." Japan, meanwhile, is obliged to keep open its base facilities, airfields, and ports, and provide support to US forces in operating in international waters and airspace.

Many scholars point out that, because of larger US-Japan security interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the Guidelines have adopted "creative obscurity" so as not to offend the PRC. Still, the ambiguity of the Guidelines to a certain extent enhances security in the Taiwan Strait. But some worry: Will the guidelines spark a resurgence of Japanese militarism? Will they give Japan an excuse to interfere in regional matters, even to Taiwan's detriment?

US interests="one China"

Besides the Guidelines, another major focus for Taiwan in October was the summit between US President Bill Clinton and Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. Though the US has continued to make guarantees to Taiwan that US policy to Taiwan will not change, and that the US will not sign any "fourth com-muniqu*" that will extend or overturn the three previous US-PRC joint communiques, no one concerned with the security of Taiwan took the summit lightly.

The key problem is that Beijing has clearly stated that the "Taiwan problem" is the most sensitive issue in US-PRC relations. A major consideration in whether or not the US and PRC can achieve a so-called "strategic partnership" is whether they can reach agreement over Taiwan.

In an interview with the United Daily News at the end of October, Lin Gang, a researcher at the US Center for the Study of Contemporary China, stated that Beijing has two basic requests of the US on this issue: One is that the US hold to the "one China" principle, and not support Taiwan independence or Taiwan's entry into the UN. The other is that the US not intervene in the manner in which Beijing "resolves" the Taiwan issue; specifically, the PRC wants the US to gradually reduce and eventually terminate arms sales to Taiwan. The two powers already have a consensus on the former question, but there is a clear divergence of opinion on the latter.

For a long time, the US position on Taiwan has been that there is one China, of which Taiwan is a part. Arms sales and other security questions are discussed under this precondition. "If we challenge this, we will only be causing trouble for ourselves," says Chen Yi-hsin, a professor of American Studies at Tamkang University and now a legislator for the New Party. The US will help maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait based on its overall interests in the Asia-Pacific region and in global security. But in handling cross-strait matters and its relations with the PRC, it always puts US interests first, so Taiwan must be very careful. For example, Chen contends that the effort to enter the UN is not only beyond Taiwan's capabilities, it is "simply being provocative."

Reunification through independence?

But the DPP's Parris Chang, and a long time scholar of the US-PRC relationship, has a different view. He says that Taiwan must offer the US a persuasive alternative to the PRC's definition of the situation. He criticizes the current line of ROC policy-that there is one China, and Taiwan is part of China, but that for the time being the two sides are divided and should be considered political entities of equal status. "Even people in Taiwan are confused, so how can foreigners be expected to understand?" he asks. He says that this line is inadequate as an alternative to Beijing's claim that Taiwan is an "internal problem," concluding: "Beijing will have the right to close the door and spank its own child."

Chang says that small countries must state their positions loud and clear, just as President Lee Teng-hui, in his inaugural address, declared: "We are a sovereign, independent country." If, Chang argues, Taiwan does not clearly declare that "We are an independent country"-that, like the formerly divided Germany, there is one nationality, but two states-then the US will not have a leg to stand on to intervene in matters related to Taiwan.

The problem is, the PRC has always declared that if Taiwan declares independence, it will attack. Recently, in an address at Harvard University, Liu Ji, vice-director of the mainland's Academy of Social Sciences, reiterated that a declaration of independence by Taiwan would be equivalent to a declaration of war by mainland China. The well-known author Po Yang has said: "Taiwan independence is the door that leads directly to reunification." His meaning is that it would lead straight to war with China, a war which might seal Taiwan's fate.

However, counters Chang, when and if the PRC really wants to use armed force, it can come up with an excuse at any time. "Don't forget the 8/23 artillery duels [referring to fighting in the late 1950s that began on August 23]. There was no declaration of independence, but the PRC attacked anyway."

The current situation is that although both sides of the Taiwan Strait accept the "one China" condition, they differ on interpreting this. "Though we mean that Taiwan is a 'part of China,' we do not mean that Taiwan is a 'part or province of the People's Republic of China,'" says Chen Yi-hsin.

Lin Cheng-yi adds that "Beijing wants us to be another Hong Kong." But, he continues, "Hong Kong was a colony, so its situation is not comparable to ours."

Obscuring "one China"

The Republic of China is a political entity with its own armed forces and diplomatic partners. So it takes reasonable acts, like any country does, to survive and develop its ties with international society. But Beijing interprets all such moves as promoting "two Chinas," "one China and one Taiwan," or Taiwan independence. Lin Cheng-yi says that both sides should relax on the definition of one China, and allow it to become more flexible. Only then will dialogue between the two sides be possible.

As for Taiwan independence, given the PRC threats, Lin Cheng-yi suggests that there should be a clear definition of what "Taiwan independence" means. "There are many forms of de facto Taiwan independence. But only when the name, flag, and laws are altered will this really be Taiwan independence," he avers.

The main cause of the standoff between Taiwan and the PRC is that they can't agree on the definition of the cross-strait relationship. Likewise, in Taiwan, various parties and factions all have different views about how the US will respond to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, and under what conditions it would actively intervene.

Last year, when the PRC was holding missile tests and exercises off Taiwan, the US aircraft carrier Independence appeared in the waters near Taiwan. This "established a benchmark," says Parris Chang. In the future, he argues, if there is a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, the US will follow this precedent. But Chen Yi-hsin says that mainland China's actions, targeted at Taiwan's first presidential elections, took place in a highly agitated atmosphere. The US, he says, was merely concerned that the two sides might accidentally start a war, "so it decided to lower the temperature." The US might not take the same action if Taiwan brought war on itself by declaring independence.

No winners, only survivors

With its political parties so divided, in the face of the ever-unpredictable global situation and an implacable foe which reiterates that "China will never allow the division of its national territory," what can Taiwan do to stay out of trouble?

The DPP's Chen Ting-nan says, "foreign affairs and defense should transcend party lines." There should be consensus in the face of the outside world. He says that the New Party, DPP, and Kuomintang all need to recognize that, no matter what, it is necessary to get along with the PRC. The PRC poses the greatest threat to Taiwan, so peaceful coexistence must be our ultimate goal.

No political party today opposes participating in international society and various types of collective security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region, whether formally or informally. "It would be fine even if we only had observer status," says Chen Yi-hsin. Or, Taiwan could establish some dialogue mechanisms. For example, this September the Institute for National Policy Research held a conference on security in the Asia-Pacific region, inviting scholars from various countries.

There are no winners in war. Perhaps it is necessary to fight in self-defense, but it would be better not to fight at all if possible. As the classic Taiping Yulan says: "The warlike end up dead, those who neglect war end up in danger. He who neither loves war nor neglects war will rule all under Heaven." Liu Hsiang's Shuoyuan states: "An intelligent king does not play at war, nor does he neglect his army." Obviously, having a strong national defense does not mean there must be war. Since the ultimate objective of war is peace, then the most clever strategy of all is one that makes war unnecessary.

Perhaps the two parties on opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait should listen more to the ancients. Remember: War has no winners, only survivors.

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Before last year's presidential elections, the PRC tested missiles and held military exercises off Taiwan. The US sent the aircraft carrier Independence to observe. Scholars are still divided on the effect of that gesture. (courtesy of AP)

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Military Forces of Relevance for the Taiwan Strait

PRC

2.2 million

6010

940 (1.05 million T)

Korea

550,000

490

210 (141,000 T)

25,000 coastal defense personnel

US Forces in Korea

27,000

90

Japan

153,000

520

160 (346,000 T)

US Forces in Japan

22,000

150

US Seventh Fleet

140

60 (650,000 T)

ROC

240,000

470

390 (220,000 T)

30,000 coastal defense personnel

Land forces Aircraft Ships (tonnage)

Source: Japan's Defense White Paper (1996)