The ROC's first mass rapid transit line, the Mucha line in Taipei, finally opened for revenue service in late March this year after an eight-year "struggle." Why did this short line, just 10 kilometers long, take eight years to bring to completion?

27 February 1996 was a day to remember for Taipei residents. With the presidential election campaign just shifting into top gear and the threat of mainland Chinese missile tests still hanging over Taiwan, everything was in a state of flux, and people were in a depressed mood. But happily the long-awaited MRT Mucha line began a free trial service period, bringing a small but timely morale-booster into Taipei residents' lives.

Taipei's doubts finally carried away?

But although the Mucha line was in service for the first time, there was none of the jubilation of a freshly completed, brand-new construction project: in the stations, the faded route maps, the old toilets where you have to press the lever for ten seconds to flush them clean, and the walls stained yellow by leaking rainwater, all betray the Mucha line's age. But what had changed was that whereas previously people passing through eastern downtown Taipei, seeing the empty railcars speeding back and forth along the elevated trackway, could only lower their heads in frustration and grumble for a moment, from that day on they could finally go up and take a look for themselves, to satisfy their long-standing curiosity.

But at the beginning, the public still had their doubts. A conversation overheard in a Taipei department store elevator on the first day of the trial service can serve as an example: "From today, every time you ride the MRT you have a chance to get NT$1.2 million!" said a man, mimicking the advertisement. "Really? Is the MRT giving away prizes?" asked his female colleague innocently, not realizing the twist in his words. "No," came the reply, "that's how much their insurance pays out if there's an accident!" At these words, everyone in the elevator burst into guffaws of laughter.

Indeed, what with cracks in cap beams, railcar fires, derailments and burst tires, pre-service testing on the Mucha line since 1993 had been dogged by one mishap after another, and the date for service to commence had been pushed back again and again, causing a complete loss of public confidence. The original mood of expectation--"When will the line start running"--gave way to derision and suspicion--"Even if it does start running, who will dare to ride on it?" However, such sarcasm and doubts have largely been swept away by reality: during the four-week free trial service period from 27 February to 25 March, over 1.8 million passengers flooded onto the Mucha line, and despite these huge numbers, although there were one or two minor breakdowns, there were no major incidents of any kind.

Not only that, but under the pen of many writers invited to try out the line, this first mass rapid transit system in ROC history was invested with a whole new literary, aesthetic and psychological significance.

Writer Yin Ti, who at one point had given up all hope in the MRT system and even saw it as "a fraud from start to finish, a monstrous fraud and blunder," now praised the Mucha line with the words "carrying away Taipei's doubts--looking down at Taipei from a new angle." Furthermore the MRT, built to serve urban commuters, has unexpectedly become a tourist attraction: around MRT stations one can constantly see old men and women holding tour company flags--tour groups up from central and southern Taiwan to take a look at the ultramodern EMU (electric multiple unit) trains; and stations at the two major centers along the route--the east downtown area with its many large department stores, and Taipei Zoo at the southern end of the line in Mucha--also attract crowds of people.

But although the tangible achievements of the project are indeed something to be proud of, this is not the only aspect which arouses people's curiosity. Looking back at the twists and turns along the way, one cannot help wondering just what the crucial factors were in the miraculous "resurrection" which allowed the Mucha MRT line to go from being the target of universal censure to opening in a blaze of glory.

From golden boy to no-hoper

"To be honest, the Mucha line on its own going into service hasn't made much real difference," observes Department of Rapid Transit Systems public relations director Sun Ke-li.

"The idea that the Mucha line was unusable was a media judgement, but the Mucha MRT line actually never 'died'; we can only say that it was labelled a loser by some people, and now through hard work it has fought its way back again," says new Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation (TRTC) chairman and president Regis Chen, who took up his post less than six months ago.

The traffic situation in Taipei has long been dire, and the people of Taipei placed great hopes in the building of the MRT system to improve matters. Looking back on the MRT's progress from "golden boy" to "no-hoper," United Evening News reporter You Hung-cheng, who has been covering MRT news for over six years, has not only watched but also indirectly been involved in the whole process.

He observes that in 1987 when Taipei City Government's Department of Rapid Transport Systems (DORTS) had just been set up under its tireless first director-general Chi Pao-cheng, although just a department of the Taipei City Government, equal in rank to the city's environmental protection bureau or its parks department, it had a large budget and a large staff: for the six lines planned for the initial network, a special budget totalling NT$400 billion had been successfully appropriated in three phases, and over 1000 highly qualified young engineering staff were gradually recruited. The great responsibility of propelling Taipei into the ranks of top international cities seemed to have been hung on this enormous investment and on these people.

You Hung-cheng recalls that at the time, with DORTS repeatedly proclaiming how the system would be "the newest, the best, the biggest and the most expensive," it was very natural that it should become a focus of news reporting; also, from a reporter's point of view, "the Taipei City Government had always been a quiet little backwater. The splash of such a large rock as the MRT immediately made the project the focus of reporting on city affairs, and every move came under the media magnifying glass." In fact the technology involved in the MRT system is no more complex than aerospace technology or nuclear power, and its overall importance for the nation probably less than that of public order or environmental protection. "If DORTS had been made a central government department, perhaps it would have long ago been eclipsed by other, more important national news!"

Be that as it may, after the MRT became a focus of media attention, the Taipei public's expectations were also raised. But it was only after work started in 1987, amid much fanfare, on the six MRT lines including the Mucha, Tanshui, Hsintien and Nankang lines, that people discovered that the problems were far more complex than originally planned for.

The MRT in a changing political climate

"Planning on paper is not so hard, but actually putting those plans into effect generally isn't so easy," says former DORTS deputy director-general Wu Meng-kui, who retired just last year after serving under four directors. Wu laments that the MRT was "born at the wrong time": work had not long started on the project when Taiwan's political, economic and social environment entered a period of enormous change which not only cast the original timetable into disarray, but also threw up all kinds of new problems which had never even been imagined before.

Wu Meng-kui cites a list of examples: the resolute public resistance during the land acquisition phase, the labor shortage after the rise of the bubble economy, and the problems of coordinating with 40-odd departments and organizations such as the water, electricity and telephone utilities, to move pipes and cables. As a lowly city government department, DORTS did not have the clout to solve these problems, so that often work might be held up for six months or a year. Then there was the contract tendering process. Because the huge budget was seen by interests from around the world as a pie they were eager to get their teeth into, there was an almighty struggle between the French and the Americans over the Mucha line, and between the Americans, the British and the Japanese over the Tanshui line. In the heat of "battle," there were attacks and recriminations on all sides. Meanwhile the domestic tenders, which were intended to support the ROC's own civil engineering sector, also provoked a fierce conflict between the forces of the big established operators and those of new players, and suspicions of collusion or excessive price cutting in their tenders have not been laid to rest to this day.

Furthermore, undertaking a large civil engineering project in the midst of a densely populated and heavily built-up urban area was outside the previous experience of the ROC, and not only severely affected residents' everyday lives, but was also a tough challenge for the ROC's engineering firms, which had always been rather slapdash in their approach. For instance, although there had long been warnings of the impending "Traffic Dark Ages," when there were repeated delays in the execution of the project the public found the proliferation of MRT construction sites harder and harder to bear, and could be heard complaining everywhere about the noise and vibrations from the day-and-night work on the elevated Mucha line, concrete from the works blocking sewers and dirtying the streets, cracks appearing in housing close to the sites, service pipes and cables being cut, and so on. Whenever there was the slightest oversight in any detail, it would attract a barrage of complaints.

At the height of the construction period in 1993-94, work on the six MRT lines was in progress at over 200 construction sites. As a general rule, if a construction site creates a problem just once a year on average, it can be said to be doing well. But with over 200 sites all going at once, problems were occurring the whole year round.

"The public can't distinguish between all the sites scattered north, south, east and west throughout the city, they just recognize one word: DORTS!" Sun Ke-li, in charge of DORTS' PR department since 1992, notes with resignation that at 7:30 each morning when he arrives at his office, the first thing he does is open the newspaper and see what news there is today about the MRT. "In the past four years, there's only been one day when there was nothing at all in the papers about us!" On the principle that "no news is good news," the more news there is, the worse it is for DORTS' image.

Furthermore, since the lifting of martial law, as the opposition parties have grown in strength, they have not missed any opportunity to vehemently attack any failings on the part of government departments. From 1992 onwards, DPP city councillor Lin Jui-tu, known as the "MRT Terminator," exposed case after case of alleged bungling and corruption, casting a shadow on DORTS' good name and severely denting the department's morale.

Train fires raise clouds of suspicion

Although there were many external factors, it cannot be denied that DORTS has had its own problems of inadequate competence, experience and planning. Just when the problems of land acquisition, workers, and pipes and cables had been initially overcome, factional infighting within DORTS itself intensified, both on and under the surface. Also, because DORTS, which is responsible for the engineering works, and TRTC, which is responsible for operation and maintenance, were separated too early, instead of the two organizations complementing and supporting each other like two intermeshing gearwheels, there has been constant friction and bickering between them, with mutual attacks and accusations.

In the face of these internal and external pressures, DORTS was in a state of decline, and the public's disillusionment after the dashing of its inflated expectations was followed by a sense of anger at having been cheated, and heartache at the thought of the colossal NT$400 billion investment. Thus once DORTS' overblown star image had been broken, things went to the opposite extreme and the department's name became a byword for incompetence and corruption.

Beset by these and other factors, the Mucha line, which had been scheduled for completion by the end of 1991, was delayed again and again. After each new target date was announced, new problems always emerged. The most serious were the cracks in the cap beams (the transverse beams which carry the trackbed on top of the supporting pillars), the railcar fires and the arbitrated compensation proceedings, all of which emerged in 1993. In the second railcar fire in particular, the firefighters could not open the doors of the blazing car and had to smash the windows with an axe. TV pictures of this alarming scene were broadcast again and again, and burned away the last remnants of public confidence.

Reviewing the railcar fire today, it was indeed a problem caused by French supplier Matra's driverless railcar system. Matra prides itself on having built Chicago's airport subway, and the design of its driverless system pays a great deal of attention to safety, incorporating multiple protection systems. But Matra's expertise was with two-car EMUs. It was the first time they had worked with the four-car trains required by Taipei City, and they evidently underestimated the difficulties involved.

"Matra's original two-car design used one computer per EMU, but now with two pairs of cars in a train, there are two computers, and Matra overlooked the problems of combining them," says DORTS PR officer Ling Chi-yao, explaining that when one pair of cars detected a malfunction and braked automatically, the other pair was not alerted and kept driving forward, pulling the defective pair behind it. The powerful friction of the locked wheels against the track finally caused a tire to ignite, and this was the cause of the second railcar fire.

In high-tech products such as cars and aircraft, there's nothing unusual about problems arising during testing before they reach the market. The problem was also a complex one to analyze. After a furore blew up over the incident, Matra sent staff from its more high-tech aerospace division to give support, and introduced a series of improvements. But since the fire had taken place in full public view, the idea that "the MRT isn't safe" was firmly implanted in the public mind, and could not easily be eradicated.

Give a dog a bad name

It never rains but it pours: while the technical disputes were still unsolved, accusations of impropriety also attracted blasts from all sides. Wu Meng-kui, who at his retirement party was presented by old friends with a plaque reading "Growing out of the filth, yet unsullied," (referring to the lotus flower, and implying Wu's incorruptibility), recalls that in late 1993, when rumors of corruption were most rife, a total of seven special central and local government investigative teams, including teams from the Control Yuan, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Taipei City Government and the Taipei City Council, were investigating DORTS simultaneously. In order to respond to their demands, in a two-week period of working day and night, Wu Meng-kui had 140,000 pages of written reports printed up for their reference, wearing out several of the department's 10 photocopying machines in the process.

At that time, caught up in the maelstrom of political and social struggles, DORTS as an engineering-based department was completely overwhelmed. Its confidence and morale collapsed, and its decision-making ability was paralyzed.

For instance, how should the cracks in the cap beams be repaired? How should systems integration be improved? What should mark the completion of the seemingly endless electromechanical tests? From a technical standpoint, these are not difficult problems, but it's hard to please everyone: elected representatives, academics and even ordinary citizens all had their opinions, and each of their voices was louder than DORTS'. Not daring to offend anyone, DORTS resorted to "delaying" as its only tactic, happy simply to have no more prosecutions and convictions. Thus the date for the Mucha line to enter service became a political hot potato, with no-one prepared to put hand on heart and make a commitment. But this only confirmed opposition party accusations that "delay is a sign of incompetence."

Actually, the crux of whether the last few steps towards opening the line should be taken was on the one hand the question of DORTS' and the public's confidence in the MRT, and on the other hand DORTS', TRTC's and the city government's ability to respond to and willingness to accept the risk. Most media reporters closely acquainted with the real situation in fact had few doubts about the engineering side of the MRT project. But in You Hung-cheng's words, "for a while we were extremely disappointed with DORTS' and TRTC's leadership and morale," and what came out in news reports was naturally the negative and pessimistic side.

The Mucha MRT line became the greatest source of dissatisfaction among Taipei City residents, and indirectly led to Mayor Huang Ta-chou's fall from office. But once the result of the mayoral election at the end of 1994 was known, much of the pressure came off the Mucha line.

By Sun Ke-li's analysis, once the electioneering was over, the new mayor was in office and a new DORTS director-general had been appointed, DORTS was no longer the prime target for opposition party attacks, and the pressure to get the line running before the elections to win political brownie points was gone too. Moreover, Mayor Chen Shui-bian came to office from the ranks of the opposition, and with his famous words "I'll have done well enough if I can just clear up this mess," everyone was willing to be patient and give him some time, or even to "make the best of a bad job." If the Mucha line could be saved, it would be a bonus, but if it couldn't, then that's just the way things were. This equanimity in fact gave the Mucha line the chance to recover.

Crazy tests rebuild confidence

Moreover, winning power is one thing, but exercising power is another, and Chen Shui-bian, who before the election had once said he would have the Mucha line "torn down and rebuilt," after taking office admitted that he did not understand the MRT project, and publicly called for volunteers for a "health check" committee. The committee, set up in March 1995, comprised four teams--civil engineering, electromechanical and rolling stock, systems integration, and operational management--and was charged with making a "final inspection" of the Mucha MRT line from the standpoint of an objective third party.

This "objectivity" was to be based on "bold questioning and careful gathering of evidence." The inspection committee members were all experienced, senior people from the engineering world, but who had not had previously had opportunities for contact with the MRT and had no detailed knowledge of it.

"At that time our impression of the Mucha line was the same as the rest of the Taipei public: we thought it was 'dreadfully expensive, and dreadfully bad,'" says Wang Ting-hsing, president of the Chinese Engineering Techniques and Management Association, who was a member of the committee's electromechanical team. He describes himself as having "approached the task with a suspicious, fault-finding attitude."

Professor Lin Neng-pai, chairman of the business administration department at NTU's college of management, had also been influenced by the media and had no good impression at all of the Mucha line. But for fear of people bringing their prejudices into the investigation, he specially urged everyone to "set aside their emotions," no matter whether their individual prior feelings about the Mucha line were good or bad, and not to concern themselves with whether DORTS had wasted Taipei taxpayers' hard-earned money. The inspection would only consider from a practical, technical point of view whether or not the Mucha line could still be used, and if it could, what room there was for improvement.

As for DORTS, deputy director-general Richard Chen says that they too were aware that this was the Mucha line's last chance: if it did not pass this "physical," it was certain to be pronounced dead.

With this attitude of hoping for "life after death," Richard Chen opened all DORTS' files to the committee, gave the media access to observe the entire process, and called on his staff to give their fullest cooperation. Chen always firmly believed that the MRT was "real gold which doesn't fear the crucible," and he hoped that everyone would be treated fairly, and that faith in DORTS would be restored.

Because the committee had no predefined remit for what they should test, they gave free rein to their imaginations, checking up on every possible doubt that ordinary people might have. For instance, every aspect of Matra's patented driverless system has double or triple safety sensing and protection systems, but what if the main control computer were to crash? What if there were a short circuit in the communications circuits? What if the sensor system were to malfunction? Every imaginable doubt was tested one by one for the committee to see with their own eyes. The craziest of all the tests, which everyone still talks about to this day, involved the almost 90* curve in the track outside the Technology Building. According to Matra's design, well before entering the curve, trains should slow down in response to a signal from the transmission line assembly, which is laid along the trackbed; when a train is about to enter the curve a wayside control unit also reminds it to reduce speed; and the trains are also connected to the control center by radio. But what if one of these systems were to fail? Would the train plough into the curve at high speed, causing death and destruction? The inspection committee decided to remove the wayside control unit from the most sharply curving part of the track, to see what "consequences" this would have.

"When the Matra engineer stationed in Taipei heard that they wanted to do this unprecedentedly 'crazy' test, he was aghast, and he immediately phoned his company headquarters in France. But the committee insisted on doing the test. When the time came the international phone lines were open, and from the managers in France to the controllers in the control center and the inspection committee members and reporters on the train, everyone's hearts were in their mouths," recalls Richard Chen with a laugh. The outcome was that the train really did, as predicted in theory, first detect a malfunction and immediately brake to an emergency stop, then move off again and enter Technology Building station at normal speed, to the jubilation of everyone present.

Reinforce them all?

The whole process made Hsieh Chang-an of the systems integration team aware of the nub of the problem: unlike in advanced countries with a century of experience with rapid transit systems, the public in Taiwan is not adapted to and has little tolerance for the "uncertain nature" of new technologies. When they think about the trains having no drivers they have worries such as: "The trains run on an elevated track--what if they fall off?" "With so many communications circuits, won't people be electrocuted?" When people are unused to something and are in too much of a hurry and too nitpicking, this puts the engineering staff involved under too much unwarranted pressure, and forces them to be constantly defending themselves.

"After the 'health check' and improvements, Matra's system really is up to international standards, and safety shouldn't be a big problem," affirms Wang Ting-hsing. However, the factor which has raised most worries is on the civil engineering side: the cracks in the cap beams.

Wang Sen-yuan, president of the Taipei Structural Engineers' Association, who first discovered the cracks in the cap beams by chance when passing by in October 1992, was also drafted onto the inspection committee. He admits that he was shocked when he took part in the inspection: the cracks in the beams were larger and more serious than had been his impression, and of over 300 beams, more than 200 had cracks. Although the real reasons are still a matter of dispute, he believed that structural faults must be among them. "If you don't go to the root of the disease, then even if there's no illness now, its bound to emerge sooner or later." Therefore he suggested that all the beams should be reinforced, both those with serious cracks already apparent and those where none had yet appeared.

However, a wholesale reinforcement program would take time, and with the electromechanical and systems integration teams both feeling that there were no problems and that the system passed muster, for the civil engineering team still not to give the nod naturally created great pressure. Finally, although the team still recommended reinforcing all the cap beams, they added a conciliatory rider: "We respect the professional judgement of the designers." Wang Sen-yuan also said that he had done his duty by stating his opinion, and had no intention of being over-insistent.

The subsequent result was just as Wan Sen-yuan had feared: DORTS finally chose to reinforce only some of the beams. They divided them into three categories according to the severity of the cracks, and reinforced only the 84 most severely cracked beams with steel plates before beginning service. This is one of the main points on which DPP councillor Lin Jui-tu continues to attack DORTS today.

"Although we have opted for reinforcing only some of the beams at present, we have required the contractors who designed and built them to continue their investigations and analysis, and there are sensors installed on every pillar. Every six months we will compile a complete set of data and get expert opinions. If necessary we can continue to reinforce further beams while the line is operating, explains Richard Chen.

The Mucha line's not bad!

Although the health check had the sting in its tail of the cap-beam cracks and a list of over 100 improvements large and small, the overall result, as many committee members grudgingly admitted, was that "in fact they haven't done a bad job of the Mucha line!" Once consensus had been reached that the Mucha line "can be used after making improvements," the focus shifted to "making the improvements as fast as possible in order to begin service as soon as possible." Hsieh Chang-an of the systems integration team observes that whatever happened, the MRT system couldn't be left to molder any longer. A perfectly good car, if left to stand for three months, will be ready for the scrapheap, let alone such a high-tech electromechanical system. Furthermore, with an engineering project one cannot only consider the hardware: what's more important is the "software," especially the TRTC engineers and technicians responsible for operating and maintaining it. When the service start-up date was being put off again and again, their morale fell to rock bottom, and their commitment to their work and their level of training urgently needed a boost. We shouldn't forget that back when these technicians were sent to France for training, they were all outstanding candidates picked from large numbers of applicants, so they could certainly perform better.

When the line passed its health check, people could not help wondering: were the merciless and excoriating attacks on the Mucha line just for show?

Regis Chen looks at this from the dual perspectives of engineering and management. He says that from the technical point of view, solving problems and making things work is what engineers are there for. What's more, the NT$25 billion invested in the Mucha line is no mean sum, and if it had to be written off this would be a loss for all Taipei residents. If the Mucha line were scrapped, any improvement in Taipei's traffic situation would be postponed indefinitely, and the idea of demolishing the line and rebuilding it was simply pie in the sky.

"Whoever was mayor was sure to work towards improving the line and getting it running," says Regis Chen.

The health check, completed in mid-1995, was the first step in rebuilding public confidence, and from then on the focus of media attention turned to expectations for the line's opening. Over the last month or so of trial service and then revenue service, DORTS and TRTC have performed soundly, and on a peak holiday the line successfully transported over 100,000 passengers in one day, further reinforcing public confidence in the MRT.

A prophecy comes true

"Confidence counts for so much," says Richard Chen. Looking back over the MRT's trials and tribulations, it was questions of the invisible and intangible factors of confidence, trust and willingness to accept responsibility which made the engineers' task so much more difficult, and as a result the entire Taipei citizenry paid a price. Richard Chen particularly admires Chen Shui-bian's approach of combining a "political maneuver" with "engineering judgement." Today DORTS has won back its reputation by dint of its achievements, and although this has come late it is still something to be pleased about.

But if this is so, then fraud or bungling aside, didn't the public unwittingly help make the situation worse? Don't worry: Wu Meng-kui, who sees "nothing succeeds like success" as the most fitting footnote to the Mucha line saga, brings out an old sheet of paper from his book-lined study, on which in early 1993, when DORTS' troubles were looming on the horizon, an American engineer wrote a list of immutable "project lifecycle rules" to raise everyone's spirits.

This list, distilled from the experience of many overseas MRT projects, divides a project into six phases: the first is one of Enthusiasm, when hopes are high; the second is a more pragmatic period of Disillusionment; next comes Panic, followed by a paranoid Search for the Guilty. Then anger is appeased by Punishment of the Innocent, after which comes the final phase: Praise and Honor for Non-Participants!

Looking at this eye-opening "prophecy," we realize that the same applies to MRT projects anywhere--the rocky road of Taipei's Mucha line was in its stars from the outset. Now that we can rejoice at the final happy outcome, thinking back carefully over the whole process is no less fascinating than riding the MRT itself.

[Picture Caption]

Compared with the congested roads down at ground level, the elevated MRT line really is quick and convenient. Taipei residents' long wait is fin ally seeing results.

At the Mucha line's grand opening ceremony, key figures such as mayor Chen Shui-bian (second from right), deputy mayor Chen Shih-meng (far right) and TRTC president Regis Chen (far left) rode the MRT together. But did they share they same feelings about the line's entering service?

The Mucha line not only carries shoppers to downtown department stores - - Taipei Zoo at the end of the line in Mucha also attracts many visitors.

As the underground work on the MRT system ripped open the bowels of Taipei city streets, the proliferation of fenced-off construction sites ushered in a seemingly endless "dark age" of traffic chaos.

Taipei Rapid Transit Systems approved network

Source: TRTC/ drawn by Lee Su-ling

DPP councillor Lin Jui-tu (at right), is known as the "MRT Terminator." His blistering interpellations in the city council chamber have left a deep impression with the public, and sown doubts about the MRT engineering works.

The testing of the MRT system has all been carried out under the public gaze, and every mishap has attracted media attention and sharp criticism. Our picture shows a tire burst incident in 1993. (photo by Tung Chun-fei)

The problem of cracked cap beams has cast a shadow over the Mucha line. Here engineering workers are reinforcing a beam by sheathing it in steel plate. (photo by Tung Ch un-fei)

When high-tech products are imported from advanced countries, technology transfer and establishing an independent maintenance capability are the biggest problems, and the Mucha line is still seeking solutions. Pictured here is the EMU repair shop at the Mucha depot.

The strains of revenue service have brought many faults in the Mucha line to the surface. In our picture, two foreign technicians are carrying out emergency repairs to a ticket reading gate in one of the line's stations.

The future of the Mucha line depends not only on TRTC's operating ability, but also on the good citizenship of passengers. EMU repair shop director Tan Kuo-kuang can only give a wry smile as he shows off an imported seat deliberately damaged by vandals

The six lines of the first phase of Taipei's MRT network will not be completed for another three to five years. Until then, the public will just have to wait patiently.

The Mucha line not only carries shoppers to downtown department stores - - Taipei Zoo at the end of the line in Mucha also attracts many visitors.

As the underground work on the MRT system ripped open the bowels of Taipei city streets, the proliferation of fenced-off construction sites ushered in a seemingly endless "dark age" of traffic chaos.

Taipei Rapid Transit Systems approved network Source: TRTC／ drawn by Lee Su-ling.

DPP councillor Lin Jui-tu （at right）, is known as the "MRT Terminator." His blistering interpellations in the city council chamber have left a deep impression with the public, and sown doubts about the MRT engineering works.

The testing of the MRT system has all been carried out under the public gaze, and every mishap has attracted media attention and sharp criticism. Our picture shows a tire burst incident in 1993. （photo by Tung Chun-fei）

The problem of cracked cap beams has cast a shadow over the Mucha line. Here engineering workers are reinforcing a beam by sheathing it in steel plate. （photo by Tung Ch un-fei）

When high-tech products are imported from advanced countries, technology transfer and establishing an independent maintenance capability are the biggest problems, and the Mucha line is still seeking solutions. Pictured here is the EMU repair shop at the Mucha depot.

The strains of revenue service have brought many faults in the Mucha line to the surface. In our picture, two foreign technicians are carrying out emergency repairs to a ticket reading gate in one of the line's stations.

The future of the Mucha line depends not only on TRTC's operating ability, but also on the good citizenship of passengers. EMU repair shop director Tan Kuo-kuang can only give a wry smile as he shows off an imported seat deliberately damaged by vandals.

These comic dialogue routines, once popular in Beijing, were put together again from memory by Chen Yi-an, opening up a new territory for comic dialogues in Taiwan.

The six lines of the first phase of Taipei's MRT network will not be completed for another three to five years. Until then, the public will just have to wait patiently.