The Communist Chinese authorities really did start testing missiles on 8 March. What will Beijing's next move be? How will Taiwan respond? And what attitude and actions will the USA take? These questions have become the focus of worldwide attention. In this article I will not attempt to make any analysis or judgement on this issue, but instead I hope to express some opinions about, and remind readers of, some features of the triangular, interdependent relationship which has newly become involved in cross-strait relations.

Looking back over the changes in cross-strait relations since 1949, as well as Taipei's and Beijing's roles, the role Washington has played has frankly been crucial from the beginning. In the spring and summer of 1950, tension was building across the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese Communists had already made preparations to cross the strait and attack Taiwan. With the mainland and Taiwan on the verge of conflict, on 25 June war broke out on the Korean Peninsula. Two days later, on 27 June, the USA announced that its Seventh Fleet would patrol through the Taiwan Strait. This timely action effectively prevented the Chinese Communists from attacking Taiwan, and marked the beginning of US involvement in cross-strait relations. In 1954 the ROC and the United States signed the Sino-US Mutual Defense Treaty, which placed Taiwan and the Penghu Islands within a mutual defense zone, and this further "challenged" Beijing's "dignity" in dealing with the Taiwan question. This prompted Mao Zedong to go so far as to shell Kinmen in 1958 in order to test the US's attitude. Once Mao had realized that the US was utterly steadfast in its resolve to support the regime in Taiwan, the PRC abandoned the idea of a military attack on Taiwan for the time being, and cross-strait tensions gradually eased.

It is worth mentioning that in the 1950s and 60s when cross-strait relations were hostile, apart from China's communist rulers' repeated attempts to resolve the Taiwan question by force, the regime on Taiwan also tried to mount counterattack expeditions more than once. Information now available reveals that both around 1962 and around 1966, the regime on Taiwan made ready to attack the mainland, but each time strenuous American resistance prevented them from actually taking action. From this we can see that the US's approach to cross-strait relations and to its China policy has always been governed by considerations of the US's highest interests. Admittedly, from Taiwan's perspective, in most cases this has provided her with a reliable protective umbrella, but seen from Beijing, US involvement has been the greatest obstacle to dealing with the Taiwan question. Except for a period of about 20 years (from 1972 when Nixon visited Beijing and Sino-US relations improved, until 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and there was a subtle change in Sino-US relations) during which time the US clearly constrained Taiwan in order to curry favor with the PRC, there has basically been no major change in this triangular relationship. In the contest between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait, the US has always been an "interloper."

Because there has been no structural change in the US's overall national strategic thinking, this role as an "interloper" has not changed to this day. The change in cross-strait relations from June of last year, and even the reasons behind that change, in fact are all intimately related to the way the US plays this role.

These last few days, since the PRC's announcement that it will test-fire guided missiles into the sea off Keelung and Kaohsiung, the US has begun to show more active concern for the cross-strait situation than before. Perceived in the context of the pressure which Taiwan is facing at present, she is naturally very grateful for this show of concern. But whether the effect on cross-strait relations will actually be for the good or for the ill is perhaps something for people throughout Taiwan's society to give careful thought.

Compared with cross-strait relations back in the time of Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek, today's triangular relationship is different in at least the following three ways: 1) The total national resources at the disposal of the PRC regime are different; 2) The US's ability and resolve to involve itself in international affairs are different; 3) Taiwan's political environment is different.

Each of these aspects has changed radically since that time, especially the third aspect. It has been said that Mao Zedong never doubted Chiang Kai-shek's nationalism, and never thought that Chiang Kai- shek would abandon the name Republic of China and set up shop on his own. Thus Mao once sent a message to Chiang saying that if pressure on him [to do so] from the US became unbearable, he could blame the communists [who would not permit it]. From this we can see that although there was conflict between the leaders on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, it was a conflict against the background of a tacit understanding of "one China." As long as this "one China" principle was not transgressed, Chiang's getting assistance from outside powers could be grudgingly accepted. To put it bluntly, this shows the intensity of Chinese nationalism.

Today, however, the situation is utterly different. Firstly, the PRC now has deep suspicions about the Taiwan authorities' commitment to "one China," and since Ryotaro Shiba's [May 1994 Asahi Weekly] article, even doubts Lee Teng-hui's sentiments about being Chinese. With all these doubts, any reliance by Taiwan on US support is inevitably interpreted as Taiwan "playing the US card," and the US "playing the Taiwan card." The result of this is that the PRC's mood in dealing with the Taiwan question is underlain by a deep, powerful and even vehement nationalism. Therefore, although it is understandable if Taiwan desires US support and is grateful when it is forthcoming, in the eyes of the Beijing regime this precisely is evidence of a "collusion" whereby Taiwan puffs itself up by virtue of its backing from the US, and the US uses Taiwan as a pretext for interfering in China's internal affairs.

China has consistently stated that there are two sets of circumstances under which it cannot renounce the use of force. One is foreign intervention, and the other is Taiwanese independence. Foreign intervention is actually ranked first of the two. In Beijing's eyes, any movement towards independence by Taiwan constitutes an enormous "provocation" to their nationalist sentiments. This is bad enough in itself, but if they also suspect that such moves are the result of US intervention in the form of "toleration" of moves towards independence, this undeniably makes the problem more complex and serious.

There is reason to believe that from the first missile exercises in July of last year, the PRC's target in its tests, intimidation and challenges has never been Taiwan alone, but has always included the USA. From Taiwan's point of view, what it hopes for in cross-strait relations is naturally peace, exchange, cooperation and eventually moves towards reunification. This orientation is meeting with some difficulties at present, but is not impossible overall if only both sides are sincere and work hard to rebuild mutual trust. The worst thing to do in these circumstances is to make simple situations overcompli-cated. The US's role might very easily lead to such an outcome, so this must be handled carefully.

The two sides across the Taiwan Straits are locked in a battle of wits, playing a two-handed game of poker. But with US involvement this becomes a three-handed game. If one of the players suspects the other two of collusion, with nationalism as a catalyst it may escalate from being a battle of wits to become a battle of tempers, or even a battle of strength. Beware! Beware!