In 1932, with the help of the Rhodes Trust, Fairbank entered Tsinghua University in Peking as an auditing student. Under the guidance of history department chairman Chiang Yen-hsi, Fairbank used the National Palace Museum's collection of Ching dynasty documents to research modern Chinese history. In 1936 he earned his doctorate from Oxford and returned to Harvard to teach. Until today, now 83, Fairbank still goes daily to the Harvard Asia research institute-- the Fairbank Center--to study, receive visitors, and write. Though no longer active in politics, he still has many followers in important places in academics or government.

Of course, if Fairbank were only a single, ordinary scholar, he would not generate such controversy. However, there is no "pure scholarship" in politically relevant matters.

During the war, Fairbank worked for the military intelligence service responsible for researching and analyzing intelligence on China. He later served as a special assistant at the US embassy in Chungking and, after the war, as the director of the American information service in China. Because he was responsible for "collecting information about Chinese attitudes, and reporting to the US government to determine American policy toward China," his subjective views naturally affected policy.

From the beginning, his position of "being sympathetic to the Chinese Communist revolution" was quite clear. In 1946, in an article in Atlantic Monthly, Fairbank praised Mao Tse-tung and others as "agrarian reformers," and proclaimed that they were produced from the Chinese land and people, and absolutely were not the puppets of the Soviet Communist International.

This view was quite compatible with the views of the American left, which was already influential at that time. Because in the eyes of the US the communist party went from being an "insurrectionary group" to "the awakening of the strength of the people," Special Ambassador Marshall tried to force the national government to accept the communists in a coalition. After the national government refused, President Truman ordered the US to stop arms shipments to the government for 18 months. In the views of many ROC historians, and some outside Taiwan, this allowed the communists to take over the mainland.

In 1950 the Korean War broke out, and Communist China announced its "oppose America, aid Korea" slogan and dispatched troops to Seoul. The United States, surprised, changed its policy toward the mainland to "quarantine," and signed the Mutual Security Treaty with Taiwan.

At that time America set off in the search for "Who lost China?" During this period of recriminations, the American "white terror"--McCarthyism--spread across the US for ten years. Just as in Taiwan's period of extreme "Communist-phobia," Americans also placed "red hats" (accusations of Communist sympathy) widely, and everyone lived in fear.

"In this white terror Fairbank certainly received considerable degradation," notes Su Chi, associate professor of Diplomacy at Chengchi University. Of course, compared to others who were imprisoned or committed suicide, Fairbank was lucky. Because of "inadequate evidence," he not indicted. After a short period in isolation, he returned to activity.

From the early 1950's, the US began researching the possibility of "two Chinas." Fairbank raised the distinction of "continental China" and "oceanic China" (Taiwan). He actively promoted Taiwan independence, and not only in articles. He encouraged Taiwanese student Chen Yi-teh to appeal to the UN every February 28 for "Taiwan independence." It even went so far as, when in 1964 Peng Mingmin was arrested for Taiwan independence activities, Fairbank wrote a letter to the New York Times accusing the ROC of "political oppression."

In 1977, rumors of the establishment of formal relations between the US and Communist China had already become rife. The Taiwan independence theory of Fairbank and others was abandoned because it did not meet the approval of Communist China.

At this time Fairbank came to Taiwan and argued that "the Sino-American defense treaty is just a symbol," "Communist China has no intention and no ability to attack Taiwan," and "the US will still maintain cultural and economic ties with Taiwan," and other unwelcome words. This kind of frank expression naturally drew attacks from Taiwan's scholarly and political community, adding to earlier enmity from Fairbank's positions as a "fellow traveler of communists" and "plotting Taiwan independence," as well as "betraying allies." Fairbank was declared a persona non grata.

In fact, today, Taiwan is liberalized. Because of this, things seen earlier as taboos are nothing unusual. Slogans like "Taiwan independence" or "Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to Communist China" are faced calmly with an attitude of "not approving, but understanding." But the position of Fairbank has not improved in Taiwan.

Perhaps it is strange to some that Fairbank has been of use to the U.S. government in raising theories that provide a basis for China policy. In terms of real influence, there are many with more power. So why does Taiwan have such a deep impression toward Fairbank?

Chang Hao, professor of history at Ohio State University, explains that Fairbank's position as a forerunner of modern Chinese studies as well as his scholastic achievements cannot be denied. He notes that when as early as 1941 Fairbank organized the Far Eastern Association (today: Association for Asian Studies), he abandoned the traditional model of Sinologists to research a new subject: modern China. This established the basis for the shift in the US from "Sinology" to "China studies."

Of course, Fairbank's Chinese is pretty terrible, so in his arguments there are many ridiculous errors, misunderstandings, and contradictions, and even an unwillingness to admit mistakes is quite common. For example, the famous columnist Nan Min points out that although in the 1960's he loudly urged "two Chinas" and "Taiwan independence," there is not a word about that in his very hefty autobiography. And when Fairbank was interviewed by the Christian Science Monitor in 1987, he explained Mao's brainwashing policy of forcing every Chinese to read only the "Little Red Book" as "educating the peasants and allowing the peasants to participate in the nation's politics."

Perhaps as Fairbank himself says, "It is not possible to have a real 'China expert' in the world." For a Westerner who is not good at Chinese, understanding China is a process of groping, error, and correction. But in this process, one may wittingly or unwittingly cause real harm, which is hard to compensate for.

For now, let's put aside "evaluation," and let Fairbank speak for himself.

Q: What is your view of the June 4 Tienanmen incident? You have said many friendly things about Chinese Communism. Does this change your opinions a little bit?

A: It's a great tragedy, a great turning backward. But sooner or later China will recover. The situation has been developing for a number of years. The Communist Party doesn't have the answer to Chinese problems anymore. And since nobody else is allowed to try, we don't know who may have the answer. The main problem is the differential rate of change in political thinking. That is, the party is now very broken up, and we had an idea of economic change without political change, which is impossible. The intellectuals are no longer convinced of Marxism-Leninism or Maoism as the answer to China's problems. But they have no very concrete alternative.

Q: They don't believe in the traditional culture either.

A: Well, they believe in some traditional culture, and they believe in some Marxism. Of course, some of their ideas are like Confucianism, though they don't speak of it. The great Chinese tragedy consists of the fact that the Chinese style of government is very well-entrenched. With power you have the official, and the advice of the scholar, the passive obedience of the ordinary people. And all of those are inadequate to these modern problems.

Q: In spite of so many students having studied overseas, there are still not enough resources to achieve modernization?

A: The problem with going overseas is that you learn modern technology and modern ideas, but how do you apply them to China? And party dictatorship was picked up as a modern Western Soviet device, but now it is out of favor. It is obviously inadequate to mobilize the people. So the Chinese situation is very tragic. Now Taiwan's success is encouraging, but not necessarily an answer for the mainland which has so many more big problems, which is so much bigger. I think the success of Taiwan is a remarkable example which will be very influential in the mainland. We hope that the Taiwan example can inspire the mainland to meet its problems. You see the advantages of Taiwan are several: One is small size. The second is the Japanese background, the Japanese infrastructure...it made a considerable contribution. Then the American aid programs, like the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. It can be of help in a small country. The mainland is too big for foreign aid. And also Taiwan had a selection of leaders beginning with Chiang Kai-shek. And Taiwan has also had the practical leaders who were not ideologically crazy. They didn't have to follow a theoretical line. So that K.T. Li and people like that are practical people. And Chiang Ching-kuo really did quite a good job going along with them.

Q: How about the future of Taiwan--mainland relations?

A: I think the whole idea of unity needs reexamination. I'm not saying there should be many Chinas, but there should be semi-autonomy of regions. After all, South China is a region, Hong Kong, Canton, Hainan, that's a viable region. Fukien and Chekiang is a region. And the lower Yangtse. You need something like the British arrangement in India--dyarchy. There were certain subjects reserved to the center, like military, and certain subjects reserved to the regions, like economic growth. And it worked pretty well. China could do that.

Q: Do you think that if Taiwan wants to claim its independence, it will bring some danger?

A: Forget it! You give the mainland a tremendous talking point, a tremendous banner they hold aloft, "recover our lost Taiwan," demagoguery, you know, "a great insult to our Chinese people." And you see how they try to make something out of "American interference" in Tienanmen. Well, Taiwan independence would be much more. It would be an "American plot," a "Japanese plot," and all the xenophobia in general would be mobilized. And anybody who tried to stand against it would be a "traitor." So it would be used to oppress opposition in the name of unity. So raising the flag of Taiwan independence would start all that unnecessarily. After all, independence is becoming less independent the world round.

Q: Since the relationship between the US and the USSR is getting better, will the importance of China be diminished?

A. Yes. Neither we nor the Soviets need China anymore. We don't need China. It's a fact.

Q: What's the American attitude toward China right now?

A: [After briefly discussing the recent Congressional and executive actions over the question of Chinese students in the US, Fairbank went on:] The Chinese students who are here are a great asset for the Americans. Future friends maybe, assuming they don't all get fed up with the USA! They will stay and find ways to get their training and so on, and if things go as one hopes there will be thousands of very able Chinese technicians, scientists and literary people who are available for a new situation in China. We had this experience in Europe. The Americans got the top in scholarship; partly through the Europeans who came here [fleeing Germany], so I think this country realizes the value of helping scholars. Of course, the US doesn't want to try too hard. Nobody wants to be known as the running dog of the Americans.

Q: The revolution of Dr. Sun Yat-sen was largely inspired from overseas, by the overseas students and the overseas Chinese.

A: Sun was a very good international organizer. Though until his last years he was not very highly regarded by Chinese intellectuals. What he had to offer--his bright ideas were not unusual. But I think Sun Yat-sen's a very appealing figure, because when you come down to why he had influence it was because of his sincerity. He didn't know as much as Liang Ch'i-chao and such people. The one thing about him was he was for the revolution, for the people, however you work it out. He could be a symbol.

Q: How about a Sun Yat-sen in mainland China?

A: Hard to say. [Fairbank then moved on to discuss how a change could occur from within China:] You would expect that there would be splits in the Chinese military and some kind of civil-military leadership would emerge and there could be some new policies. You notice Gorbachev [has admitted errors], and sometime there will be a leader in China who says "we acknowledge the mistake of Tienanmen." That's the only way to get started again.

Q: What is your personal feeling about being such a giant figure in the American-Chinese relationship? Because your influence was strong in the whole direction of that relationship.

A: I have a very disillusioned view of that. You might even call me cynical. I think that people serve as symbols. And when you have an effort to study China and find out some facts, and then sympathize with various efforts that are being made, its a sort of a movement and you need symbols, something personal, that seems to represent that. And my generation came at the right time to fit into that. And in my generation I've been particularly productive of circular letters, putting out statements, so I'm better known than others. So having a symbol lets you grab it and use it, and the anti-Communists in this country could use me as a symbol to attack. And when I was advocating normalization of relations between the United States and Peking, people in Taiwan--especially Hu Chiu-yuan--used me as a symbol of the betrayal of Taiwan. And when I went to China in 1972 Chou En-lai could invite me as a symbol of friendship to China. But I think I've been a little difficult to deal with because I'm a little critical. You know there's a Snow, Smedley, Strong Association. Those are "friends of the Chinese revolution." Well, I have escaped that. They never include me, I've said too much against them.

Q: Is there any big change in your opinion toward China over the past half century?

A: Well my opinions have been changing all the time, because I don't believe in words. "Democracy" or "revolution" mean different things to different people at different times, circumstances. So [laughs] I'm afraid I don't have an adequate ideology.

[Picture Caption]

John King Fairbank is already 83 this year, but he is still energetic. Every day he still goes to Harvard's Asia research institution--the Fairbank Center.

At this United China Relief meeting in 1942, the US and ROC flags flew side by side, symbolizing friendship between the nations. (photo courtesy of Central News Agency)

In 1945, Special Ambassador Marshall arrived in Nanking, and was met at the airport by President Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang. (photo courtesy of Central News Agency)

In 1951, with the government already in Taiwan, the commander of the US Seventh Fleet came to inspect naval facilities. (photo courtesy of Central News Agency)

At this United China Relief meeting in 1942, the US and ROC flags flew side by side, symbolizing friendship between the nations. （photo courtesy of Central News Agency）

In 1945, Special Ambassador Marshall arrived in Nanking, and was met at the airport by President Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang. （photo courtesy of Central News Agency）

In 1951, with the government already in Taiwan, the commander of the US Seventh Fleet came to inspect naval facilities. （photo courtesy of Central News Agency）