Q: The 2012 East China Sea Crisis was set off when Japan announced the “nationalization” of the Diaoyutai Islets. Has the situation restabilized?
A: 2012 was the worst year ever for the Diaoyutai issue since Tokyo and Beijing normalized their relations in 1972. Even now, it is possible that shooting could break out between the two sides in the seas around the islets at any moment. The crux of the problem is that mainland China has shifted from a policy of “cool management” of the Diaoyutai issue to one of “heated assertiveness.”
From “cool” to “heated”
Mainland China’s policy of “cool management” was manifested when in 1972 Japanese prime minister Kakuei Tanaka visited mainland China, and Japan’s interlocutor on the Diaoyutai issue switched from Taipei to Beijing. In talks between Tanaka and mainland Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, the Diaoyutai dispute was not even on the agenda, nor did Zhou seek to bring it up. In my view, the two sides must have had a tacit agreement to shelve the issue.
The first time mainland China ever sent a government vessel into the waters around the islets was on December 8, 2008. The term “heated assertiveness” refers to the mainland sending government vessels or aircraft on “routine patrols” into waters near the islets, something the mainland has been doing frequently in the past few years. They continue to do so despite Japan’s having stated that the mainland’s contention that such incursions are routine is “unacceptable.” The two sides have been unable to agree on norms governing navigation by sea or air through or over the territorial waters around the Diaoyutais. This is the critical unresolved issue of the crisis.
Q: How has the East China Sea Peace Initiative put forward by President Ma Ying-jeou been helpful to upholding Taiwan’s rights and interests with regard to the Diaoyutai Islets?
A: The method the ROC government has chosen to deal with the controversy can be summarized in three points: (1) not being provocative, but not shying away from taking a stand; (2) not acting in concert with mainland China; and (3) advancing President Ma’s East China Sea Peace Initiative.
Principled sovereignty, pragmatic dialogue
The desire not to be provocative is another way of saying that Taiwan wants to handle the Diaoyutai conflict by peaceful means. However, the ROC government’s stand on sovereignty has always been the same: The islets are ROC territory. The government will not shy away from defending that stand. For example, the ROC government’s position is that if Taiwan fishing boats go on an organized non-governmental demonstration to “protect the Diaoyutais,” they will certainly be escorted by ROC government vessels.
It was not long after the East China Sea Peace Initiative was announced that the ROC and Japan signed a fisheries agreement in March 2013. The agreement had been stuck in the negotiating stage for 17 years. As President Ma stated at the conference entitled “Examining the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute Under New and Multiple Perspectives,” staged in April of 2014 by the Institute of Modern History of the Academia Sinica, the current moment boasts the most harmonious relations between Taiwan and Japan since the break in formal diplomatic ties in 1972.
As a result of the signing of the fisheries agreement, fishing boats from Taiwan now have unhindered access to fishing grounds that are twice the area of the island of Taiwan itself, and they need not worry about any interference from Japanese vessels so long as they are operating in the area covered by the agreement. I rate this achievement very highly.
The most important thing, moreover, is that the agreement includes nothing prejudicial to our position that the ROC has sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islets.
Q: Why did Japan respond positively to the East China Sea Peace Initiative and suddenly sign that landmark fisheries agreement?
A: Undeniably, the government of Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe moved to settle the fisheries rights negotiations precisely in order to pull Taiwan closer to Japan as a response to the confrontation with mainland China. This can be considered one of a number of strategic moves that Abe has made to cope with the mainland’s “heated assertiveness.” These include steps to strengthen the Japanese military. For example, during Abe’s first tenure in office [2006–2007] the Defense Agency [created in 1954] was upgraded into the Ministry of Defense. Recently Abe’s cabinet passed a resolution that gives the Japanese Self-Defense Forces the right to engage in “collective self-defense” [i.e., to assist allies even if Japan is not directly attacked]. Also, at the end of this year the Japanese government will amend its core defense policy document [to include a substantial increase in the military budget and force structure].
Q: Now that the US and Japan have issued a joint communiqué stressing that the “Senkaku Islets” (as they are known in Japan) are covered by the US–Japan Security Treaty, how has the balance of power in the East China Sea been affected? Is there more upside or downside to the US position?
A: Abe has accused mainland China of attempting to change the status quo in both the East China Sea and the South China Sea by the use of coercive power. The US agrees with this. At the same time, the US thinks that Japan—even with Abe’s actions to strengthen the Japanese military—is not yet at the point where it could get out of control.
US aims for regional stability
The Diaoyutai Islets are right along the line that the US considers the “first line of defense” in the Pacific. The US has used its leading position in Asia–Pacific regional security since World War II to deter instability along this line, and therefore supports maintenance of the status quo in the Diaoyutai area as the best option. The US president’s declaration that the “Senkakus” fall under the US–Japan Security Treaty, the first time this has ever been explicitly stated, was not only a warning to mainland China, it was also directed at the Abe government. The US does not want Japan to go too far, because that could provoke a crisis with mainland China.
Q: Are you saying that the US recourse to the US–Japan Security Treaty is actually beneficial to maintaining the status quo and contributes to regional peace?
A: With the US making its presence felt in the Diaoyutai dispute, mainland China won’t dare act rashly, and I think that for at least the next several years Beijing will make no move to seize the islets. At the current stage, by playing a buffer role between mainland China and Japan in the East China Sea, the US can play a positive role.
But maintaining regional stability is not the Americans’ sole consideration. The ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations are another reason why President Obama “picked a side” for the first time in the Diaoyutai dispute. There has been a lot of opposition to the TPP in Japan that Abe needs to work around for Japan to enter the TPP without any hitches. The US is also pushing Japan to move faster to join. In response to the US siding with Japan on the Diaoyutais, Tokyo will be perhaps be more forthcoming on the TPP.
Q: The Diaoyutai Islets are the territory of the Republic of China. What further actions do you think Taiwan can take in controversies connected to the islets?
A: The ROC government has not strongly criticized the assertive actions taken by mainland China around the Diaoyutais in recent years. But this does not mean Taipei supports Beijing’s actions. Moreover, when necessary, the ROC government expresses to mainland China its position that the islets are under the sovereignty of the ROC. For example, in 2012, as vessels from both Taiwan and mainland China appeared in the waters around the Diaoyutais, the ROC Coast Guard warned off the mainland vessels, saying, “This is ROC territory; please leave the area at once.”
Given Taiwan’s diplomatic situation, and our need to take into account our position with regard to sovereignty over the Diaoyutais, I strongly approve of President Ma’s East China Sea Peace Initiative. After all, it is a fundamental tenet of post-WWII international society that territorial disputes must be settled peacefully.
President Ma has also proposed an action plan for dialogue and crisis management, with various possible configurations for talks. This will be a hard row to hoe. The Diaoyutais are very sensitive territory—Japan claims there are no grounds for any sovereignty dispute, so won’t agree to any talks on sovereignty no matter what the combination.
The proposed dialogue needn’t be about sovereignty. To gets talks on sovereignty started would be very difficult right now. But you could first try to start talks on crisis management. I feel that Taiwan and Japan, Japan and mainland China, and Taiwan and the mainland can successfully create a mechanism for maintaining peace around the Diaoyutais. Taiwan and Japan, at least, have to go beyond the fisheries agreement and also have a dialogue about security, to forestall possible future misunderstandings.
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