When the ROC held its first-ever direct presidential elections in March of 1996, the Chinese Communist regime on the other side of the Taiwan Strait undertook a series of missile tests and military maneuvers aimed at Taiwan. Although it later proved that the M-class missiles fired by mainland China did not carry high-explosive warheads or weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, or chemical), the tests provoked a sharp drop in the Taiwan stock, foreign exchange, and real estate markets. They also sparked the largest wave of emigration since the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979.

These events are familiar-indeed unforgettable-to most people in Taiwan. But few know that in the National Defense White Paper published in March of 1992, Lin Chong-pin, in an article entitled "Chinese Communist Military Modernization and Its Significance for Taiwan," accurately predicted the events of 1996. Lin, who is now vice-chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, postulated that Communist China could invade Taiwan through seven steps, of which the fifth was a "missile shock": "Communist China could conduct missile tests aimed at Taiwan's territory or territorial waters, intending to intimidate the population. The missiles needn't carry warheads, and the target need not be a populated area, but could be, for example, outlying islands or nearby territorial waters. Before the event, Beijing could argue that they have 'the right to test fire missiles in "Chinese territory,"' with the intention of causing the collapse of the Taiwan stock market and an emigration panic." (Note 1)

This point shows that Communist China is skilled at using psychological warfare and hopes to achieve "reunification of the motherland" without firing a shot or suffering a casualty. It also shows that as a scholar of strategic studies, Lin has long had a clear understanding of Communist Chinese intentions.

After the 1996 crisis was over, the US changed its policy toward the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. On the one hand it strengthened its policy of engagement with Communist China: The leaders of the two sides exchanged visits, there was talk of construction of a strategic partnership, and there was strengthening of confidence-building mechanisms and high-level visits between the two militaries. At the same time, the US encouraged Taiwan and Communist China to increase contacts and to discuss issues. One result of this atmosphere at that time was the visit to Shanghai by Koo Chen-fu, chairman of Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation, a visit which reopened high-level contacts between the SEF and the mainland's counterpart organization.

On the other hand, the US was quietly moving to build a wall of "containment" around Communist China. In 1997 discussions were begun to clarify the purpose of the US-Japan Security Treaty. The result of these was to broaden the scope covered by the defense treaty, with the application of the treaty depending upon "the nature of the situation." Without saying so directly, this brought the Taiwan Strait within the geographic scope covered by the defense treaty. Furthermore, in 1998 the US began to promote construction of a Theater Missile Defense system in the zone of potential conflict in Northeast Asia, with Taiwan, Japan, and the Republic of Korea playing the main roles. Though no specific potential enemy was identified, through the construction of this missile system these countries would have formed a de facto strategic alliance with the United States. This was enough for Communist China to protest vehemently.

Shocking revelations

This year, a series of unfortunate incidents-revelations of Chinese spying, human rights friction, problems over PRC entry into the World Trade Organization, and the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO in early May (which generated storms of public protest in mainland China)-have caused relations between the two sides to deteriorate to an unfriendly, Cold War level. No incident has been more shocking than the release of the Cox Report by the US House of Representatives on May 25. The report reveals that since the 1970s, Communist China has been continually and through various means stealing American nuclear secrets and satellite technology, allowing Communist Chinese nuclear weapons capability to leap forward.

Most disturbing is that Communist China acquired the technology to make multiple-warhead submarine-launched nuclear missiles, technology for miniaturizing warheads, and information for building "hot" nuclear weapons and neutron bombs, allowing Communist China to proceed with construction of third-generation nuclear weapons.

Amazingly, the "shocking" revelations of the Cox report were all foreseen in Lin Chong-pin's 1988 book China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy. On page 140 of that book it says: "China will continue improving its nuclear arsenal quietly through active spectrum expansion and passive quantitative augmentation. . . . Efforts on spectrum expansion will likely concentrate on the space industry as the leading priority. . . . A second priority is the seabased deterrent, with particular emphasis on developing various forms of cruise missiles in addition to the already tested SLCM. . . . A third priority might be the miniaturization of nuclear warheads in conjunction with the improvement of TNWs [theater nuclear weapons]. Other efforts on solid fuel, multiple warhead technology, and accuracy will continue as well." (Note 2)

From this we can see that the Cox report confirms the accuracy of the analysis and predictions that Lin made about Communist Chinese nuclear weapons strategy. It is no wonder that the relevant authorities in Communist China had Lin's book translated into Chinese in October of 1992, and gave the book high praise.

The translators' foreword (the translators included Liu Jifeng and others) praises Lin's book as "surpassing any previous study in both breadth and depth." It also applauds him for placing Communist Chinese nuclear strategy "in the historical context of traditional Chinese strategic thought," and adds: "This is a special feature of the book, and one of its strongest points."

Lin points out that the traditional elements in contemporary Chinese nuclear strategy include the idea of giving top priority to human factors, deterrence, and stratagems. Lin emphasizes that Communist China's strategy has its roots in the traditions of stressing non-military and non-combat factors, integration, flux, fluidity, negativism, and minimalism. These lead to a nuclear strategy which is based on indirection and implication, emphasizes non-military factors, involves sudden leaps forward, and actively uses passive factors.

These are some of the main arguments that constitute Lin's 1988 book China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy, which is now available for the first time in a Taiwan translation in Lin's recently published The Nuclear Hegemon. Although China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy was published back in 1988, it is still very enlightening for readers today to find out how Communist China's nuclear weapons strategy is very much tied to Chinese strategic tradition. Anyone studying Communist China's military cannot ignore the influence of traditional strategic culture.

In addition, The Nuclear Hegemon includes four articles published by Lin between 1994 and 1996 in international publications. These articles, which provide in-depth discussion of the military buildup of China's People's Liberation Army as it enters the next century, are: "The Military Balance in the Taiwan Straits," "The Power Projection Capabilities of the People's Liberation Army," "Red Fist: China's Army in Transition," and "Chinese Military Modernization." Besides allowing one to understand the qualitative and quantitative development of Communist China's military power, these also serve as a reminder to people in Taiwan not to ignore the mainland's determination and ability to use force against Taiwan.

Nerve paralysis

Finally, the book also includes Lin's 1999 study "Dianxue Warfare: Communist China's Development of Weapons for War in the Next Century." This emphasizes that in the 1980s Communist China had already begun to work on the next generation of war fighting capability (which, as Lin notes, is called dianxue warfare in the mainland). [The term, derived from Chinese martial arts, refers to the paralysis of an opponent by precise thrusts in vital spots.]

In a conflict between information societies, whoever can control electromagnetic power will win. Lin emphasizes that Communist China has been going all-out to develop dianxue capability, including "hard kill" weaponry (such as cruise missiles, guided bombs, and remote control mines) and "soft kill" weapons (like electronic interference weapons, computer viruses, directed energy weapons, and electromagnetic pulse bombs). Besides relying on their own research and development efforts, Communist China also relies on imported technology.

Communist China aims to prevent the United States from controlling Taiwan, and its ultimate goal is "to 'compel Taiwan to sue for peace' at the negotiating table, thereby completing 'reunification.'" Communist China has repeatedly emphasized that the aim of information warfare is to "achieve complete victory over the enemy's military without fighting." (Note 3)

Lin proposes a three-pronged strategy for coping with the threat: First is to quietly do research to counter theirs. The second is to upgrade technology and strengthen defenses. The third is to make Taiwan impregnable and wait for qualitative change to come to mainland China.

Don't rely on the enemy not coming

In sum, by reading Lin's new book, The Nuclear Hegemon, the reader can enjoy, first, a systematic look back at Communist China's long road to becoming a nuclear power and its subtle use of traditional Chinese strategic thinking, as seen through the eyes of a Chinese. The reader can also come to understand the true capabilities of the PLA through the essays on PLA military modernization. Finally, through the essay on dian-xue warfare, one can understand that Communist China is already preparing for war in the next century. After all, according to the adage of Sun Tzu, by knowing oneself and knowing the enemy, one can win one hundred victories in one hundred battles.

Taiwan must avoid Communist China's strengths and exploit its weaknesses, and develop measures to counter its strategies, to avoid facing a repeat of the 1996 missile crisis. As Sun Tzu wrote, it is best not to rely on the enemy not coming, but rather to rely on being prepared to meet him; it is best not to wait to be attacked, but to make oneself so strong that the enemy dare not attack. Only if we are completely prepared mentally can Taiwan be secure in the long run.

Note 1: Hong Tien-mao et. al., National Defense White Paper (Taipei: Yeh-chiang Publishers, 1992): p. 192.

Note 2: (Lexington MA: Lexington Publishers, 1988): p. 140.

Note 3: See Li Xianyao et. al., Information War (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1998): p. 82.

Title: The Nuclear Hegemon

Author: Lin Chong-pin

Publisher: Student Book Company Ltd.

Price: NT$399

Length: 482 pages

p.110

(photo by Hsueh Chi-kuang)

p.111

Communist China has been actively developing weapons for "third-wave" warfare (called dianxue warfare in the mainland), including stealing nuclear secrets from the US. Lin Chong-pin has long had a deep understanding of the PRC's long-range strategic goals.

p.113

In contrast to previous wars, in a "third wave" war it is unlikely mainland China will attempt a direct invasion of Taiwan. But this does not mean Taiwan can let down its guard. This photo shows maneuvers conducted by the ROC military this spring in the Penghu Islands. (photo by Hsueh Chi-kuang)

p.114

Lin Chong-pin suggests that the aerospace industry will be key in upgrading PRC nuclear capability. This photo was taken at an aerospace technology exhibition held at Taipei's World Trade Center last year.

Communist China has been actively developing weapons for "third-wave" warfare （called dianxue warfare in the mainland）, including stealing nuclear secrets fro m the US. Lin Chong-pin has long had a deep understanding of the PRC's long-range strategic goals.

In contrast to previous wars, in a "third wave" war it is unlikely mainland China will attempt a direct invasion of Taiwan. But this does not mean Taiwan can let down its guard. This photo shows maneuvers conducted by the ROC military this spring in the Penghu Islands. （photo by Hsueh Chi-kuang）

Lin Chong-pin suggests that the aerospace industry will be key in upgrading PRC nuclear capability. This photo was taken at an aerospace technology exhibition held at Taipei's World Trade Center last year.