Politics and economics
In the ten years since the Union Jack was lowered in Hong Kong, the territory has been getting ever closer and ever more intimate with its new dance partner. Having transitioned from doubt to acceptance, the dancers have begun to step lively.
"The game turns on Hong Kong. If 'one country, two systems' succeeds there, it will have unparalleled propaganda value in Taiwan and in the rest of the world," says an observer familiar with the politics of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. "Beijing can also use Hong Kong to counterbalance the influence of Shanghai."
Under China's current "vassal-state economy," local governments have a great deal of autonomy. The chief administrators of cities and provinces are appointed and removed based on their success in developing their economies and attracting new businesses. With China's rapid swing to the right and the focus everywhere turning to money, "Beijing sees Shanghai, where former president Jiang Zemin retains some power, as a major threat to its hegemony," continues this observer. "Consequently, when Hong Kong and Shanghai vie for position as financial centers, Beijing is more than happy to give Hong Kong a boost."
But how long will Hong Kong's wealthy and powerful new flame continue to dote on it? If Beijing's love wanes, where will Hong Kong find the energy to keep its economy moving? Recognizing what the score is, the people of Hong Kong are of two minds about the relationship.
"Take CEPA, for example. Hong Kong must realize that China will keep its promise to the WTO to gradually open its markets. That means that its pro-Hong-Kong bias will gradually fade," says Tam.
"More importantly, what are Hong Kong's defining characteristics?" asks Lin Yuh-jiun, who feels that relying on perks from China to push up revenues is risky. "If, for example, Taiwan and China were to restart negotiations and permit direct transportation links, Hong Kong would suffer the immediate loss of the more than 2 million visitors who transit through the territory every year."
"If you look at the big picture," says Tam, "Hong Kong's economic role has always been determined for it. From the days of British rule down to the present, it hasn't had the right to decide for itself." He notes that this is one of the principal characteristics of a colonial economy.
"Hong Kong would do well as a financial center, and it has what it takes," says Leung Man-tao, principal of Ngau Pang Sue Yuen (Cattle Depot College). "But in an ordinary society, if a city wanted to become a financial center, its citizens would be able to voice their opinions and discuss what sorts of structures needed to be put into place to address likely side effects, things like the expansion of the income gap, rising rents, and the squeezing out of businesses that depend upon reasonable rents."
"Sadly, Hong Kong hasn't yet been given the opportunity," says Leung. The excessive emphasis on Hong Kong's unique functions in the areas of finance, trade, transshipment, and tourism vis-a-vis the larger Chinese economy has sacrificed Hong Kong's economic independence and greatly sapped its economic health, and it has left out in the cold the many Hong Kong residents who are unable to make a place for themselves within this model.
Historically, colonialists have exploited their colonies' resources. "But Hong Kong provided Britain with no goods or materials," says political observer Nanfang Shuo. "Neither did Britain require Hong Kong to remit economic gains back to the UK. Instead, a different kind of economic benefit accrued to Hong Kong's British administration--it allowed many British-invested firms to put down deep roots in Hong Kong, such as the Swire Group (which controls Cathay Pacific Airways), and HSBC. Major corporations such as these grew strong in Hong Kong, creating jobs and contributing to the territory's prosperity."
On the eve of the tenth anniversary of Hong Kong's return, Lu Ping, a former head of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the PRC State Council who was involved in the handover talks, recalled that the central government's pre-1997 attitude was that Hong Kong's stability depended on the capitalists. Placating these capitalists was therefore the overriding concern of their economic policy. "For both the British administration and the Chinese, the heart of the matter is that Hong Kong has always been controlled through its major businesses," says Leung Man-tao.
"With Asia's lowest taxes and its lack of worker protections, Hong Kong's 'can do' spirit fostered the myth that one needed only work hard to succeed," says Tam Chi-keung. According to Tam, the refugees from the mainland who came in those days probably weren't concerned about inequities; they simply wanted to take advantage of Hong Kong's 99 years of "borrowed time" to get wealthy. But would the people of Hong Kong be willing to accept the wealth inequities and overwhelmingly capitalist leanings of their society after their return to China, even given that the nominally socialist Chinese authorities had given the system their tacit approval?
"This is why democracy, the right to make your own decisions, is so important," says Leung Man-tao. "Hong Kong faces myriad environmental and social justice issues independent of questions of GDP, logistics or financial centers. We can't depend on Beijing to resolve them."
Shops and restaurants are everywhere in Asia's "global city," providing a never-ending feast for the eyes and the taste buds.