The summit meeting between US Presi-dent Clinton and PRC leader Jiang Zemin in Beijing on June 26 once again focused international attention on the Taiwan problem. Although there was no indication at the summit that US policy toward Taiwan had changed, when Clinton vivited Shanghai on June 30, he openly enunciated the US "three no's" policy: no support for Taiwan independence, no support for "one China one Taiwan" or "two Chinas," and no support for Taiwan participation in organizations based on statehood. This statement has become the focus of attention.

Clinton led a group to Beijing at the end of June, where he met with PRC President Jiang Zemin. They exchanged views on a number of subjects including trade, nuclear weapons proliferation, Taiwan, Tibet, international security, and human rights. Naturally, the ROC government focused most closely on US and PRC attitudes towards Taiwan. It was generally believed that the summit could have a profound influence on Taiwan's future.

The Taiwan issue has always been the most important and sensitive in the Sino-American relationship. The American attitude toward Taiwan also affects cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and mainland China. America's principles for handling the Taiwan issue have mainly been based on the Taiwan Relations Act and the "three communiqu廥" signed in the past between leaders of the US and the PRC.

However, given unrelenting pressure from mainland China, as well as US hopes of building a "constructive strategic partnership" with mainland China, last year at the Clinton-Jiang summit in Washington, there were rumors that the US had agreed to the policy of "three no's." Consequently, for Clinton's trip to the PRC, attention was focused on whether or not the US would, under Chinese pressure, openly commit itself to the "three no's."

The ROC government has always hoped to play a more active role in issues related to Taiwan or PRC behavior. Foreign Minister Jason Hu states that the most advantageous method for Taiwan would be to restructure the traditional trilateral relationship into two parallel bilateral relationships (between the US on one side and Taiwan and the PRC, respectively, on the other).

The PRC side, besides conducting its uninterrupted direct offensive against Taiwan using the strategy of "one country two systems," has also been pressing the US on three issues: limiting arms sales to Taiwan, peaceful negotiations, and one country two systems. Cheng Juei-yao, an associate researcher at the Institute for International Relations at National Chengchih University, explains the significance of these three themes:

The PRC hopes to limit US arms sales to Taiwan in order to break down psychological resistance in Taiwan and reduce its outside support, and also to give communist China absolute military superiority. At the same time, through adopting a diplomatic posture of favoring "peaceful negotiation," which plays to the American concern for maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait, the PRC hopes that the US will "encourage" Taiwan to begin negotiations on political issues with mainland China. Finally, building on the experience of Hong Kong smoothly being returned to PRC sovereignty, mainland China is pushing a Taiwan version of "one country two systems" on the US.

The summit showed that the US attitude toward the Taiwan issue had not fundamentally changed. At the press conference following the summit, Clinton stated that the US would continue to follow the one-China principle and encourage discussions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Later, at a press conference held by US national security adviser Sandy Berger, a press release stated that Clinton reiterated to the Chinese side that the US adhered to the basic principle of one China, which is based on the three communiqu廥, and that-a point especially emphasized by Clinton-the most important thing to the US was that the Taiwan Strait problem be resolved peacefully. At the same time, with regard to the sensitive "three no's," the press release said the US would continue the policy of not supporting Taiwan independence, "one China and one Taiwan," or Taiwan's entry into international organizations based on statehood.

However, it was only in Shanghai that Clinton for the first time personally and publicly acknowledged the "three no's."

On the PRC side, Jiang Zemin merely reiterated the mainland's position by stating that the Taiwan issue is the most important and sensitive in Sino-American relations, and that the PRC hoped that the US would act strictly in accordance with the principles and relevant promises made in the three communiqu廥 and the Sino-American joint declaration.

In response to the summit meeting, Premier Vincent Siew declared that Taiwan hoped the US would maintain a consistent attitude and position toward Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act. Premier Siew also told ROC citizens that they could not naively rely on the US for Taiwan's security and future. The US has its own national interests to consider, and Taiwan's interests are consistent with American interests only in some respects. Meanwhile, the ROC must strengthen its interactions with the US in those areas in which they share common foundations, and let Americans know how sacrificing Taiwan's interests would be equivalent to sacrificing US interests.

Premier Siew also declared that Clinton's discussion of the "three no's" in Shanghai was "unnecessary." If the US is concerned about ROC policy, it should discuss this directly with Taipei. Foreign Minister Jason Hu added that there was really no need for the US to emphasize the "three no's," which would inevitably be a psychological blow to Taiwan. However, Hu also emphasized that Taiwan people themselves were decisive in determining the severity of this blow, and would hold fast to control of their own fate.

Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang argues that the fact that Clinton chose an informal, non-diplomatic setting to openly state the "three no's" shows that the US did not want to unduly emphasize the political significance of the policy, and that it simply represents an extension of long-term US policy. However, the "three no's," while maintaining the traditional US principle of "one China," also severely restrict Taiwan's space for participation in international society and for strengthening its sovereign independence. Hsu concluded that Taiwan clearly should deal with US-PRC-Taiwan relations even more carefully.

Kao Lang, a professor of political science at National Taiwan University, states that the ROC must pay attention to how the US implements the "three no's," as their specific form of implementation could seriously affect Taiwan's diplomatic room for maneuver. Also, if the PRC takes US oral statements as guarantees, then unilaterally extends their meaning and demands that other countries acknowledge the same principles (as interpreted by Beijing), this would also narrow Taiwan's diplomatic room for maneuver.

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