Presidential inaugural addresses are usually considered more ceremonial than substantive. The recent address by President Lee Teng-hui to mark his inauguration for the ninth term of the presidency of the ROC was thus a first in history: It was controversial even before it was made, and people had many expectations and speculations about it. The media tried every trick in the book to get a copy beforehand, with the result that it was made public the day before the inauguration. Yet there was still guessing about possible changes. And even when the speech was over, everybody was still interpreting and explaining it.

The audience for President Lee's inaugural address was the 21.3 million people of the territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. The speech covered Taiwan's democratic achievements as well as the economy, domestic policy, culture, and cross-strait relations. It included reflection on the past and expectations for the future. The part that was most prominent and the focus of greatest international concern was that on cross-strait relations. For local citizens, the economic and domestic policy sections most directly affect their daily lives. Yet, for the "children of the Yellow Emperor" who are heirs to the 5,000 years of Chinese culture, the concept of creating a "Chinese renaissance" articulated in the speech might have the most far-reaching import.

As early as February and March, when the presidential election was in full swing, the PRC began a series of military exercises to affect the election and strike a blow at the forces of Taiwan independence. It was then rumored that the Chinese military would watch the victory speech of the winner closely, and would decide whether to attack Taiwan based on whether the speech favored Taiwan independence.

Since President Lee's victory speech focused mainly on thanking his supporters and praising Taiwan's voters, attention shifted to the inaugural address. But by this time the scope of attention had broadened beyond the question of Taiwan independence. Now attention would also be given to whether or not there would be explicit acknowledgment of "one China," whether there would be an emphasis on broadening Taiwan's international space, and whether there would be any concrete gestures friendly to the PRC. At the same time, local and international media closely observed, speculated, and offered opinions. There were even a few prestigious US and Japanese media who raised the issue with Lee when, prior to the address, they were given the rare opportunity to interview him.

On May 20, Lee delivered his address according to the original text. He did not, as some had speculated, change the speech because it had been leaked to Japan's Keizai Shimbun the day before. The speech covered a wide variety of themes, demonstrating the breadth of vision of this "first ever popularly elected leader in the 5,000-year history of the Chinese people." Nevertheless, the point that attracted the most attention was, "I am willing to carry the consensus and will of the 21.3 million people of Taiwan to undertake a journey of peace to mainland China." This sentence created an opportunity to turn around cross-strait relations.

After the speech, a wave of praise home and abroad flooded the electronic and print media. Of course the response of government officials and pro-KMT scholars was most approving. Yet, even Chen I-hsin, a scholar of Sino-American relations and a newly elected legislator from the New Party (an anti-Taiwan independence party that is also seen as opposing Lee), had a quite positive assessment.

Re-opening the door to discussion

Chen I-hsin argues that not only the New Party, but all sectors home and abroad, should welcome President Lee's clear statement that Taiwan "has absolutely no need for, and cannot possibly choose, the path of so-called 'Taiwan independence.'" The theory of Taiwan independence is blind to the international situation, and can only create unnecessary tensions between the two sides of the strait. Not only would this be harmful to rational discussion, it could give hard-liners in the PRC an excuse to use force against Taiwan, causing irreparable damage to life and property.

It may appear that at this point there are many obstacles to a "journey of peace," so that it was nothing but a slogan. But since it appeared in the inaugural address, it ought to be seen as a promise, albeit a conditional one, one that depends on domestic consensus and mainland China's reaction. Moreover, says Chen I-hsin, a meeting between the leaders of the two sides "would be a major event. Before it, besides having to satisfy all kinds of preconditions, it would be necessary to have a series of amicable interactions--constant discussions at lower levels." But, Chen cautions, discussion is not agreement. Taiwan must always beware that the PRC will probably play the international card and strike at Taiwan everywhere it can internationally.

Overall, in terms of cross-strait relations, Chen sees Lee's inaugural address as being a moderate and not especially innovative speech, but it certainly did express a considerably friendly attitude and reopened the door to discussions. However, people should not expect any sudden breakthrough in cross-strait relations, because Taiwan and the PRC are in a "cold peace" situation, and there is no need to rush things. What about comments that the speech was not concrete, having failed to discuss postal and transportation links with the mainland or "Taiwan- Hong Kong relations"? Chen says that in fact this was a smart move. A presidential inaugural address should be a statement of general principles; there is no need to speak about lower-level problems that will have to be faced in the future, and to tie one's own hands.

"Delay" is victory

Although Taiwan-Hong Kong relations were not mentioned, Hong Kong media and scholars paid close attention to the speech. On the 20th, major English and Chinese language newspapers in Hong Kong gave the speech big play. They noted that Lee not only announced his opposition to Taiwan independence, he didn't even mention getting into the United Nations; they saw this as expressing quite friendly intentions toward the PRC.

In an editorial, the Hong Kong Economic Journal said that Communist China should change its view of Lee Teng-hui, and "respect the way he has navigated Taiwan to the dignity of democratic politics without bloodshed." The Tsingtao Daily called on Beijing to make a friendly response to Lee in order to ameliorate the tense cross-strait situation.

Why would the Hong Kong media, only a year before 1997, support Taiwan so strongly? Aren't they apprehensive about what might happen after the PRC takes over? Jin Zhong, the editor-in-chief of Open Magazine, says that outsiders don't understand Hong Kong. He is very optimistic about Hong Kong's future, and believes Communist China does not have the capability of changing Hong Kong's mindset of freedom. They simply cannot expect to maintain Hong Kong's economic prosperity if they try to clamp down on press freedom. "It's not that they don't want to, it's they absolutely can't do it."

Jin is also rather optimistic about Taiwan's future. Even when the cross-strait crisis was most intense, he often came to Taiwan to collect materials and visit his Taiwan correspondents. After the presidential election he immediately came to Taiwan to chair a seminar. Jin was born in the PRC and lived there for decades, and knows the bitterness of Communist rule, and also deeply understands the power struggles constantly occurring among Chinese Communist leaders. His view of Lee's inaugural address is: "It had some new ideas, and showed sincerity. It made concessions, and also held firm."

Jin does not agree with the general view that "negotiations should start from the lower levels." He points to the high-level contacts of the Nixon- Kissinger era as a case in point. He argues that the higher the level of talks, the more likely there will be a breakthrough in cross-strait relations. But the high-level talks Lee Teng-hui mentioned are conditional, and give implementing agencies like the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Mainland Affairs Council considerable room to operate. So you could say that his is a very subtle "peace offensive"--expressing the idea that "we do not fear negotiations" and putting Taiwan in the position of taking the initiative. On the other hand, Beijing is put in a passive position, and it is difficult for it to go either way. Finally, Jin sent to the people of Taiwan a maxim: "a love of delay means victory." "In cross-strait relations, there is no need to go pell- mell," he says with profound significance.

Whatever the reaction of politicians, media, and scholars home and abroad, the real targets of Lee's "journey of peace" speech were the leaders of mainland China. So far the PRC's highest official, Jiang Zemin, has yet to respond. Most officials in Taiwan- related agencies in the PRC, and even some scholars, gave relatively positive responses on May 20, shortly after the speech was made. Later the line was hardened. On the 22nd, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits denied that it had reached consensus with the SEF in 1992 that "each side could use its own name" for the "one China."

Liu Ta-jen, a senior diplomat and now chairman of the Taipei headquarters of the "CCNAA Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the US," said early on that, based on his understanding of the Communist regime, it would be very difficult to anticipate the mainland's response. The main reason is that the political situation in Beijing remains unsettled, and no one knows who will take over after Deng Xiaoping dies. Whatever responses are made now may count for nothing later, not to mention the possibility that even if there are negotiations, these would not necessarily be to Taiwan's benefit.

He looks to the past for a case in point: In the Warsaw talks, the US and PRC engaged in more than 300 meetings, but it all came to naught, ending only in a tremendous waste of resources and manpower. But when the subject comes around to diplomacy toward the US, Liu says excitedly that the fact that Lee Teng-hui was able to take the negatives of his trip to the US and turn them into positives for himself personally and for the nation shows that Lee is capable. But what about international space for the ROC in the future? Liu, like Chen I-hsin, argues that Taiwan's successful completion of the presidential election under the threat of mainland missiles attracted tremendous international attention, and the situation worked greatly to Taiwan's advantage. It's just that Taiwan should first move toward international organizations--such as the World Trade Organization or regional security forums--of more substantive importance and where there are fewer obstacles. For the time being, the high-cost, low-return effort to get into the UN should be put aside.

The latent cross-strait crisis

Since the mainland Chinese media assault and missile threats at the time of the presidential election, increasing numbers of those in the know think that the biggest potential cross-strait crisis lies in the fanning of nationalist emotions. In a recent editorial, the China Times warned against both the PRC's narrow nationalism which insists that Taiwan is a province under its jurisdiction and ignores Taiwan's autonomy of the last 50 years; and against childish Taiwan chauvinism, which sets itself outside of Chinese blood and culture, and which ignores how easily nationalist feelings can be used by the rulers in the mainland. "If the two sides become irrational and engage in a war, even if Taiwan wins, it will be completely scorched earth."

Nationalism has been at a high tide in mainland China in the past few years. This is a cause for distress to Yu Ying-shih, currently in the US as a professor at Princeton University; his knowledge and expertise in Chinese culture are most profound, and recently he published a series of articles on the cross-strait crisis. He points out that it is possible to see among young people a mood like that behind the "Boxer rebellion" of the late Qing dynasty. This mood has its roots in the collective memory of the feeling of national humiliation over the past century and more. It only needs a little fanning from a deliberate provocateur and it will resurface.

For example, the PRC has long said that it will take military action if Taiwan declares independence or if a foreign force interferes in cross-strait affairs. The problem is that the power of interpretation lies with mainland China's leaders. If they decide to depict Taiwan independence as the running dog of American imperialism, then nationalist feeling in mainland China can be easily stirred up. Taiwan will be directly affected, and there may even be internal divisions, leading to the most serious crisis.

As for President Lee's ideas on a "Chinese renaissance" and the emergence of modern China in Taiwan, Yu tends to agree. He argues that Taiwan and Hong Kong, though colonized, having been spared the damage of the 1911 Republican revolution and the 1949 Communist revolution, have preserved the original culture of China's Central Plain in a somewhat purer form. The British brought a Western system to Hong Kong, and the Japanese brought Western technology to Taiwan, yet in neither case was violence used to destroy the existing culture. Taiwan had the opportunity to absorb Western thought through Japan, but there are no painful memories of the complete abandonment or smashing of the traditional culture as in mainland China. Surrounded on all sides by water, they have had abundant interaction with the outside world, and have naturally absorbed some of the more outstanding values of Western civilization. At the same time, Chinese culture has a long history behind it, and has been able to constantly adapt and renew itself, and this is another reason for its ability to integrate and absorb culture from outside. It was this way in the Epoch of Division Between North and South, and it was like this in the Sui and Tang dynasties. But if the door is locked, as it was under Mao Zedong, even in 100 years there will be no way to regenerate itself into a grand new culture.

In the final analysis, Yu believes, there are many values that East and West can share in common, that belong to the common culture of all humankind. For example, "The sun comes up and I go to work, the sun goes down and I rest, so what does the Emperor's power have to do with me?" Or, "Whatever the ruler may do, Heaven is listening and the people are listening, Heaven is watching and the people are watching." These are basic elements of Confucian thought, and are also reflected in today's ideas about human rights and democracy. Culture is something that naturally takes shape over the centuries, and there has been no serious split in human nature over the millennia, whether in East or West. For example, the idea of private property is a part of human nature that has evolved into being over time; it is the reward someone deserves for hard work, and ownership of private property is a part of human rights and human dignity and should be guaranteed.

President Lee talked about a "Chinese renaissance"--an ideal Chinese culture based in Confucian thought, but not distorted and rigidified by authoritarian rulers, which has also absorbed the best of modern Western culture. Can this culture grow strong in Taiwan and then influence the 1.2 billion people in mainland China, so that one day they too can be the bosses of their own government? PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen says that Lee Teng-hui is "overreaching." Yu Ying-shih, on the other hand, says that the Communist Chinese have forgotten how in the old days they fed off corruption in the KMT to get a leg up, and how they used "a little barley and guns so old they had to be urine-cooled" to defeat the KMT forces with all their American-supplied weapons. And in history, there are plenty of examples of small forces which rose up and toppled usurpers to save their nations: "Shaokang recovering the nation" (in the Shang dynasty) and "Tian Dan restoring the state" (the International State in the Warring States Period).

The presidential inaugural address, which so many people had looked forward to with such expectation, was finally revealed. Aside from the Beijing leadership, silent as always, it has raised great expectations home and abroad. Was it a vital speech of our era, or just a flash-in-the-pan product of the age of the media explosion? Only time will tell.