Communist China has many objectives with its current war games. From the first set of exercises to the third, they were all planned out in advance. The third wave was not announced on account of any last-minute change of plan. I believe the PRC's objective with these maneuvers, apart from wanting to influence the elections, is also to cow the forces for Taiwanese independence. They not only want to influence the size of Lee Teng-hui's vote; they also want to suppress all the political forces in Taiwan that support Taiwanese independence. The exercises may also continue during the time before and after the newly elected president takes office, with the aim of forcing Taiwan's future leader to the negotiating table. What Beijing is engaging in here is coercive diplomacy, using a stick to drive us to the negotiating table and make us dance to their tune. This is Beijing's usual way of working.

Diplomacy is an extension of domestic policy. Why did President Clinton on 22 May last year overrule the US Department of State's decision not to allow President Lee Teng-hui to return to his alma mater? Because the US is also having presidential elections this year, and Clinton didn't want to let his Republican opponents criticize him for making too many concessions to China. That's why he made the decision. I don't believe he really intended it as containment of China. That's something the Chinese leadership seems unable to comprehend.

As for China, the leadership is not in agreement internally. There are power struggles and elements of different political "lines." After Clinton authorized President Lee's US visit on 22 May 1995, the Chinese Communists held a politburo meeting. Wang Daohan reported to the meeting on Lee Teng-hui's impending visit to the US, and suggested that Beijing should not overreact, but should watch quietly to see how things developed. Jiang Zemin supported Wang in this. On the basis of this perception, ARATS vice-chairman Tang Shubei came to Taiwan for negotiations as previously planned, and a second Koo-Wang agreement was reached. At that point the mainland leaders weren't completely opposed to Lee visiting Cornell. But some of the things Lee said in the US aroused a severe reaction among the Chinese Communists, and at the insistence of the military, the PRC shifted to a hard line. Wang Daohan, Qian Qichen and Jiang Zemin were all forced to make self-criticisms.

For Lee Teng-hui to visit the US--for Taiwan's president to be able to go to other countries--is something which has general public support. The question is, what is the best time for Taiwan's president to go overseas? Was last June the most appropriate moment? Looking back now, it ought to have been after the presidential elections this year, and for it really to help raise Taiwan's international status our directly elected president should not just go to Cornell University, but also to Washington. Was President Lee's trip to the US last year rather too hasty?

With the military tension across the Taiwan Strait, the US sending forces to assist Taiwan should not come as any surprise, for it is in America's own interest. When the media calls it "intervention" this has a negative implication, but in fact the US believes peace and security across the Taiwan Strait is an international issue, not merely a Chinese internal affair, so the question of intervention doesn't apply. This is because the US is working for its own interests. The US's and Taiwan's interests in this regard coincide.

In the past there have been doubts in Taiwan and mainland China as to whether the US would respond resolutely if the mainland were to attack Taiwan. The tremendous resolve which the US is showing at this time by swiftly sending its Seventh Fleet to patrol in waters near Taiwan gives a clear statement of US policy, and it has a considerable effect on Beijing's attitude. Beijing has indicated publicly or privately to the US that it will not use military force against Taiwan. This also shows that the US's past policy of strategic ambiguity was a failure. The US has to resolutely express that it will not sit idly by if Beijing launches a military attack against Taiwan.

Some people still have doubts as to whether the US would send its forces to assist in Taiwan's defense. In fact, if Communist China really does attack Taiwan, then if the US supplies Taiwan with better defensive weapons, US forces will have no need to face mainland China's in direct conflict. Actually these Chinese exercises are very helpful for the Americans. The people of Okinawa very much resent the US forces stationed there, and have been making strong demands for the US to pull them out, but now the threat posed by China's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, and China's hegemonistic behavior, have quietened such calls. Beijing and its apologists in other countries had been arguing strenuously that the theory that China poses a threat was false, but the bullying face which China has now shown has heightened East Asian countries' vigilance against the threat from China, and will increase their support for the US, because many Southeast Asian countries very much admire the stand the US is taking.

By dispatching its Seventh Fleet to patrol near Taiwan, the US has caused Beijing to soften its stance and pull back. Whether threats and intimidation will continue to have any effect on Taiwan, and whether Communist China will be goaded by their failure into taking more drastic action, is something to watch.

Looking to the future, we should be prepared to negotiate with China. Negotiations have to be on an equal footing. If in the future our president wishes to negotiate with President Jiang Zemin, this shouldn't be impossible. If our two countries' leaders can negotiate as equals in their capacity as heads of state, many people, including many DPP legislators, would support it. At present, however, I believe it would be best for the first meeting to be in a third country, or if not in a third country then preferably in Taiwan. Whoever is Taiwan's president, he should definitely not go to Beijing first. That would be tantamount to offering tribute or paying homage to the central government. To do so would put us at a disadvantage both psychologically and politically. To negotiate with Beijing, we have to understand Beijing's negotiating strategy and develop skilled negotiators, and in this regard we have always been rather weak. The Straits Exchange Foundation and the Mainland Affairs Council don't have that many experts on mainland affairs. As for the communist armed forces remaining in Fujian, there's nothing very frightening about that. There was a Fuzhou Military Region command and garrison in the past; reinstating the Fuzhou Military Region doesn't necessarily constitute a threat to us. Looking to the future broader situation in the Asia-Pacific region, by building up its armed forces and developing a blue-water naval capability, the PRC poses a huge threat to the Asia-Pacific region, and its hege-monistic actions are sure to bring it into conflict with neighboring countries such as the US and Japan. How to respond in this kind of environment will be a test for the wisdom and resolve of the people and governments of Taiwan and the countries of Southeast Asia.