The first person who will head up Hong Kong after it is turned over to mainland Chinese rule in July, 1997, is now known. The result is what everyone had expected beforehand: Tung Chee-hwa, chairman of the Orient Overseas business group, was elected by an overwhelming majority, with 80% of the votes of the 400 members of the Selection Committee. He will formally take office on July 1, but preparatory work for taking over administrative responsibilities from the British authorities begins as of January.

Tung's victory was facilitated by power and profit. He was strongly supported by mainland China, as well as by top Hong Kong businessmen like Li Kai-sheng. Given heavy coverage by the Chinese and English media in Hong Kong, Tung became a political rising star, gaining widespread recognition and even popular support in a short time. Relying on these elements, he defeated his top challenger, Yang Ti Liang, who was at one point seen as the favorite, and represented the idea of "judicial officers taking charge of government."

Tung personifies the idea of "business people taking charge of Hong Kong," which fits well with mainland China's principle of putting economics in the forefront under the "one country, two systems" policy which is supposed to follow the July handover. As far as Hong Kong residents are concerned, the pragmatic approach typical of businessmen suits the colony's long-established role as a commercial center.

As for Taiwan, Tung's family has long had connections with high-level political figures in the ROC, giving rise to some optimism about what will happen after he takes over the reins of officialdom in Hong Kong. It is believed that Tung understands Taiwan relatively well, a fact which should be helpful in future communication and compromise. Cheng An-kuo, director of the Chung Hwa Travel Service, Taiwan's unofficial representative in Hong Kong, acting on instructions from the ROC Mainland Affairs Commission, even sent a congratulatory telegram to Tung. Cheng suggests that Tung "knows Taiwan rather well, and he knows the importance of cross-strait relations, so he will definitely have a Hong Kong-Taiwan policy after taking office."

The greatest criticism among political observers and commentators about Tung's selection was that the process was far removed from the spirit of democracy. Some ridiculed the process-in which mainland China hand-picked the Preparatory Committee, the Preparatory Committee selected the Selection Committee, and the Selection Committee then chose the SAR chief executive-as "bungling democracy." Critics said that this process differed little from the old system of Britain naming the colonial governor, so that mainland Chinese criticisms of Britain's "undemocratic" system are nothing but "the pot calling the kettle black."

Also, with regard to a number of issues, Tung's attitude is "whatever Beijing says is right." For example, he criticizes the Hong Kong's Democratic Party for "opposing everything that Beijing does," also, he is inclined to tighten restrictions on activities commemorating the Tienanmen incident. These have led to concerns that after Hong Kong returns to Chinese rule in 1997, limitations on democracy will lead to a shrinking of freedom, which will ultimately damage the economy and take the luster off this "Pearl of the Orient."

Some observers have raised another concern about Tung-the fact that he is deeply involved in the business community. In the past, appointed British governors of Hong Kong had no local ties, and most lacked any business background. Consequently they could take a more detached view of infrastructure and development policies which would have a direct impact on special interests. Tung, on the other hand, is a "red capitalist," with extensive personal connections, a management style aimed at pleasing many different factions, and contacts in both business and political circles, giving rise to many questions.

For example: How will Tung repay the many special interest groups that supported him in the Selection Committee? Will this affect his administration? Will the seeds be planted for future collusion between government and private business interests? Tung's harsh comments about Hong Kong's democratic parties suggest that he is not likely to play the card of public opinion to balance pressures from special interests. In that case the only recourse would be to Beijing, but that would violate the spirit of an autonomous "Hong Kong ruled by Hong Kong people." It looks like Tung will need great political dexterity to cope with this challenge.

Faced with much skepticism, Tung has reiterated that "everything I do will be in the public interest, not private interests" and that the highest consideration after taking charge of the SAR will always be the overall welfare of the people of Hong Kong. He says that right now the most important thing will be a smooth transfer of power. Public opinion polls suggest that most Hong Kong residents generally support his conservative approach and cautious character. It is believed that Hong Kong has more to gain than to lose by having a man trusted by Beijing, for if Beijing trusts the head of the SAR, it will be less likely to interfere in local affairs in such a way as to destroy public and market confidence.

As for Taiwan policy, Tung has said that Hong Kong's role is to foster cultural and economic interaction between Taiwan and the mainland. He hopes that he can do better than has been done in the past. He will not distance himself from Taiwan, because he has many friends there. Tung's father, "shipping king" Tung Hao-yun, had intimate ties to the Republican government. His daughter is married to Peng Yin-kang, the son of the long-powerful military figure Peng Meng-chi (who is, it should be noted, controversial in Taiwan because of his role in the February 28 incident). However, it is also the case that when the Tung family was on the brink of bankruptcy ten or so years ago, Tung got no help from Taiwan, but rather was aided by Henry Fok, a rich Hong Kong businessman with close ties to the PRC. Fok lent Tung money which actually came from the mainland, allowing Tung to escape from financial ruin and rebuild his commercial empire.

Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, the agency in charge of policy toward Hong Kong, feels that Tung's long-term ties to Taiwan and his understanding of the island will be helpful to the positive development of Taiwan-Hong Kong relations after 1997. MAC spokesperson Kao Koong-lian adds that all three parties-Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the PRC-share the desire that Hong Kong remain prosperous, and believe that the stable development of Hong Kong-Taiwan relations will be beneficial to the prosperity of the whole region. Thus they believe that Tung's selection-and with it his own expectations for a stable transition and securing a high level of autonomy for Hong Kong-will be helpful to relations between the three areas.

Tung himself has said that the most important thing about Taiwan-Hong Kong relations is interaction. As for Taiwan-PRC relations, Tung says this policy is in Beijing's jurisdiction, and Hong Kong has no right to speak on it. For Taiwan, it is hoped that progress in Hong Kong-Taiwan relations can help smooth the way for progress in cross-strait links. The Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center program currently being strongly promoted by the ROC government relies much on economic activity in Hong Kong. Moreover, the success of the regional operations center would be of benefit to the economies of all of East Asia and especially southern China, which is the so-called "triple win" situation that many look forward to in the more distant future.

In terms of substantive policy, to clear up problems regarding interactions between Taiwan and Hong Kong or Macao in the future, the ROC Legislative Yuan passed the first reading of the "Draft Regulations for Relations with Hong Kong and Macao" on December 17. In its next session, the Legislative Yuan will complete its third reading of the bill. Prior to the establishment of direct links between Taiwan and mainland China, this law creates the legal foundation for treating Hong Kong and Macao as "third areas," so that direct trade and shipment can continue to occur between Taiwan and these two areas. If the situation changes in such a way as to create a serious risk to Taiwan's vital interests, the Ministry of Economic Affairs will be empowered to limit such trade and shipping.

Statistics indicate that there are 30-40,000 Taiwanese companies registered in Hong Kong doing trade or investment in mainland China through the Crown Colony. And the number is rising. P. K. Chiang, chairman of the ROC's Council for Economic Planning and Development, says that Taiwan will continue to see Hong Kong as a major transhipment point for business with the PRC even after the turnover in July. So long as the Basic Law is adhered to in Hong Kong, Taiwan will not change economic and trade relations with it.

In sum, the countdown has already begun for the transfer of power in Hong Kong, the chief executive of the SAR has been selected, and the "one country, two systems" experiment is about to begin. Tung is facing an unprecedented challenge. Meanwhile, the main regulations governing Taiwan's relations with Hong Kong have been largely completed. July 1997 will not merely be a starting point for Tung and the people of Hong Kong. Taiwanese, mainland Chinese, overseas Chinese, and Asia-watchers everywhere are waiting with bated breath. Tung is indeed bearing an unprecedented historical burden.

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Tung Chee-hwa has been selected by a high margin of votes as the future first chief executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and will soon become the first Chinese in charge of Hong Kong in one-and-a-half centuries. (courtesy of Agence France-Presse)

Tung Chee-hwa has been selected by a high margin of votes as the future first chief executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and will soon become the first Chinese in charge of Hong Kong in one-and-a-half centuries.（courtesy of Agence France-Presse）