Lin Chong-pin, a specialist on PRC military affairs, made quite a stir in the international academic community by correctly predicting in detail the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis years before it actually occurred. He is internationally recognized as an authority on PRC military affairs. June Teufel Dreyer, an American authority on the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), has praised Lin as having a more sophisticated understanding of mainland China's information warfare capability than any other scholar today.

Besides being a professor in the Graduate Institute of Political Science at National Chungshan University, Lin was also drafted into the cabinet three years ago as a vice-chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC). He has received high marks so far for his performance as a scholar-turned-official. Sinorama conducted an exclusive interview with Lin to discuss his academic work and his observations about cross-strait affairs.

Q: How were you able to so accurately predict the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis? What is different about your analyses compared to others?

A: Before the missile crisis, analysts in both the US government and academia saw cross-strait relations in black and white terms. They thought the military situation would either result in all-out war or nothing at all. I didn't think that this was the case, but thought rather that between these two extremes there was a large gray area. That is to say, Communist China could not conquer us, but we might sustain significant damage.

In 1990, in a lecture at the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington DC, I said that although Communist China was unlikely to mount a large-scale military attack against Taiwan, it could use "paramilitary" means-such as military exercises or missile tests-to force Taiwan to the negotiating table. In an article I published in 1993 I described a hypothetical Taiwan Strait conflict in which Beijing would fire unarmed missiles into the seas around Taiwan to intimidate Taiwan.

I reiterated such views in many conferences and publications. The third part of my new book in fact collects articles I wrote between 1994 and 1996 on military modernization in the PLA. Back when I wrote these articles many scholars thought I was making a fuss about nothing, but the facts have confirmed my predictions. A number of scholars who at the time opposed my views are now actively researching this area.

If you want to know how my research differs from others, perhaps compared to American and European scholars who study Asian affairs, I have a better understanding of the psychology of Chinese people. In addition, I collect abundant data and try to be precise in their analysis and use. This enables me to reach relatively bold conclusions.

Q: Recently the US has proposed a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system for East Asia. Could this effectively protect Taiwan? Will it cause the overall situation in Asia to become more tense?

A: In one sense the TMD is an issue, but in another, as [Mainland Affairs Council chairman] Su Chi says, it is a non-issue. Right now the potential customers for TMD do not know where they would get the money from, while the sellers have not completed work on the product. The only reason it is getting so much discussion is political-Communist China strongly opposes it because it believes that Taiwan is entering an alliance with the US. In fact, Communist China should understand that the reason for the deepening of the US-Japan security alliance is because the 1996 missile tests caused other countries to feel threatened.

Q: Not long ago the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia was bombed by NATO planes and it was revealed that the PRC was acquiring American defense secrets. Some suggest that the US is deliberately trying to cool relations with the PRC. What do you think? Is now a good opportunity for Taiwan to be able to buy more military hardware from the United States?

A: American China policy has always swung left and right. For example, in June of 1995 when ROC president Lee Teng-hui visited the US, the pendulum swung toward Taiwan. In June of 1998, when Clinton announced the "new three no's" policy, the US was swinging toward friendship with Communist China. In fact, American China policy has maintained a general direction based on three main national interests: democracy and human rights, economics and trade, and security and military strategy.

The periodic swinging results from a tug of war between two groups of US domestic forces, one more accomodating toward Beijing such as the mainstream China scholars, the other more critical, such as the media. Nevertheless, Taipei seeks simultaneous improvement of relations with both Washington and Beijing. We do not wish to benefit in terms of military sales from cooling Washington-Beijing relations.

Q: Some scholars say that there is now a "third wave" of warfare that will dominate the future. How is this different from traditional warfare? What advantages and weaknesses does Taiwan have in this respect? Taiwan is often called the "computer kingdom," and it is said that the Ministry of Defense has completed an island-wide fiber-optics system which is expected to go into operation at the end of the year. How will this improve Taiwan's ability to defend itself?

A: Communist China calls the new type of warfare dianxue warfare, which is commonly known as information warfare. Its objective is to paralyze the enemy by striking at its command center or vital communication links. The weapons used may physically damage the target (hard kill) or simply cause it to malfunction (soft kill). An example of the former is the cruise missile. Examples of the latter are the computer virus, the laser gun, and the electromagnetic pulse bomb.

I am not in a position to comment on the restructuring of Taiwan's military defense. But I feel that Taiwan's efforts in civil defense and psychological defense are very insufficient. Psychological defense refers to the degree to which the general population takes the enemy seriously. Civil defense refers to preparation for societal disruptions caused by war, especially those by dianxue warfare: the disruption of water and electricity supplies, air and ground traffic, and banking and medical services. We need comprehensive preventive measures, counter-strategy, and exercises.

In addition, Communist China has been quite active in researching information warfare. A number of specialized books or articles have been published there outlining certain details of information war such as "A Study of the Logistics of Information War," "Problems Related to Attacking and Defending Computer Networks," and others. But there has not been much published research done in Taiwan. Taiwan has very high standards in terms of computer hardware and software technology. It is essential that the capabilities of the private sector support national defense research in order to maintain an edge for Taiwan in information warfare.

Q: As vice-chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, could you analyze future relations between the two sides? Do you think that recent tensions between the US and Communist China could affect the planned visit to Taiwan at the end of the year of Wang Daohan, chairman of the mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits?

A: My view of cross-strait relations is "in the short run, pessimism waning; in the long run, optimism remaining; in the mid term, uncertainty looming large." Before 2005 Communist China is unlikely to mount a large-scale attack against Taiwan. Around 2010 to 2015, Communist China's dianxue capabilities may have matured and could be used. At the same time, on the mainland there may be mounting pressures along the coast for social change. What Taiwan can do at present is to complete political reform, improve social order, and bring investors back. Political parties must try to reach consensus on mainland policy to reduce bickering so that we can join forces in fending off the paramilitary tactics of Communist China.

In the long run, the global trends of democratization, economic internationalization, and the spread of information technology should speed up qualitative change in mainland China, so time is on our side. In this context, positive and friendly interaction between the two sides is of course extremely important.

We hope that the visit of Mr. Wang to Taiwan will not be affected by international variables. Our communication with the other side of the Taiwan Strait is certainly much better than it was in 1995-97. At that time we would send them letters, and they would simply ignore us. Now, although they are slow in responding, at least they do respond. In fact, if Mr. Wang can come, this would be a great achievement for cross-strait interactions.

So long as there is dialogue in a friendly atmosphere, we can constructively discuss any topics. As for formal negotiation, as distinguished from dialogue, we think that urgent humanitarian issues concerning the lives and rights of peoples across the Taiwan Strait should come first. These include fishing disputes, repatriation of illegal immigrants, joint efforts to fight crime, protection of Taiwanese tourists in the mainland, and so on. In addition we can move forward on plans like agricultural cooperation or sharing experiences in the reform of state-run enterprises. We've made all these suggestions in the past, and we hope that the other side will enter into a dialogue with us.

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Lin Chong-pin is not only vice-chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, but also an accomplished scholar whose research is highly regarded by the international academic community. (photo by Pu Hua-chih)