There has been much turbulence across the Taiwan Strait since Taiwan and mainland China were divided and came under separate rule in 1949. The basic pattern has always been one of an ebb and flow between hot war and cold war-"talk-talk/fight-fight." But we can also see four distinct stages within the last four-plus decades of cross-strait relations: military confrontation (1949 to 1978), some reduction of tensions as the PRC adopted a policy of appealing to the ROC for negotiations (1979 to November of 1987), contacts and exchanges between the two sides, (November of 1987 to the end of 1994), and formal acceptance on the Taiwan side (albeit not on the mainland side) of the condition of divided sovereignty between the two sides (1994-present).

In these four stages, both sides have had clear strategic orientations. But each stage has also been affected by many subjective and objective variables. Taking place under the impact of both contingent and structurally imperative factors, the Koo-Wang talks can be seen as a major breakthrough in cross-strait relations over the last decades. Under close scrutiny, and bearing the weight of great expectations, the second Koo-Wang talks were held in October of 1998. Therefore, it is a matter of extreme historical interest to take a look back at the first Koo-Wang summit. Such a retrospective will be the first and major part of this article. There will also be two other parts: a discussion of the first Koo-Wang talks and suggestions for the future.

First, let us look back at the first Koo-Wang talks. I want to discuss the reasons behind the Koo-Wang talks, their accomplishments, and the assessments various parties made of them.

Reasons for Koo-Wang I

First, in terms of the reasons behind the talks, since the ROC first allowed visits by citizens to the mainland in November of 1989, exchanges between the two sides have produced a number of problems in areas such as commerce, marriage, crime against tourists, inheritance, piracy, and illegal immigration. None of these can be solved without Communist China's cooperation. Illegal immigration is the most obvious example. The mainland has allowed nearly 30,000 illegal immigrants to remain in Taiwan for an average of 113 days after their arrest.

Another reason behind the first Koo-Wang talks is that Communist China intended to begin with "discussions and negotiations on practical issues" and gradually induce Taiwan to enter "political negotiations." By these means, Communist China hoped to achieve the objective of "peaceful reunification under 'one country, two systems.'"

Against this background, both sides established semi-official groups to undertake practical and functional preliminary contacts. In Taipei, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) was founded in March of 1991. In December of the same year, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) was established in Beijing. Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan were named heads of these two organizations, respectively. Both of these were technically non-governmental organizations, but received their authority to act from the respective governments.

Seeking an early meeting between Koo and Wang, on January 8, 1992 ARATS sent a letter inviting the SEF chairman, vice chairman, and secretary-general to visit Beijing. After more than a year of preparation, on April 8-10, 1993, Cheyne Chiu, then concurrently SEF vice chairman and secretary-general, visited Beijing. The SEF and ARATS undertook preparatory discussions for a Koo-Wang meeting, and clarified the three main topics of such a meeting: (1) Matters relating to the two foundations themselves, including formulas for contact and discussion; cooperation against piracy, smuggling, and other criminal activities; coordination on the return of persons who illegally entered the territory of the other party; negotiation of fishing disputes between the two sides; and arranging for talks on other functional issues. (2) Economic matters, including Taiwan investment in the mainland and visits to Taiwan by people from mainland economic and trade circles; discussions for a non-governmental conference on economic exchanges; and discussions on joint development of energy and other resources. (3) Matters related to exchange in the fields of education, technology, youth, and the media.

Later, in Singapore, Chiu and Tang Shubei, vice chairman of ARATS, repeatedly emphasized the "four natures" of the Koo-Wang talks: non-governmental, economic, pragmatic, and functional. The two parties agreed to put aside relatively sensitive political issues that they disagreed on. Obviously these "four natures" referred not only to the Koo-Wang talks, but could also be seen as guiding principles for future handling of cross-strait relations by the associations.

Achievements of Koo-Wang I

The first Koo-Wang talks were held in Singapore between April 27 and 29, 1993. At the first session, ARATS chief Wang was the first to speak. He addressed mainly the agenda, nature and spirit of the talks. SEF chairman Koo then made his remarks. He emphasized the importance of the talks in terms of establishing systematic contact between the two foundations, and raised six concrete issues. These covered tax regulations, limits and compensation for confiscations, fair resolution of economic and trade disputes, outward remittance of operating profits and capital, and "transparency" of PRC laws and regulations. These points were all important to Taiwanese businesses in mainland China.

In addition, Koo also expressed his willingness to work with ARATS about further looking into the possibilities of "interactions between industrial and commercial personages from the two sides" and "holding a non-governmental conference on economic exchange." However, Koo said nothing about the mainland's allegedly pragmatic (that is, "non-political") aim-proposed by Wang-to have Taiwan agree to the "three direct contacts" (direct shipping and air links, direct business, and direct mail). (At present, such contacts must be indirect, via Hong Kong or some other third location.)

The meeting definitely was a positive development for cross-strait relations. Not only did it permit a great improvement in the acrimonious atmosphere that had persisted for decades, a number of documents were signed. These included agreements covering mutual recognition and verification of public documents (like marriage licenses, wills, and so on), handling of registered mail, forms and systems for contacts and meetings between the SEF and ARATS, and a "joint memorandum" on the meeting. These laid the foundation for practical discussions and systematic interactions between the two sides.

However, the two sides disagreed on a number of issues. As a result, they agreed to leave aside several issues originally meant to be part of the signed agreements-including protection guarantees for Taiwanese investment, the conference on economic exchange, and visits to Taiwan by mainland economic figures. The two parties agreed to choose another time and place to continue discussions. Because the two non-governmental associations had vastly different understandings of economic issues, the talks were a complete washout in this respect. This precedent for discussions between the two sides thus did not achieve a completely satisfactory end.

Now let us turn to evaluations made by various sides of the Koo-Wang talks.

Evaluations of Koo-Wang I

On the PRC side, Communist China fundamentally affirmed the results of the talks. It stated that they were not only beneficial to contacts and cooperation between the two associations, but would also be helpful to economic cooperation and interaction between the two sides, and were extremely positive in encouraging the development of relations.

At the same time, Communist China also demanded that future talks be at a higher level, and hoped that, on the basis of the Koo-Wang talks, the two sides could gradually expand the scope of discussions, and raise the level of negotiations. Beijing declared, "If we just sit down and talk, all problems can be resolved. The higher the level, and the broader the authority delegated, the faster problems can be resolved." Communist China emphasized that, aside from non-governmental issues of practical concern, negotiations could go forth on a case-by-case basis on a number of problems that people on both sides of the strait were concerned about. Problems such as the "three direct contacts" and the existing mistrust and enmity between the two sides could be discussed and resolved one after the other.

As for the ROC, Taiwan affirmed the use of dialogue to resolve disputes. It stated that the Koo-Wang talks established a good foundation as a model for dialogue between the two sides, which was vital for improving cross-strait relations.

At the same time, however, Taipei cautioned against naivet* among the general public. Taipei said that, though it appeared that the two sides were equal parties in the various agreements signed at the Koo-Wang talks, in fact, this was only "equality of non-governmental entities"; under Communist China's "one China" structure, the mainland still did not accept equality between the two sides of the strait. Taipei emphasized that negotiations would have to persist one step at a time over a long period of time. In any case, the two sides had been separated for more than 40 years. It was not necessary to demand that after only a short period of interaction there would be unequivocal accomplishments, and still less could one harbor romantic longings.

Meanwhile, international opinion was positive about seeing improvement in relations between the ROC and PRC. This was the first formal high-level contact between the two sides since 1949. It not only had a direct impact on reducing the intensity of the military standoff between Beijing and Taipei, it had a profound impact on the amelioration of tensions in the Asia-Pacific area. It certainly made a positive contribution to the atmosphere of the post-Cold War world.

An analysis of Koo-Wang I

The years since the Singapore meeting have been marked by numerous controversies, and there is now ample evidence of the weakness of the communication channels supposedly established between the SEF and ARATS. This became particularly obvious at the time of the Qiandao Lake incident, in which a group of Taiwanese tourists were robbed and murdered, and the mainland side stonewalled all efforts by the Taiwan side to find out the facts or help with the victims' remains. The fragility of the channels has become indisputable since the visit by President Lee to the US sparked an intense backlash from Communist China. During the Taiwan Strait crises in 1995 and 1996, even the limited communication links that remained were completely severed, allowing misunderstandings to snowball.

Nor have the communication channels set up through the first Koo-Wang meeting helped resolve the many serious problems that have arisen as a result of non-governmental exchanges, in particular the problem of the safety of the lives and property of Taiwan business people in mainland China. This has naturally created dissatisfaction and misunderstanding of Communist China among the general public in Taiwan. Correspondingly, a growing number of people have come to favor Taiwanese independence. Seeing this situation, Communist China has resorted to military exercises and other policies to attempt to reverse this trend. The mainland is deeply afraid Taiwan will take the path to independence, yet its measures to deter this create a vicious circle which can only lead to the deterioration of relations between Taiwan and the mainland. Such a deterioration is certainly not in the interests of Chinese on either side of the Strait.

What concrete suggestions could be applied to future Koo-Wang talks? This question is the subject of the third and last part of this paper. At present, the ROC National Reunification Guidelines provide the guiding principles in facing pressure from Communist China. Although they are not perfect, if their basic spirit is grasped, and they are flexibly used, I believe they can best serve the national interest of our country. At the same time, within this larger national strategic structure, we should work toward the following two objectives:

Opening a hotline

(1) The two sides should establish a high-level "hotline." Warren Christopher, former United States Secretary of State, suggested that during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, a single miscalculation could have led to an accidental war. On February 22, 1996, the head of the US Central Intelligence Agency stated at a congressional hearing that Beijing's military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait could very possibly, because of miscalculation, lead to war, and that the situation was extremely dangerous.

In particular, during the mainland's missile tests in 1996, one missile flew virtually directly over northern Taiwan. If the missile had malfunctioned, and landed on Taiwan soil, killing a large number of people, could Taiwan have done as Israel did when it refrained from retaliating against Iraqi missile strikes during the Gulf War? Judging from the ROC national defense report, in which strategic thinking is guided by "no seeking of war but no fear of war," it would have been be essential to respond flexibly (i.e. at a parallel level) to Communist China. Under such circumstances, there could have been rapid escalation to a military conflict.

During the height of the Cold War, the US and USSR devoted a great deal of attention to avoiding misunderstandings and preventing crisis escalation. This is a lesson that we should learn from history. In particular, the two superpowers established a hotline directly connecting their leaders, which was very effective, and did not permit any outside restraints or interference. We should take advantage of the forthcoming talks and discuss with Communist China how to achieve this important point.

Signing a peace accord

(2) The two sides should sign a "peace agreement" as quickly as possible; avoiding war between the two sides is the common responsibility of the two governments and peoples. A peace agreement would have the following important effects:

It would create conditions beneficial to future reunification, or at least symbolize that the two sides have abandoned the idea of resolving the reunification issue by force of arms. It would provide a peaceful environment for the future political and economic construction of the country. It would allow both sides to save considerable sums now spent on national defense, which would not only be of benefit to political and economic construction, but would provide a solid foundation for the future of all Chinese people. In other words, the two sides would not only be able to apply the saved money to national construction, but the Taiwan Strait would cease to be a testing ground for advanced weaponry.

The first Koo-Wang talks were a major constructive breakthrough in breaking down the enmity between the two sides. Though flawed, it is undeniable that they their flaws did not obscure their value. Let us hope that future talks can, building on the two meetings already past, achieve even more in building a win-win, mutually beneficial future for the Chinese people on both sides of the strait.

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In his role as secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party, Jiang Zemin met with SEF chairman Koo Chen-fu. (courtesy of the SEF)