Deng Xiaoping's policy of reform and opening to the outside world has transformed the Chinese people from "blue ants" into flesh-and-blood hum an beings who can better enjoy life.
Deng Xiaoping, 92-year-old patriarch of the PRC, has died. His nearly century-long life coincided with the Chinese people's passage through a dark age of dictatorship, poverty, war, and desolation. He personally opened up the red door that Communist China was locked behind; he also unleashed tanks and machine guns to say 'no' to democracy, leaving an indelible, nightmarish image at Tiananmen.
There's no need to try to make any definite judgments now. Say that Deng's merits and errors have been an inevitable part of the transitional era in Chinese history if you will, or that they were incidental. Whatever, for people now and in the future, the one undeniable thing is that the Deng era has come to an end.
In this issue, we mark the demise of Deng with two articles, one by Princeton University scholar Yu Ying-shih, and the second an interview with Xu Jaitun, formerly the highest-ranking PRC official in Hong Kong (conducted by Pu Ta-chung of the China Times).
Death of a Strongman, End of an Era
In the 20th century, political and military strongmen have come and gone in many authoritarian countries. But the nature of these strongmen has differed depending on the local culture. Chinese strongmen have not only had powerful, concrete political resources, they have also had an intangible "authority." Perhaps the best example of this in history was the Eastern Jin prime minister Xie An.
Deng Xiaoping, despite having been deposed from political influence in the years around Mao's death, remained the sole CCP figure widely looked to for leadership. It was precisely because of his intangible authority that he was able to outcompete Hua Guofeng, Mao's chosen successor-who had nominal control of the party, state, and military-and lead the dramatic transformation of CCP rule.
In the 48 years since the PRC was established, there have been only two strongmen. The first 28 years were the Mao Zedong era, the last 20 the Deng era. Though it is often said that Mao belonged to the "first generation" of CCP leaders, and Deng to the "second generation," in fact both Mao and Deng were part of the same political generation-the one that seized power. Their status as part of that "revolutionary" generation was a major precondition for their becoming dominant figures. This condition no longer exists for anyone, and there is no sign another strongmen will emerge.
Thus Deng is the last of the CCP strongmen. And his death marks the end of the revolutionary era in modern Chinese history. The future will be markedly different.
Looking back on their seizure of power, naturally Mao garnered the most credit, far more than Deng. But between 1949 and 1976, Mao became responsible for bringing chaos to the country, indicating that he was far more skilled at seizing power than governing with it.
Since being rehabilitated in 1977, Deng focused on governing. He ended the ideological primacy of "class struggle," promoting instead economic reform and opening to the outside world, to lift the PRC out of poverty and salvage the CCP regime from the brink of collapse. His main concern was probably preserving Communist Party leadership, one of his "Four Cardinal Principles." But whatever his goals, it is an undeniable historical fact that his policies have improved the economic condition of the Chinese people.
Western news broadcasts have emphasized two major aspects of the latter part of Deng's life: The first is economic reform and opening to the outside world. The second is the iron-handed rule evidenced in the Tienanmen massacre. These two- his fame and his infamy-can be said to be his current epitaph.
Instead, what I want to note is that these two events-often seen as contradictory-were seen as entirely consistent by Deng himself. From the first, his policy was one of relaxation in economics, enhanced control in politics. For him, as a Communist Party leader, reform could only be limited to economics, and never be expanded to politics.
With this last strongman gone, what will the future bring? Will another power struggle occur? My view is that the objective conditions are very different from 1976, when Mao's death led to power struggles. Generally speaking, a power struggle cannot be avoided, but the form and impact will differ.
When Mao died, the struggle was intense and wide-ranging, going round after round from the arrest of the Gang of Four to Deng's rehabilitation to the fall of Hua Guofeng. This time, there is no strongman to be the focus of a coup; power is dispersed. So there will be a long period of fermentation and deployment of forces. Current factors-center vs. provincial power, poorer vs. wealthier localities, the entry of global economic forces, the difficulty of gaining control over the military, the rise of civil society, and so on-are complex, and far different from anything imaginable in 1976. Thus the coming power struggle will not be short and sharp, but will play out over a long period, with a more profound impact. Since "economic relaxation with political control" has been taken as far as it can go, it cannot be maintained. Nor can the economic situation be reversed. So politics must follow economics.
My saying this does not mean I am confident about the mainland political situation. I have no evidence to indicate that the "third generation" successors are in a stable position. For quite a long time, the turbulence in mainland politics will take place behind closed doors, and it is not easy to predict when it might come to the surface. In short, uncertainty will prevail for some time.
Only in the post-Deng era will society and politics be able to enter a truly transitional period. But there is still a long way to go before the path of democratization. The real path forward for mainland China lies in how to escape the totalitarian communist structure. This will not be easy for a country of 1.2 or 1.3 billion people. We must remain self-possessed, for the future is unpredictable.
The situation in the mainland grows more complex each day in all respects-political, economic, social, provincial, military, ethnic. Any of these could lead to unpredictable developments. So we cannot treat mainland China as stable. It is surrounded by potential crises, thus it makes threatening-but empty-noises to outsiders. Its propaganda misleads the US and others into thinking the PRC is already a threat to Southeast Asia.
As for Taiwan in the post-Deng era, we must be constantly alert, but there is no need to live in fear of the PRC. Otherwise we will fall right into its trap. The most important thing is for Taiwan, under its democratic system, to constantly increase its vitality, and not to have unrealistic fantasies about any transformation in mainland China. There is an ancient saying deserving of attention: "Heaven ever progresses, the wise man continually improves himself."
Deng's "socialism with Chinese characteristics" is an empty slogan. All we have seen thus far is "capitalism without the rule of law," with the only "Chinese characteristic" being one-party dictatorship. China's future is not in any "ism," but in building a modern civilized society with Chinese characteristics. Only when political power in mainland China changes from tyrannical to civilized can relations between Taiwan and the PRC really improve.
(reprinted from United Daily News, Feb. 21/Yu Ying-shih/tr. by Phil Newell)
Assessing Deng Xiaoping: An Interview with Xu Jiatun
Among former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials now living in exile, Xu Jiatun-at one time Jiangsu Province First Secretary and later director of the Hong Kong branch of the Xinhua News Agency (and thus the PRC's de facto top man in Hong Kong)-probably had the most contact with, and deepest understanding of, Deng Xiaoping. With Deng's demise, Xu gave his first interview to the China Times and told of his views about Deng and the future of the PRC.
Q: Please first tell us your overall assessment of Deng Xiaoping.
A: He was a daring and farsighted grand strategist. Without him, the PRC would not be what it is today.
Q: Where does Deng's importance lie?
A: As far as the CCP and Chinese history are concerned, Deng's importance lies in the fact that, after the disaster of the Cultural Revolution, he analyzed and again set in motion the development of the PRC and Chinese history. After the Cultural Revolution, society was atomized, and the party was semi-paralyzed. The economy was on the brink of collapse, and leftism was still rampant. In these adverse conditions, Deng succeeded in turning the situation around. Without his bold reforms, the PRC's economy could not even have avoided the collapse experienced in other communist countries, much less be as dynamic as it is today.
Q: It was perilous to undertake reform under those conditions. How did Deng get through that period?
A: The most important thing is that his policies were correct. His policies were to reform agriculture and rural areas first, industry and urban areas second, and to put economic ahead of political reform. The ten years of reform in the countryside brought stability to China's 800 million rural dwellers, allowing the PRC to avoid the wave of collapses of communist states.
Q: What was his biggest contribution politically? What underlying thought guided his policies?
A: At the beginning the main problem was that of eliminating uncertainty and restoring confidence in society and in the party. Deng's main principle was "seek truth from facts." Using a policy of "practice is the sole criterion of truth," he refuted Hua Guofeng's "two whatevers" and ended the chaos. That is, he refuted Mao's assertion of the primacy of "class struggle." Ending class struggle gave people a breathing spell. And, in a decisive fashion, Deng removed the many labels-"landlord," "bourgeois," "counter-revolutionary," "bad element," "rightist," and so on-from the many people erroneously branded in the many political movements of the past. This "reversal of verdicts" affected hundreds of millions of people, and put the people and party members at ease. This was a great contribution in terms of restoring confidence in society and the party.
Q: Deng's thinking differed from Mao's. What were the special aspects of Deng's thought?
A: The most well-known is the "cat theory": It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice. This is in fact just the popularization of Deng's proposal to "seek truth from facts." It reflects his ability to make more profound truths readily understandable.
As I understand it, his cat theory aimed at reducing resistance and interference from dogmatism and leftism. He wanted to avoid ideological debates, such as, for example, whether policies are "surnamed socialist" or "surnamed capitalist." For all reforms, all that mattered was results, whether the policies met one of the "three positives": a positive effect on socialist productivity; a positive impact on overall national strength; or a positive effect on the people's standard of living. Deng expressed the essence of the cat theory in saying: "Methods for raising production may serve socialism, or they may serve capitalism. Whoever uses them well, that is who they serve."
Second is the familiar "stone theory"-crossing a river by feeling for stones underfoot. As I understand it, Li Xiannian was the first to coin this term. It emphasizes the spirit of experimentation. Everything must first be tested; if successful, the policy may be extended, and if not, we can turn back. The experimental practices of the "stone theory" were most important in two areas: rural reform and the Special Economic Zones. The latter developed into "building many Hong Kongs," which in fact was using the Hong Kong experience to develop the PRC economy.
Q: Was Deng just as pragmatic about Hong Kong and Taiwan?
A: Absolutely. "One country, two systems" was an extension of the "cat" and "stone" theories; it is both pragmatic and experimental. Even now the Hong Kong problem is being solved by "groping across the river." I would like to say in passing that Deng was in no hurry to resolve the "Taiwan problem." He felt it could be handled by the next generation. It is a shame that Taiwan did not reach any understanding with Deng while he still had control of national affairs.
Q: In foreign policy, what was the biggest difference between Deng and Mao?
A: Deng felt that for the time being there would be no major war. After Tiananmen, he rejected an aggressive strategy, disavowing leadership of world revolution. He affirmed that the current international situation is one of peace and development. He said, "We fear no one, but want to offend no one; we act according to the five principles of peaceful coexistence." He argued that economic development should be the core priority in foreign policy. He also emphasized seizing on the current dramatic transformation of world politics to allow the Chinese economy "to move to a higher level."
Q: Is Jiang Zemin fully loyal to the Deng line?
A: Not completely. Jiang emphasizes that "stability is more important than anything." But as Deng said, "To emphasize stability is correct, but if it is overemphasized opportunities will be lost. Stability is necessary, but it cannot solve all problems." If Jiang emphasizes stability over all else, this will not conform to Deng's way of thinking.
Q: Do you think Deng made no mistakes after being rehabilitated after Mao's death?
A: He made some. The first was that he had too many reservations about political reform, and, because of obstruction from some in the party, the pace of reform was slowed. Bringing down Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were major errors. Second, during the Tiananmen demonstrations, while Zhao Ziyang was out of the country, Deng gave weight to the one-sided briefings of people like Li Peng and Chen Xitong, who exaggerated the seriousness of the situation, leading to the decision to repress the demonstrations by force. A third error was that he should not have asked Yang Shangkun and Wan Li to step down at the time of the Fourteenth Party Congress. If they were still in power, they would strengthen the forces acting to maintain and deepen Deng's line.
Q: Based on your personal contacts with Deng, what kind of man was he?
A: He was very decisive and direct, and acute at analyzing problems. When you made a report to him he would not interrupt, but listen very carefully. He would ask a few questions if he had any, but not immediately express an opinion or say anything if his thinking had not matured. But once he spoke, he was clear and simple, without any beating around the bush. Because of that he had a reputation of being awe-inspiring, but in fact he was very easy to get along with.
Q: Deng's death will probably be disadvantageous for Jiang Zemin at the Fifteenth Party Congress. Is Jiang's authority stable? What challenges does he face?
A: Jiang's deportment and policies are "both Mao and Deng, yet neither Mao nor Deng"-very contradictory. With Deng gone, Jiang will face more problems than before. The key is that I hope he does not depart from the Deng line and try to reverse direction. Also, Jiang will be severely tested in the personnel decisions to be made at the Fifteenth Party Congress.
Q: Do you think there will be a "counter-Deng" phenomenon now that he is dead?
A: I hope not. For the PRC, and the Communist Party, the current situation both home and abroad is unprecedently positive. Economically, as Deng said, it is necessary to "seize opportunities and make timely decisions." He once said, "It is not enough to simply be satisfied with the stable political environment we have achieved. The most fundamental thing is the speed of economic growth."
In terms of political reform, orderly progress is essential, and the first steps must begin. Why is it that the more anti-corrup-tion measures the government takes, the worse corruption gets? It is because there is no oversight from society. It is necessary to liberalize oversight by the media and create a certain amount of judicial independence. Practice has already proven that the current policy-reliance solely on internal supervision by the government and party-cannot work. For the CCP, now is the best opportunity to implement intra-party democracy.
The public at large is in many ways dissatisfied with the party, but, because they have benefited from economic reform, people have not lost all hope for the CCP. The party must take advantage of this chance to undertake thorough reform. At the Fifteenth Party Congress, the selection of every level-from the Congress delegates to the members of the Central Committee's Standing Committee to the Politburo to the Politburo's Standing Committee-should be by nomination by party members or Congress delegates, followed by a one-man, one-vote general intra-party election. Given that the quality of party members has in general reached a reasonably high level, the main outcome of such reforms would be positive; at least they would go a long way toward correcting the corruption and failures in the party.
If the CCP's leaders are selected through a "process," then people will look to them for leadership, and the so-called "core" leadership will take shape naturally. Once the CCP sucessfully implements democracy within the party, this will be an experience to draw on for national democratization, and people will have hope. The best way of commemorating Deng Xiaoping is to not miss this chance, and to seize these opportunities.
(reprinted from the China Times, February 21/interview by Pu Ta-chung/tr. by Phil Newell)
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Deng Xiaoping's policy of reform and opening to the outside world has transformed the Chinese people from "blue ants" into flesh-and-blood human beings who can better enjoy life.
