DPP Debates Options for Policy Toward the PRC

The Democratic Progressive Party has always been seen as favoring Taiwan independence and as lacking a coherent policy to deal with the PRC. On February 13, the DPP began a three-day conference on mainland policy. The conference was conducted in the manner of an open debate, and attracted considerable attention from other political parties in Taiwan as well as from the international community.

The DPP conference attracted attention for two reasons. First, there was no precedent in Taiwan for a political party reaching consensus through open debate. Second, DPP policy toward mainland China is a topic everyone is concerned about.

Among those sitting in the audience at the conference were representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Mainland Affairs Council, and the Straits Exchange Foundation; from the rival New Party; and from the American Institute in Taiwan, the French Institute in Taiwan, Singapore, Australia, and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party. There was also great interest among academics and business people in Taiwan and in the international and local media.

The debate was divided into three main topics: (1) the impact of the post-Cold War world order on relations between Taiwan and the PRC, (2) strategic planning for bilateral negotiations and interactions between Taiwan and the PRC, and (3) the problem of trade and economic relations between Taiwan and the PRC as well as entry into the World Trade Organization.

The DPP is divided into two main camps over these issues. On one side is the Formosa faction led by party chairman Hsu Hsin-liang. On the other is a grouping of other factions, including the New Wave faction, the Welfare State faction and the Justice Alliance.

In terms of the new international situation, Hsu argued that a new international order, led by the United States and built on a foundation of common economic benefit, has already taken shape. He argued that the global community is using its collective power to prevent international conflict, which is creating pressure for negotiations in the Taiwan Strait, where the shadow of war has not yet been eliminated. Moreover, he noted, the US and China are building a strategic relationship, a development to which Taiwan must actively respond.

The non-Formosa group argued that the international situation is one in which conflict and cooperation both exist, with no definite international order, and the US and China still see each other as potential enemies, so that Taiwan does not need to worry excessively.

In terms of cross-Strait negotiations and interactions, the factions reached consensus that negotiations can only proceed under the prerequisite of maintaining Taiwan's dignity and security, and must be on the basis of equality. As for how negotiations should be conducted, the Formosa faction has in the past advocated a relatively active position of beginning negotiations on opening direct commercial, transport, and communications links with the PRC. However, before the debate, they adjusted their position to one of a "comprehensive negotiating strategy." Hsu argued that there are a huge number of items to be discussed, including sports, culture, and the arts, and negotiations should proceed on a long-term, comprehensive basis.

The non-Formosa group expressed approval at the shift in position by the Formosa faction, and moreover proposed four feasible options for resumption of contacts between Taiwan and mainland China. These included communication between the two business communities, civic forums, resumption of talks between the heads of the SEF and ARATS (the two semi-official foundations which previously maintained contact on behalf of the two sides until the PRC broke off this channel in 1996), and contacts through the WTO.

The sovereignty question is the most sticky in negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. In the end the two DPP groups adopted a pragmatic posture. They are inclined to the view that, in order to avoid a complete rupture of negotiations, and to moderate relations between the two sides, it is best at this time to avoid the issue. Shen Fu-hsiung of the Justice Alliance argues that, if a strategy of separating politics from economics is considered, the Taiwan side should carefully evaluate the advantages and disadvantages, in order to avoid giving China the opportunity to force Taiwan into diplomatic concessions by exerting pressure through the Taiwan business community. The Formosa faction, on the other hand, proposed a technical solution. Kuo Cheng-liang, executive director of the DPP policy committee, pointed out that negotiations for air rights between two sides were carried on under a structure of not discussing sovereignty, and were still able to reach an effective agreement.

The last day of the debate was devoted to economic issues. Originally, there was seen to be a clear clash between the Formosa faction's policy of "go west" (that is, encouraging closer economic ties with the PRC) and the "strengthen the base and gradually advance theory" (that is, encouraging businessmen to stay and grow in Taiwan rather than shift operations to the PRC) of their counterparts. Some commentators in the media considered this to be a mirror of the debate going on in the government between those urging direct commercial links with the PRC and the government's current "don't hurry, be patient" policy.

However, as on other issues at the DPP debate, the two camps adopted pragmatic perspectives. It was widely agreed that economic interaction between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is inevitable. They accepted that investment by Taiwan business in China has long been practiced. A consensus evolved around the idea of "strengthening the base and moving westward."

Still, differences remained. Hsu Hsin-liang suggested that only through commercial interaction with the PRC could Taiwan's economy ("the base") remain strong. Because, for cultural and geographic reasons, Taiwan is at an advantage in competing for the mainland market, economic strategy should move in that direction.

But non-Formosa DPP members feel that the Formosa faction may be too optimistic. Chiu Yi-jen argued that, if the Taiwan economy is not first strengthened, linking it to mainland China could be fatal. Su Huan-chih says that the Formosa faction has blind faith in market forces, and warns that unrestricted investment in China will make Taiwan's economy too dependent on the mainland, while hastening deindustrial-ization in Taiwan.

Commentators unanimously concluded that the conference was an ambitious effort on the part of the DPP. However, many considerations were left out of the debate. Liu Yi-chun, an associate researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences at the Academia Sinica, notes that no one questioned whether or not the party's advocacy of Taiwan independence, which is part of the party platform, is compatible with their positions in the policy debate.

Xu Bodong, an academic at Beijing University who follows the DPP, points out that the Formosa faction members have had more contact with China than members of the other factions. He suggests the latter may have misconceptions and gaps in knowledge, and they are therefore subject to emotional thinking.

Yang Kai-huang, a professor of politics at Soochow University in Taiwan, comments that everyone spent a great deal of time discussing trends in the new international order, but ignored that China will inevitably be one of the shapers of the future order in Asia. Moreover, they ignored that mainland China's ability to resist and to dissipate international pressures to make concessions in negotiations is far greater than Taiwan's. Yang concludes that an objective understanding of the PRC's situation is the minimum requirement of any understanding of the world order. Otherwise, people in Taiwan will be tempted to see things only from the point of view of what is best for Taiwan, without trying to create a win-win situation for the two sides.

Although there were problems in the debate, most observers agreed that its merits outweighed them, and affirmed the political courage of the DPP. You Tze-hsiang, an associate professor of communications at Shih Hsin University, pointed out that most people think debate is inevitably conflictual and not cooperative. Therefore, the DPP took a risk that its internal conflicts would be aired before the public. Fortunately, many commentators noted, in this debate the various factions all strove to expand their common ground and downplay differences. This shows the DPP's flexibility in reconciling differences of opinion within the party and its imagination and vigor in setting major policy positions.

Wei Yung, a member of the KMT Central Committee, said he respected the DPP for holding the debate while having a chairman and a secretary-general from different factions. Legislators from the New Party, who strongly praised the DPP's democratic style, may have learned something; they plan to hold a similar debate at the beginning of April.

As for the DPP itself, Yang Kai-huang notes that this type of open procedure for formulating policy is a first for democracy in Taiwan. The DPP has successfully made the transition from a party of protest to an opposition offering policy alternatives. Moreover, before the debate began, participants had to provide written papers, which encouraged each faction to seriously confront the issues, and which served to instruct party members and to train policy specialists. Thus, aside from the policy outcome, the very process of the debate has generated positive rewards for the party.

Government officials also paid considerable attention to the debate. Premier Vincent Siew said that it looks as if the DPP's policy orientation toward the PRC is not much different from the government's current policy in focusing on substantive issues, exchanges, and equal negotiations. If the DPP can achieve an internal consensus, and if the various political parties can achieve consensus among themselves, in future negotiations with the PRC, Taiwan can present a unified position.

After three days of debate, the DPP reached consensus on several issues, and outside comment was positive. But there are still variables in the future formation of the DPP's PRC policy. The most notable one is Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian, the DPP leader most popular with the general public. He refused to attend the debate, saying the DPP's party platform already contains the mainstream view on PRC policy. DPP executives from other cities and counties also failed to attend. Among them are some who have specialized knowledge and have strong opinions about PRC policy, thereby devaluing somewhat the representativeness of the consensus achieved at the debate.

Nevertheless, by agreement among the leaders of the various factions, Party Chairman Hsu will gather the consensus views into a set of "PRC policy guidelines." This will be sent to the DPP's central executive committee for discussion. If this becomes the party's official policy, and all factions cooperate in implementing it, then an embryonic policy will have taken shape.

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The DPP's open debate on policy toward mainland China was closely watched by local and international media. (photo by Hsueh Chi-kuang)