Taiwan Hosts International Conference to Promote Peace in East Asia

Since World War II, half a century of rest and recovery has allowed East Asia to become the engine of global economic growth. However, because of East Asia’s vital strategic location, it has continually been a point of intersection between the spheres of influence of major international powers, with many potential flashpoints. Another variable was added to this volatile mix last November when mainland China suddenly announced its establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), effective immediately, which directly conflicts with the airspace warning areas that Japan and the US have been routinely using in this region.

In reaching a fisheries agreement last April, Taiwan and Japan showed the kind of pragmatism called for in the ROC's East China Sea Peace Initiative. Demonstrating the benefits of setting aside irreconcilable conflicting claims and focusing instead on areas of possible compromise, Taiwan fishermen will now enjoy unobstructed operations in the maritime areas designated by the two parties.

In fact, more than 20 countries around the globe have established ADIZs. The earliest to do so was the US, which formed one jointly with Canada in 1957, as a measure against Cold War rival the USSR. The US and Canada observe and track all flying objects of any kind (airplanes, hot air balloons, etc.) that enter the zone.

Nor is mainland China the first country in East Asia to establish an ADIZ. Korea did so in 1951 and Japan followed suit in 1969. So why has this action by mainland China created so much tension in the region? This issue was the center of attention at the recent International Conference on Peace and Security in East Asia held on February 26 in Taipei.

At the conclave, Wang Kao-­cheng, professor in the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Taiwan’s Tam­kang University, argued that there are three reasons why the US and its allies have seen the mainland Chinese action as a provocation. First, “there was no public discussion or disclosure of information in advance,” thereby taking neighboring countries by surprise. Second, the scope of the mainland’s ADIZ covers a vast part of the East China Sea, not only overlapping with the air defense identification zones of Taiwan, Japan, and Korea, but also including the disputed Diao­yu­tai Islets and other islands. Finally, the mainland has adopted relatively stricter regulations for its zone than the softer rules used by other nations, requiring all aircraft of other nations, military or civil, to notify it when passing through its zone.

Although the mainland’s East China Sea ADIZ does not pose any direct threat to Southeast Asian countries, nonetheless there is reason for concern in that region as well. As pointed out by Bernard F.W. Loo, associate professor at the S. Raja­rat­nam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nan­yang Technological University, the mainland has established military bases in the South China Sea and held military exercises there, steps that are detrimental to regional stability. The nations of Southeast Asia are anxiously asking themselves: Now that the mainland has established an ADIZ over the East China Sea, will the next step be to adopt a similar mechanism in the Yellow Sea/South China Sea region?

This year will see the 100th anniversary of the start of World War I, and Todd Hall, associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, focused his presentation at the conference on comparisons that have been made between the situation in East Asia today and that in Europe before WWI. Some people, he noted, see mainland China’s ambitious posture and rapidly increasing international status today as a reprise of Germany’s history in the early 20th century, with the US playing the role of Great Britain. But Hall cautioned against taking the analogy too far.

He pointed out that “security in those days depended primarily upon soldiers stopping soldiers and ships sinking ships,” whereas today nuclear weapons make full-scale war between mainland China and the US “all but unthinkable.” A nuclear war would result in destruction on a global scale, the fear of which creates a sort of balance of terror or “nuclear peace.” Moreover, Hall said, “The worldviews that made war acceptable—even desirable—a century ago have been discredited,” and great powers no longer see their relations as “a Darwinian struggle between races.”

Nonetheless, Hall reminded everyone to remember well the relevant lessons of WWI. The first problem was “alliance dynamics.” Tiny Serbia, emboldened by backing from Russia which in turn was allied with France, defied Austria, which was allied with Germany, drawing everyone into a disastrous war. Second, domestic nationalism was a force that all governments had to reckon with, making it difficult for diplomats to make compromises to keep the peace. Third, there were repeated regional crises (e.g., in the Balkans), raising the stakes for each successive gain or loss of prestige and creating the grossly mistaken conviction that such “minor” crises could always be managed and would never lead to a major war. Comparing all these factors with East Asia today, the US maintains open or opaque security partnerships with many nations in the region, and such guarantees could cause smaller countries to misjudge a situation. If tensions then escalated further and the US sent forces to their defense, it could lead to a crisis that gets out of control.

Taiwan occupies a strategic hub position in East Asia and cannot avoid being involved in these matters. Building on its limited hard power, and backed by extensive soft power, Taiwan is active in calling for reasonable, peaceful solutions, with avoidance of war being given the highest consideration and the shelving of disputed issues being given the next highest priority. In this context, the interested parties can pursue peaceful co-existence and achieve the goal of regional prosperity.

Former ROC minister of national defense Andrew Nien-dzu Yang, now a professor at National Sun Yat-sen University, noted that over the past 60 years Taiwan has accumulated a great deal of experience in maintaining an air defense zone and has made many contributions to regional stability in the Taiwan Strait region. But in recent years, Taiwan has been left out of many international discussions. He wanted to remind the US that, as it shifts its strategic pivot toward Asia, it should take Taiwan’s experience into account.

Wang Kuan-­hsiung, a professor in the Graduate Institute of Political Science at National Taiwan Normal University, drew particular attention to the ROC’s East China Sea Peace Initiative, announced in August of 2012, especially to its proposal for “shelving disputes” and instead focusing on those issues where there is common interest. This concept is similar in practical terms to the “provisional arrangement” notion of the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, and can be helpful in resolving the controversy over overlapping ADIZs. The Taiwan–Japan fisheries agreement signed last April can be considered a prime example of what can be accomplished by following this principle.

However, Christopher Hughes, head of the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, averred that international law is of little use in resolving sovereignty disputes unless the parties themselves respect it; if they fail to do so, there is no higher enforcement power. In any case, the main factors that make East China Sea issues so difficult to resolve are not legal but ideological: anti-Japanese nationalism and militarism in the PRC.

Hughes did add an important caveat, however: Although international law may not be binding in resolving political disputes, it can be useful in maintaining regional stability and minimizing friction. He stated that the East China Sea Peace Initiative’s core idea that “while sovereignty is indivisible, resources can be shared” is a very effective approach to “depoliticization.” When relations are depoliticized, international law can then “do what it does best,” offering a framework for pragmatic commercial and economic cooperation.

In the face of the rapidly changing situation in East Asia, there has already been a shift in the United States’ strategic outlook and deployments.

John Hamre, former US deputy secretary of defense and currently president and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, outlined the US position. He stated that the US has a vital role to play in maintaining regional stability in Asia and that President Obama considers Asia to be the top priority in grand strategy. As the US refocuses its attention on Asia, it will be essential to open a dialogue with mainland China.

Hamre affirmed that the US has no intention of adopting a “containment” policy toward mainland China, and believes that China will continue with reform. As a result, mainland China’s economy, diplomacy, and society will become more integrated with the international community, and the higher the degree of integration, the more there will be positive interactions with other countries. Asian economies are particularly closely meshed together, and Asian countries cannot and will not try to isolate China. He added that the “Trans-Pacific Partnership” currently being promoted by the US is not only an international trade pact: the US hopes it will also be a mechanism for international norms, transparency, and trust. The US welcomes participation by mainland China and other Asian nations, with every participant benefitting.

Alexander ­Huang ­Chieh-­cheng, an assistant professor in the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tam­kang University, remarked that a great power rivalry is currently unfolding in the Asia–Pacific region. Taiwan, caught at the intersection between cross-strait relations on one side and the US–Japan alliance on the other, is not in an easy position. Besides continuing to pursue cross-strait peace on one hand and maintain relations with the US and Japan on the other, Taiwan must also consider its own “Asia–Pacific rebalancing” strategy, inform its public about the necessity of trade liberalization, and create the conditions for entry into the TPP. These are the conditions, he concluded, for assuring Taiwan’s future.