Differing Views on Inviting Mainland Personalities Shen Chun-shan vs. Kao Ying-mau

Two years ago, President Chiang Ching-kuo set the integrated liberalization policy for the ROC Internally was the lifting of martial law and democratization; externally came opening of mainland policy. A person needs two legs to walk; if one policy is opened up, it could create instability in the domestic political situation.

In the process of discussing mainland policy over the last year or two, a consensus has emerged to move forward under conditions of securing Taiwan's tranquility and peaceful forward evolution; the near-term goal of the two sides is stability and concurrence with both sides substantive benefit.

From the good side, this policy looks out for humanitarian concerns of families on both sides, opens cultural vistas, improves the ROC's international image, gives business an additional route, and, most importantly, weakens the reunification-independence dispute.

It does the last because it allows ROC citizens to practically comprehend the mainland, and allows the country's future to be decided by open discussion; in this way there slowly takes shape a consensus. Given Taiwan's objective and subjective conditions, there is no way to accept either reunification under Chinese communist rule or absolute independence. It is necessary to undertake, under the current structure, maximum democratization internally and moderate, cautious exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, to achieve the objective of peaceful evolution.

However, the negative effects of liberalization deserve attention. For example, confusion of friends and enemies. Originally one could use the simple anti-communist principle. Now there is interchange, creating problems for many citizens. Second is confusion of legal norms. The legal structure cannot suddenly, after 40 years, reconcile sentiment and rationality, and may even produce unreasonable outcomes. Under current laws, teachers cannot visit family on the mainland, which seems somewhat callous. Third is a loss of government authority, including loss of public trust and doubt among the business and intellectual communities of the government's leadership abilities.

However, mainland liberalization still must move forward; it cannot go back. But besides respecting the "three no's" on the government level, there should be the "three wants" on the popular level:

"Wanting to understand" means building institutions and personnel with specialized knowledge of the mainland, systematically collecting information, and doing scholarly research. Reporting from the mainland should be opened up, allowing reporters to do their job openly. If there is no source of information, there can be no understanding, and no next step in mainland policy.

"Wanting to get involved" means legal and administrative involvement, and not negotiations. The government must take responsibility and control the situation. An advantageous administrative model can be established from involvement.

"Wanting initiative" means we must actively lead the direction of liberalization. On the one hand we must choose what is of benefit to Taiwan and moderate the situation between the two sides; on the other we must consider the collective benefit of the whole ROC rather than individual benefit.

Bringing off the "three wants" is to encourage the goal of peaceful evolution, and make the mainland concerned over "three no's" vis-a-vis Taiwan. The first is "not daring to use force"; we must let them know that the price of war will be high given ROC defense construction. The second is "not able to use force" through making the ROC an indispensible member for the pursuit of development in the international community, and relying on international strength to block Chinese communist military action. The third is "not willing to use force"; this does not mean that their government will not wish to fight, but that the broad society will not.

These three no's are the pillars of the peaceful evolution of relations between the two sides. Mainland policy is most tied to the "not willing to use force" aspect. Up to now, policy has been passive, on the humanitarian or cultural levels. As for how to take the initiative, I believe inviting outstanding personalities and overseas students from the mainland is one way.

Why? First, ROC citizens must know two basics about the mainland situation: first, the mainland elite is not limited to the communist party center, and can be divided into the conservative faction, the nation-building faction, and the democratic reform faction. Different classes have different interests. Second, the coastal and inland factions have different interests.

After Teng Hsiao-ping, there will be conflict. In inviting personalities and students-- besides letting the world know the ROC is open and democratic and there is but one China--we can make the mainland elite understand that Taiwan's separate existence is beneficial to the mainland. In the long term, maintaining ROC stability is better than "one country, two systems." Taiwan's free economic life is something mainland modernization cannot do without. The purpose is to allow the Chinese communists to understand Taiwan's great progress, and for those knowledgeable persons on the mainland, Taiwan's existence is a great stimulus to the Chinese communists.

Perhaps some fear invitees will be united front practitioners. In fact, the power of choosing lies with us. Under the current situation of mainland fever, for this first time inviting overseas mainland students to Taiwan, we had to take careful measures. The most important consideration is if they have earned the respect of compatriots or the international community in scholarly or cultural fields, and if they are honest. Their political views are secondary, so long as they are not politicians.

In general, invitees pose not too great a threat to Taiwan's security. But we must carefully pay attention to implementation: will this policy increase blind "mainland madness"? Will it affect internal political stability? Create provincial alienation or conflicts between political parties? And we cannot have personal interest groups who wishfully want to use the outstanding mainland personalities as tools for their own benefit.

Therefore, I believe that for sports, music, or performing artists, it is best to wait until the mainland madness has passed. As for business contacts, we must wait until the legal norms are established; it's not necessary to consider these for the near future.

The above are comments made by Minister without Portfolio Shen Chun-shan during a discussion session on the topic of inviting students from the mainland studying in the U.S. to come to Taiwan, sponsored by Sinorama.

The "mainland fever" phenomenon created by the rapid and wide liberalization of the past year makes me maintain a relatively cautious attitude toward whether or not we should invite outstanding personalities from the mainland to Taiwan.

From a technical viewpoint, moving from unilateral family visits to the mainland to the two-way communication of inviting visitors requires cautious consideration. Legal problems created by visits to the mainland, like polygamy, inheritance, and contracts, are complex. Sudden approval of visits prior to resolving these questions is somewhat excessive haste.

For example, if we invite friends from the other side of the straits, how do we explain how the fundamental National Security Law looks on the communist party? Are they "bandits"? Or "friends"? The things they bring are from communist areas--should they be confiscated? To invite people without resolving these questions first adds to difficulties.

The problem of visiting the ill or attending funerals by the common people is relatively simple. Currently the object of liberalization is outstanding personalities. You choose their outstanding personalities, but the mainland meanwhile will devote efforts to choose their own so-called "outstanding" persons; will these be experts in united front tactics? And with local media bound to give detailed coverage, how can the people maintain their consciousness of danger and distinguish between friends and enemies?

From another point of view, I think visits by outstanding personalities and overseas students from the mainland will sharpen the domestic reunification-independence debate. Currently some overseas personalities from Taiwan are not permitted to return; they may ask "Those you considered as bandits and spies can now come to Taiwan. Why can't its own people go home?" Some ask, "Will the government sell out Taiwan?" These ways of speaking have a bad effect on unity.

What path should development of relations take?

President Lee Teng-hui has said liberalization of mainland policy must have principles and conditions, and must consider national security and tranquility. That is to say, there must be short-, medium-, and long-term objectives, with steps matched to them. We must ask: Have the Chinese communists made a positive response to liberalization? Has liberalization promoted willingness to peacefully coexist? If the answer is yes, we may take the next step.

I have often criticized the older generation for being too rigid. But based on several trips to the mainland, I understand their united front abilities and organizational strength.The current communist strategy is simple, but dangerous. In the 50's and 60's they relied on military threat. Today they use peaceful overtures, but has their ambition altered? Their current strategy has three main points:

(1) Strengthening economic and cultural exchanges (the "three links and four exchanges") to tighten relations between the two sides. ROC businessmen flock to the mainland, while the communists emphasize "Get on the money-earning train!" This kind of seduction is dangerous.

(2) Adopting a political strategy of factionalizing the R.O.C internally. Witness the case of Legislator Hu Chiu-yuan's visit and discussions with communist authorities; the issue of his expulsion from the KMT split the party.

(3) Isolating the ROC internationally. Recently they asked UN members to boycott the ROC's flexible diplomacy. They do not allow us any room to exist.

The main purpose of these maneuvers is to "Hongkongize Taiwan." The mainland does not wish to destroy Taiwan's economy with armed force, and uses a long run strategy to force Taiwan's status down to the level of Hong Kong, to impose the "one country, two systems" formula on us.

Can we really accept "special district" status like Hong Kong? The reasons Hong Kong has no choice are simple: their economic reliance on the mainland is deep, the people have no political strength to resist, and it lacks the support of international allies. Given the current mainland fever, will we find ourselves in Hong Kong's position? This question really deserves serious reflection by all citizens.

Further, we must ask, "Do the Chinese communists really want to peacefully coexist, or are they just using every possible strategy to turn us into a local government?" From their attempts to isolate us internationally, they obviously are not using practical measures to show their sincerity to peacefully coexist.

Liberalizing mainland policy is not some romantic longing but a serious topic. There absolutely must be responsibility for national security and social tranquility. According to communist statistics already over 400,000 businessmen have gone there to do business. As for the coming to Taiwan of outstanding personalities, my view is--wait until we have the strength to deal with legal complexities, and also give the Chinese communists a chance to prove their sincere respect for the existence of the ROC, and then we can adopt opening in both directions. This is perhaps the wisest course.

The above are comments by Brown University Professor Kao Ying-mau at a discussion session on the topic of inviting mainland students studying in the U.S. to come to Taiwan, sponsored by Sinorama.