Cutting Through the Global Drug Network

In early February of this year, Minister of Justice Ma Ying-jeou went on a low-key trip to Thailand to visit the poppy-growing area of the "Golden Triangle." This trip to see the source of the drug trade first-hand was highly praised in the media and made Ma a "modern Lin Zexu" (named after a Qing dynasty official famed for his opposition to opium). Yet, in contradictory news, at the beginning of March the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report released by the US cited Taiwan, for the third time, as being a significant drug transshipment center. This was quite a blow to Taiwan's international image.

With coastal fishing in the economic doldrums, many fishermen have turned to "at-sea" trading to pick up extra money. Harbor policemen trying to deter this practice carefully inspect returning fishing boats. （photo by Lin Meng-san）

Just how important is international cooperation in fighting drug trafficking? What role does Taiwan play in the international drug trade? What difficulties exist, and what breakthroughs have been made?

It was about 200 years ago, at the height of the glorious Qianlong reign period of the Qing dynasty, that Britain's East India Company began transporting shiploads of opium paste from India and the Indochina peninsula through the South China Sea to Quanzhou in Fujian Province. At that time opium was a legal product in China, and was a favored bedtime indulgence for royalty and high officialdom. It was also a profitable tool by which imperialist powers could squeeze silver out of China.

Sixty years later, opium was being sold in huge quantities, and the tottering Qing dynasty, ruling an increasingly impoverished and decadent populace, could stand it no more: They decided to strictly ban opium, and burned existing stocks. The result was the Opium War, which launched a century of national humiliation for China. By the end of the war, won by Britain, it was not only impossible to ban opium, but its use had become even more rampant. Eventually China began to produce opium itself, until it became far and away the leading producer and consumer of opium in the world--the "Opium Kingdom." The fate of the Qing is evidence that "opium" and "kingdom" were mutually contradictory in the end.

From legal trade to international crime

The opium that undermined China more than a century ago arrived through transnational trade, and the same thing is true of modern narcotics. In advanced countries drug production is strictly controlled, and it is virtually impossible to cultivate poppies (for opium or heroin), coca (for cocaine), or cannabis on a huge scale. Given the high demand for narcotics in these societies, the result is that supplies are inadequate, naturally forcing prices up. For people in poor countries, consequently, what could be a faster way to wealth than to produce these raw materials for narcotics? This is why the drug trade is based on the principle of "the wealthy buying from the poor," and why it has become an international enterprise.

As the harmful effects of drugs came to be understood, drug trafficking changed from being legal to being a criminal offense around the world. There has been a significant trend toward international cooperation in fighting the drug trade. Producer, transshipment, and consumer nations have joined hands to clamp down at every link in the chain. Only in this way can narcotics activities be completely rooted out. On at least one occasion the US dispatched heavily armed military police to mountainous areas in Columbia to assist Colombian police in cracking down on major drug dealers who control production and sales operations. This action was not an effort by the US to uphold the authority of the Colombian government, but was aimed at protecting Americans against the flow of narcotics. International cooperative efforts like these are the key to whether anti-drug efforts can show results.

Prior to 1989 or so, the drug situation in Taiwan was not very complex. The most popular addictive drugs were chemically synthesized narcotics and hallucinogens. Very powerful drugs were rare. By the 1990s, however, things had changed. This was due in part to expanded trade as a result of economic internationalization and liberalization, and in part to rising wealth and consumer demand in Taiwan. Taiwan had become a new market of great potential that international drug dealers eyed with greed and worked to develop.

Caught in a pincer attack

According to Ministry of Justice statistics, the peak year for drug use was in 1993. In that year, the government confiscated more than 1100 kg of opiates (mainly heroin), and 3300 kg of chemically synthesized amphetamines. In 1994, amphetamine seizures (of finished and semi-finished products) were even higher, at more than 6800 kg. For 1993 and 1994, the number of people convicted of drug offenses was about 45,000 each year. Based on an estimate that for every user caught four others escape the law, then the actual number of users exceeded 200,000. And that is not an alarmist estimate.

Where do the drugs come from? This requires making some distinctions. Though heroin, processed from poppies, and amphetamines, which are chemically synthesized, are equally important as local drugs of choice, they have very different origins and production processes. There are also differences between the groups that use them. You could say that Taiwan is caught in a pincer attack.

As far as heroin goes, the main supplier to Taiwan is the infamous Golden Triangle (lawless territory where Burma, Thailand, and Laos come together). Most of the narcotics coming out of the Golden Triangle go through Bangkok. Major dealers there strike deals with Taiwan buyers, and the drugs are then smuggled in on fishing boats. To get large shipments past customs authorities, the ships are fitted with specially designed hidden caches in holds and engine rooms.

Alternatively, drugs are carried on direct flights from Bangkok to Taipei. The goods are spread out in small amounts among many carriers. Or the drugs may be transshipped into Taiwan in containers through the international ports of Hong Kong or Singapore.

All these old routes have shrunk in usefulness in recent years as Bangkok police have made intensive efforts to stop the trafficking. But this means that there are even greater windfall profits for those shipments that do get through, so dealers have been trying to develop new routes. They have gotten lucky as border trade between mainland China and Southeast Asia has blossomed of late. Now large amounts of narcotics from Thailand and Burma are delivered into Yunnan Province, and then are transported overland to Hong Kong or Macao, and thence by sea to Taiwan. Also, with the very recent opening up of Vietnam, some drugs from Laos and Cambodia are beginning to be exported though Vietnam.

The narcotics situation in Southeast Asia has changed significantly these past few years. Right now, power in the Golden Triangle is in a state of flux following the recent departure of drug warlord Kun Sha. It is uncertain yet whether police will benefit from his leaving. Also, there are many new producing areas entering the market, including the remote Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Central Asian nations of the former USSR. Asia's "narcotification" crisis is deepening.

At present Yunnan and Guizhou together produce about 10,000 kilos of heroin a year. It is estimated that much of this, together with heroin brought into mainland China from the Golden Triangle, ends up in Taiwan. In Guizhou, an important transshipment point where the drugs are concentrated and then redistributed, a kilo of local heroin sells for about RMB*80,000 (about NT$26,000 or almost US$1000). As the shipment moves east, the price increases in each province, so that by the time the drug reaches Fujian on the coast a kilo costs RMB*800,000. After being shipped over the Taiwan Strait, that same kilo fetches the equivalent of RMB*5 million in Taiwan. And when supplies are short, a kilo can be broken up and retailed on the street for a total of up to NT$30 million (over US$1 million or nearly RMB*10 million). With such enormous returns on a small initial investment, no wonder so many are willing to join in this risky and possibly fatal commerce.

Amphetamine investors

Taiwan is a victim nation in the heroin trade, but when the subject changes to amphetamines, Taiwan's role is a little embarrassing. Over the past few years, Taiwan has acquired the reputation of being a major amphetamine producing nation. But amphetamines were also originally an import. Their history can be traced back to the Second World War. The "secret weapon" behind the Japanese kamikaze pilots who suicidally attacked the allied forces was amphetamines, which pilots used to get charged up. Amphetamines were long widely produced in Japan and Korea; after the authorities in those nations cracked down, many manufacturers moved to Taiwan.

The manufacture and sales of amphetamines is very similar to the pattern of the international division of labor for most consumer goods. There are cheap raw materials (ephedrine produced in China's Ningxia Province), shipment to Taiwan (in fishing boats), processing and production in Taiwan with "technical assistance" from Japanese and Korean experts, and exports to Japan, Korea, or Hawaii.

Until the mid-1980s, Taiwan was still mainly an amphetamine supplier. Though there were many underground factories, there were not a lot of "speed-heads" actually using the drugs. But after Korea tightened up on its market, international drug dealers, changing course, began to develop the Taiwan market, and once opened it has proven impossible to shut down.

Since 1993, as part of a major government crackdown, the government has thus far closed down over 30 underground amphetamine laboratories. Nearly 14 tons of raw materials, finished products, and semi-finished products were uncovered. The industry's history then repeated itself, only this time it was Taiwan drug manufacturers putting up the capital and providing the equipment and technology, as factories moved westward to coastal China (especially Fujian). Goods produced there are either sold to Taiwanese businessmen or shipped out to Taiwan, Japan, and Korea.

Missing puzzle pieces

Regardless of the type of drug involved, all exhibit the phenomenon of transnational crime. The only way to effectively block the flow of drugs is international cooperation. Unfortunately, Taiwan is at a marked disadvantage in this area.

A number of international narcotics organizations have been founded in the past several years. In 1988, 108 UN member states signed the "UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances," whose outstanding feature is that it is binding, not merely for reference. In 1990, there was a special meeting of the UN General Assembly on narcotics, which approved a "Global Program of Action" to fight trafficking. This was immediately followed by a high-level Asian regional conference on the subject. In addition, information on smuggling can be exchanged through the International Customs Union and Interpol. Techniques and legal concepts governing international cooperation against drugs are constantly being updated and altered. Frustratingly, owing to its special diplomatic circumstances, Taiwan is excluded by all these organizations.

Being unable to participate in international bodies means the loss of opportunities to exchange ideas and share programs with other countries face- to-face. Taiwan's only recourse has been to actively sponsor large scale and Asian regional seminars on the drug problem in order to demonstrate its dedication to the fight against drugs and to demonstrate its successes.

In addition, in 1992 Taiwan and the US signed a memorandum on common pursuit of narcotics offenders; a more detailed memorandum on the same subject was signed this year. Taiwan also hopes to use US assistance to develop an anti-drug network in Southeast Asia.

Yet, however hard Taiwan may work, there are still gaps. For example, Taiwan lacks formal diplomatic relations with any Southeast Asian state, nor are there any formal bilateral or multilateral agreements. This creates many problems in terms of sending anti-drug agents to those nations, exchanging intelligence, and detaining and extraditing criminals. Each case must be handled separately, with the outcome depending upon how the relevant agencies get along and whether they are willing to help one another out. Not only does this make Taiwan dependent on "goodwill" from the other side, it wastes much time and effort.

A staffer at the Bureau of Investigation raises a case in point. Between the Burmese drug dealer and the Taiwan addict, a gram of heroin passes through well over ten pairs of hands as it goes through each level of the system. There is only a one-way link at each step, and the network has a "delinked design" that makes it hard for police to trace drugs back to the source, which is carefully hidden right from the start.

Under these circumstances, when a "mule" (a person actually transporting the drugs) is caught, he or she only knows his/her immediate link to the chain. Even then, this link is likely to only be "some Thai guy" known only by a nickname (a "live drop") or just a letter box or a convenient hole in an old house or under a bridge (a "dead drop"). If it is impossible to call in the Thai police for help, then there will be no way to try to pursue the geographic relationships in the chain; it will be likewise impossible ever to catch the behind-the-scenes suppliers or the syndicates acting as middlemen.

In short, the anti-drug effort is like an enormous crossword puzzle for the police, with some of the pieces in Taiwan and others overseas. Unless transnational cooperation is possible, there will inevitably be gaps in the anti-drug picture.

Controlled exchanges

In recent years, money-laundering operations by drug cartels have become more sophisticated and diversified. This means it is increasingly important to be able to look at records of international financial transactions. For example, as Chen Chia-yao, a well-known local drug enforcement officer, says, how can police determine the role in the overall drug organization of a given offender arrested in Taiwan? Based on previous experience, the most powerful figures rarely touch the contraband themselves, and not a speck of drugs can be found on their persons. But they definitely take the cash. Under these circumstances, the easiest way to know how important a given criminal might be in a cartel is to check his accounts in foreign banks. For Taiwan, the lack of formal diplomatic relations means that it is very difficult to gain access to this type of information.

There are also times when Taiwan's police know very well where a wanted man has escaped to. But because there are no extradition agreements, all they can do is watch the criminal flee from justice. Even if it is possible to lay hold of the individual by having the country in which he has taken refuge expel him, this is still a complicated process and easily leads to disturbances. There are even those times when witnesses needed for cases in Taiwan are being held abroad for other cases--how can these be compelled to return? How can material evidence abroad (drugs, transport devices, money) be brought back to Taiwan? How is the evidence to be entered into the record in court? The absence of these essentials not only impedes investigation, it can also affect the judge's verdict.

Authorities in producer nations, transshipment nations, and consumer nations all have their own interests owing to their different needs. From the consumer nation point of view, the ideal situation would be to "stop the drugs from ever reaching shore." When authorities in producing or transshipment nations can be notified of an impending shipment, they can intercept it even before it has left their territory. This can preempt a lot of problems. That is why the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) stations agents in every major producer and transshipment country. The DEA also offers generous rewards to buck up the morale of cooperating local police as well as to reduce incentives for collusion between police and criminals. It may seem like all this costs an awful lot, but it is money well spent compared to the enormous sums required for law enforcement and rehabilitation in the consumer country.

Yet each case must be handled individually according to its specific features. Sometimes drugs are shipped directly into a country. If, after being found by customs, they can be followed like a trail, then the drugs and a whole network of local dealers large and small can be scooped up in a single blow. This is the ideal situation.

However, there are also times when shipments circulate through the ports of many countries owing to the requirements of the transport ship. In such cases, to prevent the wily dealers from slipping away with the goods, it is necessary that each country along the route cooperate to keep the shipment under covert observation. This is called "controlled exchange," and is one of the newest techniques in international cooperative anti-drug efforts.

The logic of "controlled exchange" is simple enough. But it is very complex to pull off, and impinges upon the law enforcement autonomy of each nation along a route. If a civil servant knows about a shipment of contraband in the country's territory and does not act, is that not "dereliction of duty"? Also, seeing as many nations offer rewards to police for confiscations, asking local police to hold off on a known shipment is like asking to them to restrain themselves from scooping up money floating by on a stream, seriously affecting their willingness to cooperate.

For this reason, the Vienna treaty specially included controlled exchange in the list of international cooperative obligations. Signatories to the treaty are not allowed to refuse requests to participate in controlled exchange actions. Nevertheless, it has been revealed that on at least one occasion Taiwan asked another nation for cooperation, only to have the other side--in violation of international protocol--seize the shipments, leaving Taiwan officials empty-handed.

You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours

Generally speaking, downstream consumer nations must rely heavily on assistance from producer and transshipment countries. In terms of amphetamines, Japan needs help from Taiwan, while Taiwan needs help from mainland China. As for heroin, Taiwan especially needs help from Thailand, Burma, mainland China, and Hong Kong.

Lin Jieh-shan, director of the Drug Enforcement Center of the Investigation Bureau, says that while Taiwan does indeed face special obstacles to international cooperation, there have been cases of cooperation. Relying on the principle of reciprocity and on workaday tacit agreements, through the close exchange of information some major cases have been broken. For example, in October of 1993, the Criminal Investigation Bureau, using information provided by the Southeast Asia branch of the DEA and by Thai police, cracked a Taiwan-Hong Kong drug smuggling ring. In the process, they confiscated 120 heroin bricks totaling 420 kilos. Later, Taiwan police went through Interpol to ask the Hong Kong police to follow up with arrests in the case.

Another successful example of cooperation occurred in June of 1994. The BOI received a tip-off that a Taiwan buyer was going to Fuzhou in mainland China to purchase amphetamines, and then transport them back to Taiwan by fishing boat. They tracked the movements of the fishing boat by satellite, and discovered that the boat transferred the drugs onto a Japanese-registered ship while on the high seas. The Japanese authorities were notified immediately, and intercepted more than 150 kg of the drugs at the harbor.

"International cooperation is like a positive feedback loop--the more you give, the more you get," explains Director Lin. International help is especially appreciated for cases when whole ships or containers filled with contraband can be intercepted in port, because police can seize a larger amount and there is much less risk of meeting resistance from drug dealers. It is at these times that information from the other side (exporting or transshipping nations) has decisive importance.

As Taiwan strives to develop law enforcement and judicial cooperation with Southeast Asian states, "cross-strait" ties remain worrisome. As in the cultural, agricultural, and economic fields, cross-strait narcotics exchanges and mutual reliance among dealers have also grown significantly these past several years. Cross-strait anti-drug cooperation should be implemented with urgency, but it is stagnating amidst disputes over sovereignty and legal jurisdiction, and it has proven difficult to make any breakthroughs. Reflecting back on how drugs destroyed the country 200 years ago, it is likely that Lin Zexu would be rolling over in his grave at the inability of the two sides to join hands to combat controlled substances.

The face of Taiwan drug dealers

Given the intensity of the government crackdown over the past few years, it is increasingly rare for dealers to boldly bring large shipments in on fishing vessels. There has been a decline since 1993 in the amount confiscated by the government (see chart). But Taiwan is a major trading area, and includes the world's third busiest port (Kaohsiung). Ships come and go 24 hours a day, and there are countless business travelers and tourists. Meanwhile dealers are constantly coming up with new ways to smuggle contraband--tucked into ship containers, hidden away in luggage, even inserted or swallowed into the human body.

Intercepting shipments even before they leave their point of origin, or grabbing them in port, are the best ways to halt trafficking. But most police actions take place after the drugs enter the country. It may take several months, even a year or two, of setting traps, collecting clues, following suspects, and tapping phone lines before the time is right to move. This is what is referred to as "in-country seizure."

For law enforcement officials, drug raids are much more dangerous than actions against other types of crime. Fortunately drug abuse does not have a long history in Taiwan, and its dealers are but small players in Southeast Asia in terms of ferocity and power. Most are local or clan-based hoodlums, perhaps important local criminal figures. There is as yet no sign that the largest underworld organizations in Taiwan are involved in drug trafficking in a major way.

Under these circumstances, Taiwan has thus far largely avoided the types of turf wars between rival drug syndicates so bloodily depicted in Hong Kong films. Nor has there been the slightest sign of any problem like that in Colombia, where the drug dealers are wealthy enough to be decisive players in local politics, and they battle authorities in open warfare. A section chief in the Drug Enforcement Center surnamed Su, says that the advantage in all this is that there is much less danger for police when they conduct raids. The disadvantage is that distribution channels are too scattered, so it is only possible to arrest a few people here, a few people there, but not to topple a whole organization in one blow.

Yet, though the organizations are small, they have a high level of interaction. Sometimes they share sources, and sometimes they shift supplies to help each other out. Amphetamine manufacturers often share the same "master," having learned their skills from the same person. Every time police break a case, they only have to patiently follow the threads and often they will come upon another organization. These instances of "a case within a case" account for a large proportion of police successes.

Although drug networks in Taiwan are not well-organized or large-scale, there are concerns about the phenomenon of smuggled guns and drugs coming through the same channels. Are drug gangs increasing their firepower? Investigative agencies are keeping a close watch on the situation.

An ethnic drug network?

Because Taiwan has become increasingly internationalized, its dealers are no longer relying as much as they did on Hong Kong intermediaries. Recently they have begun to cross national boundaries and go directly to their sources. As in ordinary trade, there are ethnically based networks. These cultural and linguistic ties have led to intricate links between Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, the mainland, and even in Southeast Asia. Although no one can say for sure what proportion of the Southeast Asian drug trade is controlled by ethnic Chinese, a Chinese network has quietly taken shape.

In the third biggest drug case ever cracked in Taiwan (in 1994), the main suspect admitted that he got involved through a chance meeting with the nephew of drug warlord Kun Sha. The two got along well together right away, and the nephew asked him to sell 60 kg of heroin for him in Taiwan.

Kun Sha is part Chinese, and the opium growing areas along the border between the Golden Triangle and the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou are mainly in ethnic Chinese hands. In Thailand, a key distribution and shipment center, ship owners of Chinese origin are responsible for smuggling channels and methods. Needless to say, those in charge in Fujian and Guangdong are also Chinese. And then there are the Chinese of Hong Kong, whose importance as middlemen between Southeast Asia and Taiwan is not to be underestimated.

Where Hong Kong and Taiwan dealers differ is that Taiwan sellers are usually addicts themselves, and they get into the trade to keep up their habits. In Hong Kong, however, dealers are professionals. After being accepted by the drug organizations, they are prohibited from taking drugs and are given "training." They are required to be well-dressed and gentlemanly, at least on the surface, and they are made familiar with police detection techniques and procedures; they are extremely alert and cautious. With "technical exchange" between Hong Kong and Taiwan, the level of Taiwan criminal behavior has been much "upgraded," making life that much harder for law enforcement officials. With the 1997 deadline fast approaching, there are rumors that Hong Kong triads want to shift operations to Taiwan, so the situation is still treacherous.

Given the fact that Taiwan has been drawn into the global drug traffic, and given its current conditions, we can see that the many anti-drug successes recently enjoyed have not come easy. The war on drugs can only be a long one. Can Taiwan find a way to completely extricate itself from being a node in the international drug network? We'll have to wait and see.

Taiwan's coastline stretches more than 1400 kilometers, and it is difficult to keep it all under surveillance. Coastal police mainly use fast anti-smuggling boats to conduct patrols.

The amphetamine crystal known as "ice".

In a folk museum in a northern Thai village, it is startling to see the Chinese for "opium flowers" written on the sign to attract visitors.

In February, Minister of Justice Ma Ying-jeou went to the Golden Triangle to discuss international cooperation measures with Thai narcotics police. （photo courtesy of Ministry of Justice）

Poppy.