Chen's Victory Creates New Possibilities, New Risks

The election of Chen Shui-bian (Demo-cratic Progressive Party), marks an unprecedented change in Taiwan's politicals. Internally, this is the first time transition of leadership from one political party to another. It is also the first time the president does not have majority support in the public or in the parliament. In terms of both the political party system and the functioning of the constitution, Chen's election will raise novel issues and possibilities.

Externally, in terms of cross-strait relations, for the first time a party whose roots are entirely in Taiwan will figure into an equation that had previously only included the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China. The Democratic Progressive Party and the CPC lack a shared historical relationship, and this will be a major new variable in cross-strait relations.

Plurality president

The key to Chen Shui-bian's election victory was the split in the KMT, which resulted in three major forces contesting the vote. This was in fact a repeat of the conditions under which Chen was elected mayor of Taipei back in 1994. This time, the split in the KMT allowed Chen to be elected with only a 39% plurality.

There are two things particularly worth noting about a plurality president: First, such a president does not have support from more than half of the electorate, so his base is smaller than that of the majority party in the parliament. Inevitably the latter will contest the legitimacy of the president's mandate. Second, the president only leads the executive branch, and must face checks from the legislature and judiciary. These will certainly challenge the president's policies.

To overcome such obstacles, a plurality president must bring together other political forces to create a majority coalition to stabilize the political situation. The core members of the incoming cabinet will have to work closely with the incumbents during the transition period from March 18 to May 20. Through such practical political interaction, likely coalition partners can be identified.

Before the election, Chen declared that he would create a supra-party advisory body to help him organize the cabinet, and that Academia Sinica president Lee Yuan-tseh would be in charge of cross-strait matters in this advisory group. Chen also promised that if elected he would convene a National Affairs Conference to build a consensus among political forces. Either or both of these steps would help ameliorate the difficulties faced by a plurality president.

Restructuring the system

Let us turn to the question of the restructuring of the political party system. James Soong, who left the KMT to run as an independent, lost the election to Chen by less than three percent of the vote. Moreover, Soong finished far ahead of the KMT candidate, Lien Chan. Soong's success has created uncertainty for the remaking of Taiwan's political landscape.

For James Soong, restructuring of party politics offers two main challenges: First, in policy terms, he will have to figure out how to play down traditional issues of ethnicity and of reunification vs. independence, so that Taiwan party politics is no longer purely an ideological struggle fought over symbols, but involves rational debate over public policy. Organizationally, Soong will have to get rid of obsolete elements and recruit new leaders, so that not only do reformists become the mainstream in a new political party, but the influence of corrupt and criminal elements is limited.

For the DPP, there are also two main challenges: In policy terms, they must leave behind historical tragedies, and adopt a more tolerant and inclusive perspective. They must heal the wounds of the election, and redefine Taiwan's domestic and external situation. These are historical tests that the DPP cannot evade. Organizationally, in the process of absorbing more local political resources, the DPP must be careful that big business and criminal opportunists are not able to infiltrate and corrupt the party. This is a major test for a party holding high-level political power for the first time.

Cross-strait relations

It must also be remembered that DPP party members are the chief executives in the large majority of Taiwan's cities and counties. Now that the DPP also controls executive power at the central level, the political map will have a green line running from localities to the center. This could very well lead to a reorganization of political forces at the local level. It can be predicted that prior to the city and county executive elections in 2001, many KMT and independent county and city assembly members, township mayors, and township representatives will join the DPP, greatly expanding the DPP's capability at the local level.

Undoubtedly, the greatest challenge for Chen Shui-bian is not in domestic reform, which most everyone favors, but in the dilemma of cross-strait relations. This is especially the case given that the DPP carries the burden of its long-term advocacy of Taiwan independence, as a result of which there is no trust between the DPP and the Beijing authorities. It will be necessary to advance step by step, to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings, and to clear up long-standing prejudices. It will take a more open-minded, frank, and responsible attitude to create a new situation in cross-strait relations.

In his victory speech, Chen stated his goals for cross-strait relations. They are "amity and harmony, active cooperation, and permanent peace." He stated that he was "willing to use the most friendly attitude and determination to undertake comprehensive constructive dialogue and communication. Under the preconditions of ensuring national security and the interests of the people," he added, he would be "willing to undertake discussions on a variety of subjects, including direct air and sea links, direct trade, investment, a peace treaty, and military confidence-building mechanisms." In addition, he said that he would be happy to encourage visits of leaders across the strait so long as such visits were acceptable to both sides.

To be honest, since Chen comes from the DPP, it is almost certain that his position on Taiwan's sovereignty will be very firm. But this does not mean that there is no possibility of developing political dialogue or negotiations across the strait. Before the election, Chen made a number of important statements in this regard-that he would not declare Taiwan independent or seek to have the "two states" formula inserted into the constitution; that he would not seek a public referendum on reunification or independence in his term of office; that he would not participate in DPP party activities after the election; that cross-strait matters were not something that could be decided by one single person or one party; that the national interest transcended the interest of any political party, and so on. All of these were intended to ease fears that he would feel bound by the Taiwan independence clause of the DPP party platform.

Even more importantly, Chen stated that in his new government, cross-strait matters would be guided by a supra-party organization led by Lee Yuan-tseh, who is not affiliated with any political party. This is clearly an important step in the definition of cross-strait policy, and leaves room for creative politics.

As for Beijing, in contrast to its pre-election efforts to intimidate voters into rejecting Chen, its preliminary reaction to Chen's victory has been low-key and pragmatic. Although it has not declared an end to the cross-strait crisis, in terms of its political posture at least, it has left room for compromise. Beijing will be keeping a close watch on Chen during the transition, and on his inaugural address, to see whether his words and deeds match his pre-election promises.

Create the future together

In other words, if the leaders handle the situation appropriately, there is room for cautious optimism about cross-strait developments. After all, because Beijing originally had very low expectations of Chen, if Chen proves flexible, there will be a psychological impact of improvement. What's more, if the two sides do indeed enter the World Trade Organization at the same time later this year, this will force liberalization in both economic systems, and will help in economic discussions.

As for the definition of the end-game structure of cross-strait relations, the key, unfortunately, remains whether Beijing can adopt a new way of approaching the problem. Over-anxiousness for quick results will not necessarily lead to positive interactions across the strait. Even if there are political negotiations, it is not necessary to immediately go right to the question of sovereignty. The two sides could start by establishing offices in the other's territory, creating bilateral organizations, signing a peace treaty, and adopting confidence-building measures. These would create mechanisms for resolving political differences.

In sum, Chen's victory could lead to an unprecedented crisis or an unprecedented opportunity for improvement; this applies to both domestic and external affairs. The key lies in whether Chen acts wisely to create a consensus with other political forces and to actively promote cross-strait harmony.