為什麼邀請大陸傑出人士來訪——沈君山Vs.高英茂

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1989 / 2月

文‧林麗雪整理 圖‧陳品君


去年十二月一日,行政院核定的「現階段大陸傑出人士、在海外大陸學人及留學生來台參觀訪問申請作業規定」正式公布;緊接著十二月下旬,五位大陸留學生來台,更造成一股不小的新聞旋風。

究竟為什麼邀請大陸傑出人士來訪?大陸政策由單向探親走進雙向溝通,將有何利弊?在本社舉辦的座談會中,行政院政務委員沈君山與美國布朗大學政治系教授高英茂,各有不同的看法。

沈君山


兩年前,經國先生制訂中華民國的整體開放政策,一方面是對內解除戒嚴的民主化,另外一方面則是對大陸政策的開放。這兩個開放政策就像人走路要用兩條腿,如果只開放其中的任何一個,都可能會造成國內政局的不穩定。

開放互有利弊

在最近一、兩年的大陸政策討論過程中,朝野得到的共同看法是,在確保台灣的安全以及和平演進前題下,兩岸關係的近期目標在求穩定且符合雙方實質利益下進行。

從好的一方來看,這樣的政策照顧了兩岸親情人道,開闊了國人文化藝術的眼界和認同,改善了中華民國的國際形象,增加了工商業的出路,而最重要的一點,是藉由兩岸的交流,而淡化了統獨之爭。

為什麼能消弭統獨的爭論呢?因為讓國人到大陸探親能實際地認識大陸,另外國家前途也可以經由公開討論來決定,於是能慢慢地形成一個共識——台灣在主客觀的情勢之下,都無法接受中共統制下的統一或斷然的獨立;而必須在現在的體制下,對內儘量從事民主改革,對外緩慢謹慎的兩岸交流,而達到和平演進的目的。

然而開放所造成的負面影響也值得注意。例如敵情意識的混淆,本來一直是把握簡單的反共原則,現在又要與他們往來,對許多國人形成了困擾;其次是法律規範的混亂,因為經過四十年長久的隔離,突然之間解凍,法律規範不容易做到合情合理,甚至也會有不合情不合理的情事發生,像現在大陸探親規定中,還不准教師去,就有點不合乎人情了;三是政府威信的損失,這一方面是公信力的損失,另外一方面則是企業界、學界、知識分子對於政府的領導能力產生懷疑。

民間應「三要」

不過在這些正負兩面交互影響之下,大陸開放政策還是要繼續往前走,而不可能走回頭路。因此在政府層面上的「三不」大原則是一定要遵守的,但是,民間交流也應該主動地實行「三要」觀念——要了解、要介入、要主導。

所謂「要了解」就是要設立大陸的專職機構、人員,有系統地收集大陸資訊,做學術研究;也要開放大陸採訪工作,讓記者在名正言順下採訪報導。因為沒有資訊來源就無法了解,也不能制訂更進一步的大陸政策。

「要介入」是表示司法和行政上的介入,這並不代表雙方政治上的談判,而是政府要負責任,要控制情勢。行政司法上的介入接觸,不但能使情勢不致於失控,而且還能從介入當中建立有利於我們的行政的模式。

「要主導」則是我們要主動領導開放的方向,一方面選擇有益於台灣、有助於緩和兩岸局勢的措施;另外一方面是要注意以整個中華民國的利益代替個別集團的利益。

能做到「三要」是為促進和平演進的目的,接下來則要使中共對中華民國有「三不」的顧慮。

中共對我有「三不」顧慮

第一是在軍事方面,使中共「不敢打」,要讓他們知道在中華民國的國防建設下,打起來的代價非常昂貴。

第二是要應用國際關係讓中共「不能打」,也就是在國際參與之下,使中華民國成為國際社會裡共謀發展不可或缺的成員,利用國際的力量來防止中共動武。

第三是讓中共「不想打」,這並不表示要去求中共政府不想打,而是讓中國大陸的社會大眾不想打。

這「三不」將是兩岸關係和平演進的主要支柱,缺一不可。而其中如何讓中共「不想打」,與中華民國的大陸政策走向最有關連。到目前為止,我們的大陸政策還停留在滿足人道、文化藝術認同等被動層面;至於要如何走向主動積極的層面,我認為邀請大陸傑出人士或留學生來台訪問是方法之一。

為什麼要邀請大陸傑出人士或留學生來訪呢?

益處多多

基本上,首先國人要對大陸局勢有兩個認識:一是大陸精英領導階層是一個有機體,而不只是中共的中央,一般可分成保守體制派、建國務實派、民主改革派,不同的階層有不同的利益意識。二是以地區來分成沿海、內地兩派,利益也不完全相同。

而在鄧小平之後,這些不同的利益集團互相牽制的力量非常大,彼此之間也有相當大的衝突。

因此邀請大陸傑出人士來台訪問,除了可向全世界證明中華民國的民主開放,更向海外華人表示,我們不只是立足台灣,也真正的胸懷全中國;更可以使得大陸精英分子體認到在目前,台灣與大陸分別的存在,對大陸是有利的;長期而言,維持中華民國局勢的穩定,對整個中國的貢獻,要比中共「一國兩制」的方式利益來得大;而且,台灣自由經濟的生活方式,將成為中國大陸現代化不可或缺的一環;最重要的一點是,台灣經驗的介紹並不一定要影響大陸走向台灣這邊,而是要讓中共了解台灣的進步建設。對大陸的有識之士而言,台灣的存在對中共政經措施是個很大的刺激。

「傑出」人士是統戰高手?

也許有人要擔心大陸「傑出」人士會不會都是統戰高手,而對台灣內部安定有所影響呢?其實選擇權是操在我們的手中。在目前報章雜誌一片大陸熱的情形下,對於第一次邀請大陸人士的來訪,的確必須審慎從事。因此我們最優先的考慮對象,是在學術文化界有影響力的人,當然是他在學術研究或對國家建設的貢獻,普遍贏取大陸或國際人士的尊敬。當然他的人格也是受到尊敬的,是一個誠實的人;至於他個人的政治立場倒在其次,只要他一定不是個政客。

總之,邀請大陸傑出人士來台,對國內安全雖不致有太大的影響,但我們還是要謹慎注意這項政策的實施,會不會增加目前盲目的大陸狂飆?會不會影響國內政局的安定?造成省籍隔閡或增加政黨爭執的變數?同時,也不能因此造成局部或個別的利益集團,一廂情願地以傑出人士的素質,作為個人謀利或謀名的工具。

所以,我認為體育、音樂、戲劇等方面的表演人才,要等到目前大陸風潮不再那麼狂熱之後,才能邀請;至於牽涉到商業營利行為的接觸,必須等待法律規範定出來之後,才能進行,在近期內則不必考慮。

高英茂

從過去一年多來,因為快速大幅度開放,所造成的一窩蜂大陸熱現象,讓我對是否邀請大陸傑出人士來台訪問,抱持比較保守的態度。

驟然行之,徒增困擾

由技術層面來看,從單向的大陸探親走向邀請訪問的雙向溝通,是要慎重考慮的。因為,國人到大陸探親、做生意所發生的法律問題,像重婚、遺產繼承、商業契約等仍是千頭萬緒,在沒有完備的解決辦法之前,驟然行之是有一點太操之過急。

舉例來說,假如邀請海峽對岸的朋友來訪問,應如何解釋我們最基本的「國家安全法」,對「共產黨」如何看待?他們是「匪」?還是「朋友」?他們帶來的財產是來自匪區,要不要沒收?這些問題都沒有妥善處理方法之前,就邀人前來,徒然增加困擾。

平常百姓來探病奔喪問題還比較單純,而目前最主要的開放對象是傑出人士,你選他們傑出人士;相對的,大陸也會下一番工夫選擇他們所謂的「傑出」人士,這些人會不會是統戰高手呢?而我們國內最好報紙版面、電視時段,為他們做詳盡的報導,怎麼能夠再要國人保有憂患意識、敵我之分呢?

另外一方面,我以為大陸傑出人士、留學生來台訪問,反而會升高國內的統獨之爭。目前,某些在海外的台灣人士,仍被當局列入不准入境的名單中。而許多海外社團也在施加壓力:「你以前認定的匪諜都能到台訪問,為什麼自己人都不能回去呢?」某些不滿人士甚至傳播「政府是不是要出賣台灣?」之類的說法,這樣對內部團結將有不良的影響。

中共策略簡單卻危險

因此考慮開放的問題,不能不關切到我們對中國大陸應該是如何發展法?

李登輝總統曾指示,大陸開放政策一定要有原則、有條件地開放,不能只是一廂情願,一定要顧及國家的安全與安定。

這也就是說要有周詳的短、中、長程目標,然後依照目標一步一步走。我們也要問,中共對我們的開放政策,是不是有正面反應?是否有促使雙方和平共存的意願?如果答案是肯定的,我們才能繼續走下一步。

我過去常常批評國內老一輩的人態度太過僵硬,把中共統戰策略看得太厲害,而得了所謂的「恐共病」。現在我並不是太老,但是基於到大陸訪問多次的經驗,深深地感受了中共統戰能力和組織的強大。

目前中共對我們的策略很簡單,但是也很危險。一九五○至六○年代,可以很清楚地看出中共是用槍砲威脅我們,那時候先總統蔣公的態度也非常堅決——一定要反共。如今中共採行和平的三通四流策略,但是,對於我們的企圖心,是不是也有改變呢?

是否願意接受香港模式?

依目前的狀況來看,目前中共對我們的策略主要有三點:

一、是加強兩岸經濟、文化的交流,也就是提倡三通四流,如此一來雙方就會有密切的關係。像國內的企業界非常熱衷到大陸作生意賺錢;而中共也不斷地對這些人強調:「你們不要搭不上賺錢的列車!」這樣的宣傳誘惑是很危險的。

二、對中華民國內部採取政治分化策略。資深立委胡秋原到大陸去,與中共當局談判統一,被國民黨開除黨籍。這明顯地是要把國民黨統派的勢力提昇,造成國民黨本身的分裂,而政治勢力一分裂,就沒有力量。

三、中共還是不斷地在國際上孤立中華民國。最近中共才在聯合國傳遞一份文件,要聯合國的會員抵制中華民國目前的彈性外交,不讓我們有活動空間。

中共之所以採取這些策略,主要的目的就是要「台灣香港化」。

進一步說,中共今天並不想以武力把台灣的經濟打垮,而是以長期策略把台灣降成香港的地位,再把所謂的「一國兩制」模式加在我們身上。

因此我們必須自問是否願意接受香港模式?換句話說,也就是願不願意成為北平統治下的一個特區?這是非常原則性的問題。

拿出實際行動證明誠意

那麼,香港又為什麼不得不接受中共一國兩制的安排?理由非常簡單——一是香港的經濟依賴中共非常深;二是香港人民沒有政治力量來抵抗中共的壓力;三是香港根本沒有國際友邦的支持。

在目前國內一窩蜂的大陸熱之下,我們有一天會不會也變成香港的處境?這個問題值得國人深思。此外,我們也要問:「中共是真正與我們和平共存,還是要利用各種策略,把我們降為地方政府?」

從中共不斷地在國際外交行動中處處掣肘、讓我們沒有生存活動空間的事實來看,他們顯然一點也不願以最簡單的實際行動,表明他們願意和平共存的誠意。

大陸開放政策不是浪漫的憧憬,而是嚴肅的課題,一定要為國家安全、社會安寧負責。根據中共統計,國人到大陸探親做生意已超過四十萬人。我對開放大陸傑出人士來台的看法是——等我們有能力處理好這其間衍生的複雜法律問題,同時也給中共一點時間,證明他們有尊重中華民國的生存誠意後,再採行雙向開放,這才是明智之舉。

相關文章

近期文章

EN

Differing Views on Inviting Mainland Personalities Shen Chun-shan vs. Kao Ying-mau

Sophia Lin /photos courtesy of P.J. Chen /tr. by Phil Newell


Two years ago, President Chiang Ching-kuo set the integrated liberalization policy for the ROC Internally was the lifting of martial law and democratization; externally came opening of mainland policy. A person needs two legs to walk; if one policy is opened up, it could create instability in the domestic political situation.

In the process of discussing mainland policy over the last year or two, a consensus has emerged to move forward under conditions of securing Taiwan's tranquility and peaceful forward evolution; the near-term goal of the two sides is stability and concurrence with both sides substantive benefit.

From the good side, this policy looks out for humanitarian concerns of families on both sides, opens cultural vistas, improves the ROC's international image, gives business an additional route, and, most importantly, weakens the reunification-independence dispute.

It does the last because it allows ROC citizens to practically comprehend the mainland, and allows the country's future to be decided by open discussion; in this way there slowly takes shape a consensus. Given Taiwan's objective and subjective conditions, there is no way to accept either reunification under Chinese communist rule or absolute independence. It is necessary to undertake, under the current structure, maximum democratization internally and moderate, cautious exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, to achieve the objective of peaceful evolution.

However, the negative effects of liberalization deserve attention. For example, confusion of friends and enemies. Originally one could use the simple anti-communist principle. Now there is interchange, creating problems for many citizens. Second is confusion of legal norms. The legal structure cannot suddenly, after 40 years, reconcile sentiment and rationality, and may even produce unreasonable outcomes. Under current laws, teachers cannot visit family on the mainland, which seems somewhat callous. Third is a loss of government authority, including loss of public trust and doubt among the business and intellectual communities of the government's leadership abilities.

However, mainland liberalization still must move forward; it cannot go back. But besides respecting the "three no's" on the government level, there should be the "three wants" on the popular level:

"Wanting to understand" means building institutions and personnel with specialized knowledge of the mainland, systematically collecting information, and doing scholarly research. Reporting from the mainland should be opened up, allowing reporters to do their job openly. If there is no source of information, there can be no understanding, and no next step in mainland policy.

"Wanting to get involved" means legal and administrative involvement, and not negotiations. The government must take responsibility and control the situation. An advantageous administrative model can be established from involvement.

"Wanting initiative" means we must actively lead the direction of liberalization. On the one hand we must choose what is of benefit to Taiwan and moderate the situation between the two sides; on the other we must consider the collective benefit of the whole ROC rather than individual benefit.

Bringing off the "three wants" is to encourage the goal of peaceful evolution, and make the mainland concerned over "three no's" vis-a-vis Taiwan. The first is "not daring to use force"; we must let them know that the price of war will be high given ROC defense construction. The second is "not able to use force" through making the ROC an indispensible member for the pursuit of development in the international community, and relying on international strength to block Chinese communist military action. The third is "not willing to use force"; this does not mean that their government will not wish to fight, but that the broad society will not.

These three no's are the pillars of the peaceful evolution of relations between the two sides. Mainland policy is most tied to the "not willing to use force" aspect. Up to now, policy has been passive, on the humanitarian or cultural levels. As for how to take the initiative, I believe inviting outstanding personalities and overseas students from the mainland is one way.

Why? First, ROC citizens must know two basics about the mainland situation: first, the mainland elite is not limited to the communist party center, and can be divided into the conservative faction, the nation-building faction, and the democratic reform faction. Different classes have different interests. Second, the coastal and inland factions have different interests.

After Teng Hsiao-ping, there will be conflict. In inviting personalities and students-- besides letting the world know the ROC is open and democratic and there is but one China--we can make the mainland elite understand that Taiwan's separate existence is beneficial to the mainland. In the long term, maintaining ROC stability is better than "one country, two systems." Taiwan's free economic life is something mainland modernization cannot do without. The purpose is to allow the Chinese communists to understand Taiwan's great progress, and for those knowledgeable persons on the mainland, Taiwan's existence is a great stimulus to the Chinese communists.

Perhaps some fear invitees will be united front practitioners. In fact, the power of choosing lies with us. Under the current situation of mainland fever, for this first time inviting overseas mainland students to Taiwan, we had to take careful measures. The most important consideration is if they have earned the respect of compatriots or the international community in scholarly or cultural fields, and if they are honest. Their political views are secondary, so long as they are not politicians.

In general, invitees pose not too great a threat to Taiwan's security. But we must carefully pay attention to implementation: will this policy increase blind "mainland madness"? Will it affect internal political stability? Create provincial alienation or conflicts between political parties? And we cannot have personal interest groups who wishfully want to use the outstanding mainland personalities as tools for their own benefit.

Therefore, I believe that for sports, music, or performing artists, it is best to wait until the mainland madness has passed. As for business contacts, we must wait until the legal norms are established; it's not necessary to consider these for the near future.

The above are comments made by Minister without Portfolio Shen Chun-shan during a discussion session on the topic of inviting students from the mainland studying in the U.S. to come to Taiwan, sponsored by Sinorama.

The "mainland fever" phenomenon created by the rapid and wide liberalization of the past year makes me maintain a relatively cautious attitude toward whether or not we should invite outstanding personalities from the mainland to Taiwan.

From a technical viewpoint, moving from unilateral family visits to the mainland to the two-way communication of inviting visitors requires cautious consideration. Legal problems created by visits to the mainland, like polygamy, inheritance, and contracts, are complex. Sudden approval of visits prior to resolving these questions is somewhat excessive haste.

For example, if we invite friends from the other side of the straits, how do we explain how the fundamental National Security Law looks on the communist party? Are they "bandits"? Or "friends"? The things they bring are from communist areas--should they be confiscated? To invite people without resolving these questions first adds to difficulties.

The problem of visiting the ill or attending funerals by the common people is relatively simple. Currently the object of liberalization is outstanding personalities. You choose their outstanding personalities, but the mainland meanwhile will devote efforts to choose their own so-called "outstanding" persons; will these be experts in united front tactics? And with local media bound to give detailed coverage, how can the people maintain their consciousness of danger and distinguish between friends and enemies?

From another point of view, I think visits by outstanding personalities and overseas students from the mainland will sharpen the domestic reunification-independence debate. Currently some overseas personalities from Taiwan are not permitted to return; they may ask "Those you considered as bandits and spies can now come to Taiwan. Why can't its own people go home?" Some ask, "Will the government sell out Taiwan?" These ways of speaking have a bad effect on unity.

What path should development of relations take?

President Lee Teng-hui has said liberalization of mainland policy must have principles and conditions, and must consider national security and tranquility. That is to say, there must be short-, medium-, and long-term objectives, with steps matched to them. We must ask: Have the Chinese communists made a positive response to liberalization? Has liberalization promoted willingness to peacefully coexist? If the answer is yes, we may take the next step.

I have often criticized the older generation for being too rigid. But based on several trips to the mainland, I understand their united front abilities and organizational strength.The current communist strategy is simple, but dangerous. In the 50's and 60's they relied on military threat. Today they use peaceful overtures, but has their ambition altered? Their current strategy has three main points:

(1) Strengthening economic and cultural exchanges (the "three links and four exchanges") to tighten relations between the two sides. ROC businessmen flock to the mainland, while the communists emphasize "Get on the money-earning train!" This kind of seduction is dangerous.

(2) Adopting a political strategy of factionalizing the R.O.C internally. Witness the case of Legislator Hu Chiu-yuan's visit and discussions with communist authorities; the issue of his expulsion from the KMT split the party.

(3) Isolating the ROC internationally. Recently they asked UN members to boycott the ROC's flexible diplomacy. They do not allow us any room to exist.

The main purpose of these maneuvers is to "Hongkongize Taiwan." The mainland does not wish to destroy Taiwan's economy with armed force, and uses a long run strategy to force Taiwan's status down to the level of Hong Kong, to impose the "one country, two systems" formula on us.

Can we really accept "special district" status like Hong Kong? The reasons Hong Kong has no choice are simple: their economic reliance on the mainland is deep, the people have no political strength to resist, and it lacks the support of international allies. Given the current mainland fever, will we find ourselves in Hong Kong's position? This question really deserves serious reflection by all citizens.

Further, we must ask, "Do the Chinese communists really want to peacefully coexist, or are they just using every possible strategy to turn us into a local government?" From their attempts to isolate us internationally, they obviously are not using practical measures to show their sincerity to peacefully coexist.

Liberalizing mainland policy is not some romantic longing but a serious topic. There absolutely must be responsibility for national security and social tranquility. According to communist statistics already over 400,000 businessmen have gone there to do business. As for the coming to Taiwan of outstanding personalities, my view is--wait until we have the strength to deal with legal complexities, and also give the Chinese communists a chance to prove their sincere respect for the existence of the ROC, and then we can adopt opening in both directions. This is perhaps the wisest course.

The above are comments by Brown University Professor Kao Ying-mau at a discussion session on the topic of inviting mainland students studying in the U.S. to come to Taiwan, sponsored by Sinorama.

 

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