中日和約60週年的時代意義

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2012 / 9月

文‧滕淑芬 圖‧國史館提供


60年前(1952年)的8月5日,對中華民國來說,具有重大意義──這一天,外交部長葉公超與日本全權代表河田烈當年4月28日在台北賓館簽訂的《中華民國與日本國間和平條約》(簡稱《中日和約》)正式換文生效,是東亞地區從戰爭走向和平的分水嶺,也開啟了中華民國遷台以後立足國際社會的地位。

長期以來,台灣與中華民國的關係,一直困擾著國人,也嚴重消耗國力,這個攸關中華民國定位與前途的大命題,如今透過外交部與國史館在台北賓館舉辦的展示《中日和約》相關的重要史料,回歸歷史現場,得以釐清種種誤解,並尋求最大共識。


「一個抗日最早、作戰最久、對打敗日本貢獻最多的國家,二次大戰後竟被排除在同盟國與日本的談判簽約之外!」在國史館與外交部主辦的「中日和約生效60週年紀念特展暨學術座談會」上,國史館館長呂芳上從最近公布的蔣中正日記中,首次揭露《舊金山和約》簽訂時老蔣總統的內心不平。

1951年,英美等48個同盟國準備在美國舊金山與戰敗的日本簽訂和平條約,以確認日本的戰爭責任與戰後地位。當時中華民國政府已遷來台灣,舉步維艱;而鄰近韓戰仍酣,蘇聯、中共對台灣虎視眈眈。由於英國、蘇聯等國已轉向承認中共政權,因而主張邀請中共與會,美國則因韓戰爆發後為圍堵共產勢力的擴張,堅持中共不能參加。

最後,英美妥協,將中國大陸與中華民國同時排除在舊金山和會之外。

我國未參與舊金山和會

6月15日,在舊金山和會召開的3個月前,蔣中正接獲美國將中國大陸與台灣同時被排除在會議之外的消息,甚至可由日本自主選擇簽約對象的妥協方案時,「至為憤怒」,視為奇恥大辱,在日記中稱此「違反了國際信仰」,隨即發表措辭強硬的《對日和約聲明》,表示「任何含有歧視性之簽約條件,均不接受。」

在堅持國家尊嚴與國際平等的前提下,我方極力爭取對日和約在舊金山多邊和約生效前簽訂,但我方與日方觀點仍多分歧。

1952年4月初,中日談判陷入僵局,我方透過美國介入,美方對日表示,如果美國總統不批准已簽定的《舊金山和約》,日本就無法恢復主權國家的地位。至此,日方才讓步,於4月28日在台北賓館與我國舉行簽約儀式;此時,距《舊金山和約》生效前僅7小時30分。

值此關鍵時刻,蔣中正在日記中寫道:「中日和約本月時陷停頓與決裂之勢,……已橫遭侮辱,實已為人所不堪忍受之苦痛矣。然此約果能訂立完成,亦為我革命歷史奮鬥中大事也。」「和約可得以明日美國三藩市多邊和約生效以前簽訂,這與我政府在國際地位不僅得以挽回若干,而且數年來一落千丈之墜事,或可由此轉折而伸展乎。」可見他一面深深感到與日本簽訂戰後和約的重要性,一面以堅定態度爭取該有的尊嚴。

法理依據:舊金山和約為中日和約的母法

《中日和約》簽署生效,正式結束兩國的戰爭狀態;在法理上,也確認了台灣及其附屬島嶼歸還給中華民國。其中第2條指出,依據《舊金山和約》,日本放棄對台灣、澎湖、南沙群島、西沙群島之一切權利;日本承認民國30年(1941)以前與中國所締結之一切條約,均因戰爭結果而歸無效(第4條);確認中華民國國民應包括一切台灣及澎湖居民(第10條)。

過去幾年,曾有部分人士質疑,該條文中,日本只宣示「放棄」台灣、澎湖之權利,並未言明「歸還」給中華民國,因此主張「台灣前途未定論」,但這樣的論述究竟有沒有法理依據?很值得討論。

歷史上,有關台灣主權移轉與歸屬的事件與國際條約包括:

(1)1895年清廷甲午戰敗,與日本簽訂《馬關條約》,將遼東半島、台灣與澎湖列島「永遠讓與」日本。

(2)1943年中美英三國領袖發表《開羅宣言》,要求日本竊自中國之領土,包括東北、台灣及澎湖列島,必須歸還中華民國。

(3)1945年中美英三國發表《波茨坦公告》,其中第8條規定,《開羅宣言》的條件必須實施。同年8月14日,日本天皇接受《波茨坦公告》;9月2日,日本在東京灣美國密蘇里軍艦上簽署《降伏文書》,接受《波茨坦公告》。

(4)1951年9月日本與同盟國簽訂《舊金山和約》,1952年4月與中華民國簽訂《中日和約》。

馬總統在出席特展開幕致詞時指出,這些都是戰時國家領導人具體承諾的國際文件,其中《開羅宣言》、《波茨坦公告》、《降伏文書》等文件,已編入美國國務院出版的《1776~1949美國條約與其他國際協定彙編》;日本《降伏文書》也編入《美國法規大全》與《聯合國條約集》。

政治大學外交系與法律系合聘教授陳純一在座談會中指出,《中日和約》締結後,日本國內有幾項判決作出的解釋,也認定台灣已歸屬中華民國。例如1959年東京高等裁判廳對賴進榮一案判決中說:「至少可以認定昭和27年(1952)8月5日中日條約生效以後,依該條約之規定,台灣及澎湖諸島歸屬於中國,台灣人依中華民國之法令擁有中國國籍者,當然喪失日本國籍,應以中華民國之國民待之。」

重新理解國家定位的新意義

這紛擾國人半世紀的認同問題,經過重新理解後,也將被寫入9月出版的國內高中歷史教科書。

出席座談會的學者之一、曾任國史館館長的中研院近代史研究所研究員林滿紅表示,以往我們的歷史教科書談及台灣主權歸屬時,有兩大階段。首先,民國46~95年(1957~2006)間,是以《開羅宣言》確立台灣主權歸屬中華民國,但由《中日和約》第二條可以了解,取代《馬關條約》的是《中日和約》而不是《開羅宣言》。

其次,民國95年之後(2006~2011)則以中華民國並未參與簽署《舊金山和約》,認定日本「放棄」台灣,但沒有對象,因此提出台灣前途應由人民自決的論述。

林滿紅指出,《舊金山和約》第2條,要求日本放棄韓國(條約中稱「高麗」)、台澎、千島列島、南極地區、南沙群島之一切權利、權利名義與要求;第4條則規定,日本與放棄各地間之行政當局商訂特別處理辦法。

該條文中,日本也承認美國政府有關日本於第2條放棄領土之安排;中國戰區最高統帥是根據盟軍麥帥命令第一號接受日本在台最後一任總督的投降。

「更需要仔細閱讀的是第26條,日本準備與對其作戰,但非該和約簽字國,又服膺聯合國精神的國家訂立一與該和約法律效力相同的雙邊條約,這一條其實就是為日本與中華民國另簽雙邊條約作準備,《中日和約》正是將《開羅宣言》法理化的條約,」林滿紅說。

有人主張,1972年日本與中共建交後,外相大平正芳在新聞記者會上片面聲明終止《中日和約》,但林滿紅指出,這就像《開羅宣言》這樣的新聞公報不能片面終止《馬關條約》賦予日本的台灣主權一樣;台灣主權在《中日和約》簽訂之後,只有中華民國才有權處理。也因此,1978年日本與中共簽訂的《中日和平友好條約》無權另外處理台灣的主權移轉。

「國際條約各條款中有執行的條款,也有已經處理的條款,可以終止的是執行中的條款,但對於已經執行的條款是不能終止的。」林滿紅說,《中日和約》生效後,只有中華民國有權對其主權做進一步的處理,台灣未定論的言論是沒有法理基礎的。

林滿紅進一步比喻,就像有人已經簽了約把房子賣了,對房子的所有權只有買方有權說話,賣方太太或其他人說未定的話,是完全沒有法律依據的。

尊重歷史向前看

如今透過嚴謹的法理論述,重看《中日和約》的時代意義,目的在於認識台灣與中華民國血肉相連的關係,也賦予中華民國更開闊的國際空間。

外交部長楊進添致詞時表示,《中日和約》奠定了雙方60年來友好的基礎。雖然目前中華民國與日本沒有邦交,但自馬總統上任後,即將我國與日本的關係定位為特殊夥伴關係,例如簽署雙邊投資協議,開放松山、羽田機場直航以強化經貿互利等。

楊進添指出,日本最近一項民調顯示,高達91%的日本人,認為與我國的關係良好,67%的人對台灣有親近感,84%認為台灣值得信賴;而台灣亦然,一般民眾最想去旅遊的地點就是日本,顯示兩國人民的深厚情誼。

馬英九總統說,4年來,政府在札幌設處,簽訂60年來第一次的中日投資協議,積極促進經濟發展;日本政府也修改法律,讓旅日僑胞受到尊重,國會則通過《海外美術品等公開促進法》,排除故宮文物日後到日本展覽可能遭遇到的障礙。

他進一步強調,去年日本東北大地震、發生核電廠輻射外洩事故後,台灣民眾熱情捐輸,共捐助了66億台幣(約合200億日圓),其他93個捐助國家的總數都沒有我們多,雙方為此特別發表「厚重情誼倡議」,未來兩國往來將更趨緊密。

台灣主權移轉的歷史,因不同族群對於中日戰爭、日本統治的記憶有別而顯得「各說各話」,甚至混亂模糊,如今藉由重新對話,客觀看待史實,希望下一代可以不再為國家認同問題所困擾。

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New Perspectives:The 60th Anniversary of the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty

Teng Sue-feng /photos courtesy of courtesy of the Academia Historica /tr. by Jonathan Barnard

August 5, 1952 was an important day for the ROC: On that date the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan (a.k.a. the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty or the Treaty of Tai­pei), which had been previously signed at the Tai­pei Guest House by ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs Yeh Kung-chao and Japanese representative ­Isao Ka­wada, took effect with the exchange of instruments of ratification between the two governments. It was a watershed moment in East Asia’s transition from conflict to peace, and it established a place for the ROC in the international community following the ROC government’s relocation to Taiwan.

For a long time controversial questions about sovereignty over Taiwan have confounded the nation’s people, and consumed much national energy. The issue has huge importance for questions on the status and future of the ROC. To mark the 60th anniversary of the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty, the Academia Historica and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs co-sponsored an exhibition and symposium at the Taipei Guest House. This article presents some of the views expressed by the scholars and officials in attendance.


“For a country that was the earliest to be at war with Japan, had fought the longest, and had contributed most to the defeat of Japan, to now be excluded from the peace talks between the Allies and Japan was simply too much to bear!” It was with these words, based on his reading of the recently released diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, that Academia Historica director Lu Fang-shang described the sense of injustice that Chiang experienced in the time leading up to the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco.

In 1951, 48 allied nations including Britain and the US were preparing to sign a peace treaty in San Francisco with the defeated Japan in order to establish Japan’s responsibility for the war and its status in the post-war world. The ROC government had decamped to Taiwan, and was facing many difficulties. In the region, the Korean War was raging, and the Soviet Union and Communist China looked covetously upon Taiwan. Britain, the USSR and many other nations that had already switched diplomatic recognition to Bei­jing were calling for the Chinese Communists to come to the signing. But the US, which was trying to contain the expansion of communist power following the outbreak of the Korean War, insisted that they should not attend.

Eventually, Britain and the US reached a compromise: Neither mainland China nor the ROC on Taiwan would participate in the peace talks.

No “Chinese” representatives at SF peace talks

On June 15, 1951, three months before the peace talks opened in San Francisco, Chiang Kai-shek received news that both the mainland and Taiwan were to be shut out of the talks—and Japan would be allowed to choose the government with which it would sign a peace treaty. Enraged, Chiang viewed the decision as an extraordinary humiliation, describing it in his journal as a “violation of international good faith.” Immediately, he issued a strongly worded statement that stressed that any treaty containing discriminatory articles would not be accepted.

Insisting upon the preconditions of national dignity and international equality, the ROC actively strove to sign a treaty with Japan before the multilateral treaty that had been signed in San Francisco would enter into force. However, there were many points of difference between the ROC and Japan.

In early April of 1952, the talks with Japan hit an impasse, and the ROC asked the US to intervene. The Americans informed Japan that if the US president did not ratify the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan would be unable to return to the ranks of sovereign nations. At this, Japan finally relented and sent emissaries to a signing ceremony with the ROC at the Tai­pei Guest House, which occurred just seven hours and 30 minutes before the Treaty of San Francisco entered into force.

At this critical juncture, Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary: “By signing before the San Francisco multilateral treaty takes effect tomorrow, the ROC government will regain some of the standing that it has lost in the international community. After falling for so many years, our nation may have reached a turning point and will start to move in a positive direction.”

Subsidiary to the San Francisco Treaty

When the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty was signed and took effect, it formally ended the state of war between the two nations. From a legal standpoint, it also confirmed that Taiwan and its appurtenant islands were being returned to the Republic of China.

Article 2 read: “It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace which Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on 8 September 1951..., Japan has renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.” Article 10 stated: “For the purposes of the present Treaty, nationals of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores).”

Over the past few years, some people have called into question the meaning of Japan’s “renouncing” its claim to Taiwan and Penghu without stating that these were being “returned” to the Republic of China. As a consequence, they have argued that the future of Taiwan was left unsettled. But is there any legal grounding for this argument? It’s worth discussing.

In history, events that relate to sovereignty or transfer of sovereignty over Taiwan include the following:

(1) In 1895, after the Qing Empire lost the First Sino-Japanese War, its representatives signed the Treaty of Shi­mo­no­seki with Japan, which ceded the Liao­dong Peninsula, Taiwan and ­Penghu to Japan “in perpetuity.”

(2) In 1943 the leaders of the ROC, the US and the UK issued the Cairo Declaration, which demanded that “all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.”

(3) In 1945 the ROC, US and UK issued the Potsdam Declaration. Article 8 states that the terms of the Cairo Declaration must be carried out. On August 14, 1945, the Japanese emperor accepted the Potsdam Declaration. On September 2, aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, Japanese representatives signed the Instrument of Surrender, including acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration.

(4) In September 1951 Japan signed the Treaty of San Francisco, and in April 1952 it signed the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty.

National Cheng­chi University law professor Chen Chun-i pointed out at the symposium that after the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty was concluded, various domestic Japanese legal rulings held that Taiwan was part of the ROC. For instance, in Japan vs. Lai Chin Jung in 1959, the Tokyo High Court ruled: “At the very least it can be determined that from August 5, 1952, after the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty took effect, and as a condition of the treaty, Taiwan and ­Penghu were returned to the ROC, and the people of Taiwan took on Chinese citizenship under the laws of the ROC. They naturally lost their Japanese citizenship on becoming ROC citizens.”

New understanding of national status

The issues of identity have caused much turmoil among the nation’s people for half a century. New understanding about these issues was included in the nation’s senior-high-school history books in September.

Lin Man-houng, former Academia Historica director and now a research fellow at Academia Sinica’s Institute of Modern History, explained that there were two distinct periods in how textbooks in Taiwan discussed the return of sovereignty over Taiwan: From 1957 to 2006 they described the Cairo Declaration as having established that sovereignty over Taiwan belonged to the ROC. However, Lin pointed out, in fact it was the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty, not the Cairo Declaration, that superseded the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Then the history textbooks in use from 2006 to 2011 made the case that as the ROC was not a signatory to the Treaty of San Francisco, although Japan had indeed renounced its sovereignty over Taiwan, no other nation had been designated to assume that sovereignty. On this basis it was argued that the island’s future should be left to its people to decide.

Lin Man-houng pointed out that Article 2 of the Treaty of San Francisco required Japan to “renounce all right, title and claim” to Korea, Taiwan, the Pescadores (Penghu), the Kurile Islands, Antarctica, and the Spratly Islands. Article 4, on the other hand, required Japan to make “special arrangements” with the “authorities presently administering” the areas mentioned in Article 2.

“Article 26 requires detailed reading,” said Lin. “In it Japan declares its preparedness to sign a bilateral peace treaty with any nation that it had fought against that was not a signatory to the Treaty of San Francisco and that adhered to the spirit of the United Nations, on substantially the same terms as in the Treaty of San Francisco. That article laid the groundwork for a separate bilateral treaty to be concluded between Japan and the ROC. That treaty—the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty—gave legal embodiment to the Cairo Declaration.”

There are people who argue that when Japan established diplomatic relations with the PRC, Japanese prime minister Ma­sa­yo­shi ­Ohira repudiated the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty in a press conference. But Lin pointed out that just as the Cairo Declaration could not override the Treaty of Shi­mo­no­seki, once the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty was signed, only the ROC had the authority to deal with the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Consequently, the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the PRC could not bring about any further transfer of sovereignty over Taiwan.

“International treaty provisions include those currently being implemented, and those whose implementation is already complete. Those that are in progress can be terminated, but those already completed cannot.” Thus after the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty took effect, only the ROC had the right to make any further disposition regarding sovereignty over Taiwan. Assertions that Taiwan’s status was left undetermined had no basis in law, said Lin.

Toward the future

Today, the purpose of taking another look at the meaning of the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty with strict attention to legal principles is to understand the inextricable ties that bind Taiwan to the Republic of China and to provide the ROC with a wider international space in which to maneuver.

Addressing the symposium, Minister of Foreign Affairs Timothy Chin-tien Yang stated that the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty had laid the foundations for 60 years of friendly relations between the two nations. A recent public opinion survey in Japan had revealed that as many as 91% of Japanese believed that Japanese relations with Taiwan were good, 67% felt close to Taiwan, and 84% believed Taiwan was trustworthy. And in Taiwan the destination to which the greatest numbers of people would like to travel was Japan. These attitudes reflected the deep sense of friendship between the two nations’ peoples.

President Ma Ying-jeou, in his address, noted that in the last four years the ROC government established a representative office in Sap­poro and signed the first ROC-Japan investment agreement in 60 years, to spur economic development. Japan’s National Diet also passed a bill governing the display of foreign art works, allaying concerns about what could happen to works exhibited there from the National Palace Museum collection. And after last year’s devastating earthquake and tsunami in northeastern Japan, the Taiwanese public contributed unstintingly to relief funds, donating a total of NT$6.6 billion (about ¥20 billion)—more than the other 93 contributing nations combined. Consequently, the two sides specially issued a “Declaration of Deep Friendship.” Ties between the two nations would only grow stronger in the future.

The vastly different opinions on the history of shifting sovereignty over Taiwan have been in part related to the different memories that ethnic groups in Taiwan have about Japanese rule and the Sino-Japanese War. Let us hope that with dialogue and an objective view of history, the next generation will have a clearer understanding about these issues of national identity.

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